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CHAPTER I 
I NTRODUCTION 
The problem investigated in this thesis is the hi s-
tory of the Stilwell Roa d, from its beginning in 1920, as 
t he old Burma Roa d, to its completion , re-naming , use in 
1945 , un d death in 1946 . 
The study of this problem justifies itself for var-
ious re asons , namely: (1) The Stilwell Road was severel y 
needed by China as the only thoroughfa re to the outside 
world . Chinese needs we re of morale , equipment and arms- -
both l a r ge and small , and the trainin g and advisory l ea der-
ship of existing man-power . 
China having s tood alone agains t the Japanese since 
193'7 . needed the psychological boost that was given by the 
Road--the thought that sorreone strong still s tood at her 
s id e to see her through . 
Without the Road , it would have been imposs ible to 
transport to China the l arge amounts of arms , equipme nt and 
s upplies that found their way into the country . How wel l 
these supplies were used is a question f or dispute , but it 
i s known tha t Vlith American supervision in distribution , 
t he Chinese did receive some of the tool s to put up a 
grea ter s truggle to free themselves fro m the Japanese . 
2 
Along with equipment and arms the training in 
how to use them. The Chinese soldier, being ignorant of 
the modern mechanical equipment and ideas of the west, 
needed training and gaidance from the lowest levels, In 
China, a general maintained strength and prestige by being 
able to keep together a large numerical army, To the gen-
eral, combat meant casualties and loss of manpower and 
therefore a decrease in his own personal strength, To try 
to offset this long-practiced policy, as well as to give 
intelligent gu.idanoe, the constant prodding of .1.merica.n 
officers was necessary, 
(2) !llhe Stilwell Road was important to ,\.merica in 
sustaining China, and thereby holding down over 1,000,000 
Japanese troops, Some of Japan's greatest combat divisions 
foue;ht and died against General Stilwell's American-trained 
Chinese troops. ~l'he fact that the Chinese did fight great-
ly eased the path of the Americans who advanced in the 
.Pacific area. 
(3) In supporting China through the 3tilwell Road, 
an honest effort was made to maintain a non-Communist 
government in the country, However. as later events have 
proved, this government did not have the internal strength 
to maintain itself in its own domain, 
( 4) The Stilwell Hoad was largely an ,unerioa.n ven-
ture, It was an act of good faith from a heartfelt 
1 
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,~merle(\; an attempt to help the free remain free. It was 
an act :erom a rtrong nation that would someday need an 
equally fni thful alJy. 
This theaHl ie Olllil)JO<led oi' twelve chapters, which 
3 
are organjzed, as closely ~;s rossible, in chronoloe:ioal 
order as the Hond. passed throurh periods of need, con-
struction, destruction, plannine:, lHJ.ttle, more construc-
tion, final use, and eventual death, Interspaced, are over 
thirty enlargemen ta concerning the Stilwell aoad and three 
maps. 
In investit,tttinr, this problem, the author :found 
that no complete previous studies had been made on the sub-
ject. ~'aot<tal informati.on wnil broV.{I'ht out in many news~ 
paper articles, m.<J.gs.zine articles, government papers, and 
several books, but the information was usually 1:ound on 
just one :phase of this spacious :problem, The roap;azine 
articles covered very •~ell the hardsl1:l.jlS in Uoad construc-
tion, laneuap;es and Jleoples along the Road, and some facts 
and fir;ures. The government reports were very helpful on 
facts and figures, Uoad personalities, and battle areas, 
The books were helpful on the political, militar.J', and 
oonstruotion phases of the i\oad, 
Durine; World War II, the au thor had a chance to 
volunteer to drive a. vehicle ove1· the l\oud. This chance 
was accepted and full advantage was taken thereof, About 
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4 
forty photographs were taken, when the opportunity pre-
sented itself, Some of these did not turn out too clear us 
the camera lens was too slow to take care of very much 
movement. ,,11 pictures were taken, developed, enlarged, 
tinted and toned by the author, The three maps were 
compiled from the following sources: The Stilwell Papers, 
.fopular M:echunica, Taj Mahal Atlas, and a map :put out by 
the Indian Government covering India, Burma, and China, 
!Sach of the three r~p~ was made up from material 
from these sources and then a negative was made of each. 
The maps in the thesis are enlargements from those nega-
ti vas • 
Chapter ten was w.ri tten largely from memory on 
the author's trip over the iload, 
,n attempt was made to bring the thesis entirely 
up-to-date by including the Stilwell Road tonnage figures 
from the opening o:f the Hoad in 1~45 to its dis-use in 
1946, The author was so inf'orrre d by the War DerJartrnen t 
that this information is still classed as secret. 
CHA.l?Tll'H II 
!!.'HE lmE'D FOH TU!i' ROAD 
'£he basis of ,unerica' s traditional policy toward 
China is the Open Door. '£he policy p;oe s buck some one 
hundreil and fifty years and was well conceived because it 
accorded with the fundamental attitudes of the American 
people. "The application of' the Open Door policy led to 
a conscious effort by the United States to help China be-
come a free, strong 1.111d uni ter.1 nation."l 
Many efforts have been made since 1844, through 
treaty, by American statesmen, to maintain China's freedom 
and at the same time, gain equal trading rights for the 
United i3tutes, "In the Treaty of Wanghia, conclUlled by 
Calc b Gushing in 1844, eqUAl trading righ ta for the Vnited 
states was eeoured." 2 After China had been defeated by 
Japan in the war of 1894-5 several countrie a had g;:•ined 
footholds along the coast and in the interior of China, 
In order to safeeuara our trading rights, Secretary Hay, 
therefore, on September 6, 1899, sent notetl to Great 
Britain, Germany, and l\ussia., and subsequently to Japan, 
1 Walter H, Mallory, "The Open Door in China: A 
Heuppraisal," ll'ol'eif}n Affairs, 26:158, Ootober, 1947. 
2 Ibid,, p, 156, 
6 
Italy and France, 3 
It seemed unlikely that Secretary Hay's bold move 
would be successful but the fact that the provisions of the 
agreement applied to all nations gave each an interest in 
checking the growth of monopoly privileges. Consent from 
the other :Powers finally came. and the arrangement was a 
strong factor in checking further encroachments on the ter-
ritory of China by other states. 
As early as 1863, the American Commissioner 
Humphrey Marshall, had Baid: "The highest interests of the 
United i:lta. tea are involved in sustaining China ••• rather 
than to see China become the theatre of wide-spread anarchy 
and ultimately the prey of European ambition."4 !twas 
not until the Washington Conference in 1922 that inter-
national acceptance of this elaboration of the Open Door 
doctrine was set-'Ured. Article I of the Nine-Power ~·reaty 
which was signed by Belgium, China, ll'rB.rloe, Great Britain, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, rortugal and the United 
States, provided: 
The Contracting rowers, other than China, agree: 
1, To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and 
administrative integrity of China; 2, To provide the 
fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to 
3 See appendix, 
4 Mallory, .2l?.• cit,, p, 159. 
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develop and maintain for herself an effective and 
stable government: 3. To use their influence for the 
purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining 
the principle of equal opportu.ni ty for the commerce 
and industry of all nations throughout the terri tory 
of China: 4, To refrain from taking advantage of oon-
di tiona in China in order to seek ape cial rights or 
privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects 
or citizens of friendly dtates, and from countenanc-
ing action inimical to the security of such statea.5 
"Other clauses in the Agreement pledged the s ie,na-
tory Powers to respect the principle of equ(u opportunity 
of trade ."6 
In 1931, Japan broke the Nine-Power Treaty by at-
tacking China. 
China and the United States have both wanted. peace, 
neither has had aggressive desiens against the other, and 
both have wanted trade. 
A survey of the monthly trade returns shows a 
steady decline through most of 1~38, followed by an in-
crease in 1939 and in the first six months of 194o. The 
following table. according to Johnstone, 7 indicates the 
trend since 1936. 
5 Mallory, lli• ,gj,,i. 
6 Loo. oi t, 
- -·-
7 l'lilliam c. Johnstone, 
.s!,Q,)Jarl' s New Order. (New York: 
1 941) • p. 169 • 
The United States and 
mtr.'orQ"tTril'vers ffl l!re as. 
7 
!~z~ 
1937 
l!l3B 
1959 
1940 
u.s, E~ports to China 
:H<>, a19, ooo 
49. 69'1' 000 
3•1, 719.000 
55,809,000 
(6 months) 47,349,000 
u.s. Imports from China $74,340,006 
103,616,000 
47,189,000 
61,700,000 
43,822,000 
~he grc~clual ino1·ease :l.r tr<J,C!.e, he~tonj.ng in 1938, 
can be a.ccounte d :cor by a sh:l.:ft:l.nt to porte not tmder 
Japanese oocu:oation o:r· not oocnpieo. until the end of 1938, 
a shifting to war cotomoditiee, which WO\I.ld. merul a higher 
value in terms of J\.mericlm dollars, and the :!.ncreased use 
of the Indo-China-Yunnan railway and the :Burma, Road as ar-
teries of' supply to the interior of China,s 
~in, ant:i.mony, tungsten, and tung oil are strategic 
raw materials, cmd are necessary to American industrial 
:production. 
Just as America \~as begi.nning to feel the seriou.a-
nesa o:t' insufficiently ~Jtocked strategic stockpilea, and 
China still ha.d a.ccliss to the southeast China ports, Japan 
struck to close off the main remaining sources of supply. 
"The fall of Canton last October 1938 deprived Chi!Ja o:f 
her last iutpol·tant port o:f entry for war rua.teriala f.x·om 
a.broad," 9 On the coast China would thenoefol·th have to 
depend upon a thin tx·ickle of supplies which mir;ht elude 
8 See a.ppen dix. 
9 Walter 1!, Mallory, "Burma. Road," Foreign Affairs 
17:625, April 1939. 
9 
the Japanese naval :forces and be landed at small porta 
such as Foochow, Wenohow or Swatow, 
On June 20th 1940, by agreement between the French 
Indo-China Government and Tokyo, tm transportation 
of goods over the Indo-China-Yunnan railway was sev-
erely restricted ,10 
The French l"Je:t·mitted the Japanese to send inspec-
tors to Hanoi to see that no military supplies reached 
Chiang Kai•shek. France, at that particular moment, was 
in no poai tion to resist encroachments from anyone. By 
October 1940 however, as states Johnstone,ll the Japan-
ese were in practical control of the port of Haiphong, of 
China.. The Japanese also acquired the use of air fields 
from which they could bomb Kunming, capital of Yunnan and 
the Chinese section of the Burma Road, 
Two foreign avenues for supplies remained to China, 
First, the road to Russia via Lanchow in Kansu province 
and Urumohi :1.n S:inkiang. According to Mallory112 
over this route goods must be carried the entire 
distance of more than 2,000 miles by truok. It leads 
through desolate country, and obviously even with a 
good road much of the carrying capacity of the 
lorries must be devoted to fuel supplies. 
10 Johnstone , .212.• ill.•. p, 181. 
11 Mallory. loc. cit. 
12 J,oc, .'lih 
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Hussia, hemmed in by two historical enemies, was 
in no pod tion ei thor to supply China by this route, or to 
aggravate Japan in so doing, 
Lastly, there remained the Burma Road, Chi.na's lac~t 
source of supply and hope in her struge:le ar;ainst Japan, 
The Burma roall made it possible to ship to China 
the machinery needed to build up her industries and there-
by enlar(te the country'<~ war output. It helped Chj.nt.i in-
terw:illy to become a modern military power by improving 
her economic positJon, Perharls of more importance than 
these n~'lterJal gains war-; the political significance of the 
rowl. "It demonstrates to the Chinese people that we do 
not consi.der them as second clttSB allies ,nl3 
To millions of Ch:l.nese, the Burma Hoad stdnds as a 
symbol of their will to survive us a nation, Not 
only is it one of the country'r.; l<'Bt lifelines but a 
monument to the )latient, toiling coolies who bu.nt it, 
a miracle of mass labor lJke the Great \'iall or the 
I'yramidn of F.gy:pt,l4 
.as King-Chau Muil5 staten, "as an eneineering fetJ.t 
amonr; the Chine Ge the building of the Burrrn Road is se;;ond 
J.:? "Hi.,.hway to Victor•r " S<JholastJc 46·4 Pebru-t.J • '!) t • .. • 
ury ~'6, 1945. 
14 "The l'oup:h Chinese. i'leor>6nine of the Burma 
Hoad Hetr;htens Will to Hane On," Newsweek, 16:27, October 
28, 1940, 
15 King-Chau Mui, "Burma Hou.a and Its SirnifJ-
oance to the 'iiodd," Vital Speeches, 7:151, De<Jember 15, 
1940, 
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only to the con ntru.o ti on of the Great liall," 
Shepstone16 has this to say: 
The Burma Road is a }JSyoholop;ioal link with the 
outside world, a tenuous line over which unseen 
strenp:th and courap.:e and determination :!'low clay dnd 
nifht, bridging cave-ins and landslides, mountain and 
p;orge, :plague r,md pestilence. It iE. this hiph1::ay of 
intanp;ibles that really matters, 
11 
When, in l~l45, the completed Stilwell Hoad was 
thrown oren to beleaguered China, Chiang Kai-shek's armies 
were once ar:ain riven full uocess to the outside allied 
world, The benefits of the route were very a1JJ.y srunmed up 
by ilow ard Isaacs ,1 7 
The benefits of orer,inr; the road Bhould not be ex-
aggeratetl by ballyhoo. Hot only is the road's ultim-
ate capucity snmll, but for a tlme truffic will con-
sist lar[':ely of tr·Ltoks being clelivered for use in 
China and supplyi,,g only <mch tonnare as they can 
bring in on tha. t one -way trip. 
The immediate advantage cuu 1Je summarized thus: 
(1) Aircraft will be pal'."tly relieved of the task of 
carryine gasoline on d trucks over the Hump to China. 
so more air space will be avnilable for a heavy ton-
nar:e of other vi tal war materials, ( 2) China wi 11 re-
ceive a l1rre numter of sorely needed vehiclec for in-
ternal troosport, (3} A pipeline whicl1 is keeping puce 
\Vi th the road build:i.np: will eventually brinr: in e;as 
for the E'ourteen th Air Force and for ro o.cl transport, 
(4) Bulldozers, rraderB, and. other heav::! equipment 
tll!>t could not be sent by air v:ill now reach Chir:a. 
A. t the end of the wa.r, the rc were r;;o re than 
16 Harolcl J. Shepstone, "Sym1)ol ;'XJd Hir·hwa.y," 
!£:::!. !£fl!; Till)3B Mavuziroc, p. 5, OotolJer 20, 1940, 
17 HOWil.rd lklaacs, n;,'irst Truck to Kunndnr," 
Newsweek, <C:t):34, Janu~1ry 2\J, l\J41i, 
12 
1,000,000 Japanese troops in China. Regardless of motives 
and refusals to put ur much of a fie:ht, the Chinese made a 
great contribution to victory simply by not surrendering, 
To thiB end, the Stilwell Hoad playe<l itB hiBtorical rmrt •. 
CJIAJ)T1\R II I 
Before China opene<l her E:euports on the China Sea 
to the \/estern Po·::eno;, the e:reater lJart of her eommerciul 
and diplomatic intercourse was carried over thj_s route, 
iunbaesa!lors u::ed this roatl. to Southea:Jtern ,_,nd :3onthern 
parts of ,isia, The great armies of Kublai Khan moved 
across its tortuous stretches, "As Burroone l)rincillalities 
offered tribute to the Chinese r~mperors by means of this 
route, it became also iclentified as the Old Tribute or 
Am bas 8ad ors Hoad, ul "It follows the old trail wh i <.:h Marco 
Polo traveled when he vist ted the Middle Kin[c;dom more than 
600 years ar.;o," 2 
The .Burma noad is the neweBt and, r;ithout ,>J. doubt, 
the gre~.,tellt highwt~y developed by the Chiuese in the past 
4,000 years, 
Starting from Kunminr t11e Burma Hip:hi'ID.Y passes 
thrOUp;h 8i[r,lltner: hsiPDS (districts) t llD.liBly, cllllling, 
I,otze, Lufen g, Kwang-Tunr;, Tsuyunp:, Chen nan, Yaoan, 
:>iLmgyun, Mi tu, l!'etlgyi, ToJ.i, Yunrrpi, Yunvlung, 
Yungping, hwslmn, J.urwlinr· anil J,usth reachinp: the 
1 C, ~r. J!'eng, "China u.nd Her Ncv; Ead: Door," Vi tal 
S1)eeches, 6:43, HoVrJmber 1, 1939, 
2 i'lal te [ li, Mallory, "1Jur ma ll.oad," Fore ien AffaJ.rs, 
17:625, April 1939 
border at W~nting rli th a totRl distance of 959,40 
kilometres, 
The rood construction was started in 1920 by the 
Yunnan Provincial Government, 
14 
The Kunminr,-il.nning section, a length of 33 kilo-
meters, 'Ni th I•ro]Je r gravel sur:fac ing, bridges H!l d ctt1-
vertn, ru.1c completecl in 1929. The road 'bed of the 
ci.nning-::3iakwa.n 8ection, 3'78.60 kilometers in length, 
was eompleted before 1935,4 
The above section was without proper Burfacinr, and 
most of the b:i:idges I:J.£td culverts were of temporary nature 
all d were not able to carry a loud of four tom>. The above 
mentioned defects v1ere taken care of top:ether with the 
Siakwa.n-','l!mting section construction in l'lecember, 1937, 
The journey :from Kunminr; to ::;iakl'lan >1as shortened from 
thirteen dayE; by pack horse to three by bus, 
"Siakwan-I'IM ting section, a to tal len r:th of 54'7 ,80 
kilometers, rnv' sturted in December, 19:57."5 Thi:s route 
was over territory once described by Marco l?olo as: "w:l.ld. 
m1d hard of acces<:, :full of p:reat woods and mountains 
which it is impossible to pnss."6 Viith the LJ.l>e of coolie 
3 Heconstruction of the Burma Road, lublic i\elat-
ions OfYicer, Y-Force Operations ::lfaff,UnHcc1 States Army 
Jl. 12 .. 
5 )~o<.:. oi t. 
6 "The Burrra Hoc~ d., Japan \'/ins ~m .1.11pe a.semen t, 11 
Newsweek, 16:31, July 29, 1940, 
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15 
lal>or and primitive methocls, the twi:oting 345-mile stretoh 
was finished in eleven months--an enr;ineering miracle, 
The first part of the section of road beyond 
<Jiak\·:.m was the toughest problem, Only a mile below the 
city there was a. very nan.ow ror['e cut throup:h the hurd 
rock, which, r:uarded by two fort<:, has been a natural pr.o-
teution for the rich valley of 1'ali for many centuries. 
A lare;e part of this r:orge had to be blaEted out to make a 
r.i r,llt of way, 
As Tan l'ei-ying7 ctates: 
The principal obstacle in the 8han States was a 
mountain oalled San ~:ai Shar,, or ~'hree Step Mounta.:tn, 
which caused us co much trouble that t!1e General-
i>~<>imo ChiMe Kai-shek wanted u<' to c.:oncider tunnel-
ine underneath it, 'L'hat proved to be impractical and 
it took tl labor forue o:f three thotu aod ,.1orking for 
five months to cut the Hoad over tl1e mountain j_n many 
hairpin turns. 
Two hundred Chine<>e enf·ineers and nearly 200,000 
coolies four;ht mountains and rivers, landsli.deE ancl mom1oon 
storn~l to complc te this section. "~'his meant an ave:rap:e of 
more than 650 men per mile o ·? road, 01· le :on than three 
yard~l per man. "8 
The workerfl, men, woncn :tnd ehilrlren, acting by 
7 Tan fei-ying, "How 'l'hey \lorkcil On the Jlurma 
Road," Asia, 45:445, September 1945. 
8 "Burnu--iihcre the .i.load. lleMrw," ;·)cholao i'tc, 
40:12, J<'ebnwry 16, l9t±2., 
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families or clann, gathered heavy rocks toeeti1er in long 
piles beside the road, drawine the heavier boulders on 
crude sledr;os pulled by oxen. Each pile vms marked with 
the name- c;lm.rlloter o:f the faJ'llily who bunt it, some from 
China's hundred names, f:ome from names u.dopted by the 
tribespeople. The next "tep was to crack the rocks, ,,,·hich 
wae done by patient old r;randporents or by cretinous 
people from the mountain rlistricts, •::1 th ilure p:oi ters, \'lho 
seemed to l'lUk the intellip:ence for <tnythinr; more active, 
'l'he larger stone 2lab~; were laid evenly over the roacl, and 
the spaces between were filled with cracked rock, vihioh wau 
also spread over the top. Theil thi ;J suri:\tce wa<: pressed 
dmm 'by draw in[' over j t crude rolle rR of rour;h-dressed 
::tone and nas then covered with coarse gravel .mc1 smoothed 
over, Unfortunately for the worker,, the route was (;Onsioe 
ered too important to discontinue the hases, so constant 
interruptionn rentl.lted, ~,md s:Jme of i no JlrOcHsse;, lMd to 
be repeated over and over aruin after th(J l'lheeln had sent-
tered c~~refully 1 .. 1.:i.d otones. 
1'he brl.dgeH over the ilah:een and Mekonr· riverE 
we1·e o:f similar corwtruction, l'j.J.e::; ~,:ou.ld r'ot he d1:tven 
becaUlJe there wns no equiyn!lent to drive them ~:i th, so the 
bridgeG had to be ,;m;pender1, ~'he cahl.Js •:;ere made of 
steel •.·;i th nteel oable trusses. The road·,:m.v was composed 
o:f boc'.rc1 planking, The Uprler Mekonr·· l\iver b"·j.dp·e, sorne 
18 
300 feet in length, was d.estroyeil b;)" a Jap bomb in January, 
194~o. The l!wei Tung bridge over tne Salween Hi.ver, 250 
feet in length, v;as con vtructed by a weal thy l'aoc~han si lvor 
mine ovmer Vl'lO wanteit a Ehort<!ut lJetween hh: work und his 
horne, Jlo uontri.butet1 a large f1tlrn of money, c;olleoted many 
gifts from the others interested in the sho:ctuut lllld then 
securen support from the Yunnan government, "\ihen the 
Burma Hoac1 was built, itll route v;all c1irectec1 to utilize the 
bridge, ,g 
The construction progrmn was divided into :oeotionB, 
excludirw the sy.eci.al lJecti on for the Mekonp: Briilp:e, 
The Beciiorw conBiflt of the follovJ:itJfC: Ann:irw, J,ufeng, 
l~ufeng-Penr;yi, ,)iak"LL', Yangpi, Yanepi-Yu.nlurw, Yuh-
lune- Paoshan, . 'aoshan-Lun F,1inp;, Lungl:inp:, J,unelinF,-
J,usih, <l1Jt1 .. Lttsih-\Vantiq·, All instructtonG and super-
vision were e;i.ven direct from the P.ao~~ha Paoehan 
llc adq ttarte rs ,10 
'.Phe OO!Hltruotion of the laflt sections of tile llurma. 
Hoad by hand was in line with the often reiterated advice 
of Chiang K~>i-shek to hie countryman, urp:ine them: "to 
UEe '.'ihatever wa te ri iJlS they hatl at hM c1 :.uHI not to moan 
for v1 nat they had not, to we their braJ.nB and endeavor to 
make the he<~t of everythJnr;, an(l to ·~nr•te nothinp:,nll 
9 S/Se;t. C,l!, . uohanan ,,.no. (let. John H, McDowell, 
c3tilv:ell Hoad (Calcutta: Indian 21·efJS J,td,, 1945), p. 20, 
10 Hoconstruotton of the BUl·rna Ho:Hl, J.'ubli<! Hela-
t:!.ons Officer, Y-Porce Opcrutlons ::Jtafr,tl'ii:ited St.d:es 
Arrny. p. 1:~. 
19 
In l\J3\J, tile llritish Government of Burma (;on:,truct-
ed rot>ds in that uountr;v to connect the railro.:ccl at J,ashio, 
Burma, '.l!1C1 the Irrawailcly Hiver port at :Bitc>mo, Burma, and 
both with the Burma Hoad at \i'intinp:. A railway uormects 
the port of Ran1>oon with Ute railhead at Lashio, 
The Burnn Hoad ts further extended by the rotJ.d 
from Kunmine to Chungkinp;, the wnr-tir;,e capital, but this 
section is ucually not re fnuded o.B part of the J3urma Hoad. 
The 13u.rJW. Hold ir-; only rtine feet wide for more 
than half its lenftlt, It is mostly unpaved, and there is 
not a fence or guardrail an;ywhE<re alonp: it, illly driver 
who travo led at r:JOr e than fifteen m1.J.c c u.n houx· rit>ke d his 
life, ",•t no pLwe ou the road uan he see nore than an 
ei r··hth of u. mile strai@lt ahead ,"12 
The road runs over 13 grarles (})oaks i exceeding 
2,000 meters ( rouphly 6,600 feet), the hip:he: .. t of 
whiuh is Tienatze Eia.o, elevation 9,200 feet, There 
is little taneent ( fitraifht a··:ayl and little flat, 
~'rom kilometer<> 413 to 644, the terrain ie ver'' x·oueh 
and the road is uontinually c1·osBir:f mountain 
ra/. r:e n ,13 
Buildinrt on trJC road v;as vrtthou.t enp:ineerJnr as we 
kJow it. It ·;;;J.8 done by c.:oolies under the as<nunpHon that 
a road wu~> nnyli1inr; a truuk c:oulcl drive over in o.ry 
weather. 
13 r,o u, .£.!.!. 
20 
When the Americans sturted cooperatinr, with the 
Chinese National Government's Yunnan-Burma Highway Engin-
eering Administration in early 1943, the }Jurma Hoad. was 
essentially a one-track, all-weather road, "Maximum grade 
was 21 percent with numerous short grades of 5 to 50 feet 
exceeding this, ancl, approaches to all bridges, looatecl in 
swamps, exceeded this grade ,"14 The minimum curve was 
twenty-five feet on the center line of the road, and in 
the mountainous and rooky sections the road was as narrow 
us eight feet, 
~'otal average mobilization of conscripted labor by 
the 24 hsiens per day amounted to over 110,000 and 
they were as follows: Xwanr,-!l.'ung 2,000 Tsuying 
5,000, Chennan 4,000, Yaoan 3,000, SLwr;yun 5,000 
Mitu 3,000, ~'engyi 5,000, Tali 5,000, Mene;ha 8,000 
Shurminr, 8,000, Yungpi 2,000, Ghengning 8,000, 
Yunglung e,ooo, Paoshan 10,000, r.ungling e,ooo, 
Tengchung 8,000, Ghenkong 3,000, J,iangho 2,000, 
Yinphiang 1,000, Linshan 1,000, Lusih 2,000, 
Lungchuen 1,000, ,.ma Suili 1,000,15 
The work was completed l>etween Deceml1er 1937 and 
May 1938, with only temporary bride;es, and 50,000 con-
scripted laborers were retained to do the improved work, 
Total amount of conscripted labor employed for the 
entire comrJletion of the Burma Hoad was over 
33,800,000 man d>1.ys, Nearly 80 per cent of the car-
penters and masons available in the (Yunnan) l'rovj.nce 
14 Heconstruction of the Burma Hoad, l'u.hlio He-
lations Officer, Y-Foroe Operations staFf; UnHed States 
Arm,y·, p. 6, 
15 Ibid., l'• 13, 
were calle d upon to do the wo r k along various parts 
of the Roa d , nnd about 20 Burme se technicians were 
culled in for the compl etion of the Mekone: ( Hi verl 
br i dge. W:f.th 50 ,000 contracted labore r s worki ng day 
and n i p;ht the Road was opened to traffic i n De cember 
1~ 38 . 
21 
Work clo ne by conscrir>te n l aborers was as f ollows : 
earth qu untities for road bed 12 , 000 , 000 cubic rreters , 
5 roo ter ro~d surface ( gr avel) 920 k ilorre t ers , ~Bc.~:--------1 
oulverts . l6 
Governor JJunr of Yunnan l>rovince promi s ed t he 
Bri t ) sh thut , i f they would att e11 c1 to the r oad-buildine on 
t heir s ide of t he border , he would furnish t he pe r sonne l 
i n Yurlna.n Pr ovince . Asi de from the surve yors and eng in-
eers , many of whom were gr a dua te s of Yunnan Unive.rsHy, no 
one was ;oai d f or hi s work . 
I n pl a in fact , the he :.tdmen of all vi11a.ees and the 
chie f s o r the va rious non-Chinese tribes of abori~i­
n t~l13tock liv ing as far as eigh t day ' s ID \rch f r om the 
road v1ere each req u_i r ed to send a r iven number of 
workers ; a nd tho se chosen hnd t o go, unless t h ey were 
we althy en oueh t o lmy substitutes . l 7 
The whole re eion (,'U t by t he new road i s ve r y 
sca.r se l y settle d, except f or t ile mai n valleys with ce r.ters 
Au ch as Yun p,chane u.n d JJunglin e . 
The Yunnane s e a re t h e mos t nume r ous of the ro si-
(le n ts i n the are o. trave rae d h,y t he Bu rma Roa d . Mtnp-lo d i n 
wit.·! too ove ruJJ. Chi ne se pa ttern or. Yunnu.ne se , hot.Ve ve r , 
16 Re c onstruction of t ho Bu rnc1. Hoad , loc . cit . 
17 Schuyl e r Camman , "Ch i na ' s Hew Hoa d to t he Sea , " 
.A.s :l. u. , p , 1 26, Mare;h 1939 . 
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are a variety of population groupings retaining independ-
ently their various tribal characteristics, c:ulture, sen-
timant, and dialect. Most of the tribes are friendly with 
the allies and some chieftans and headmen have signed 
agreements. 
The r;eneral areas in which the tribes furnishing 
workers on the J3urm Road were most numerous were as 
follows: 
"North of road and centered northwest of Xunming--
Independen t Lolo tri bespeople •"18 The great numbers of 
these workers on the road from Kunming were scarcely to be 
distinguished from the descendants of settlers from North 
China. 
"Uorth of road and centered northeast of Xunming--
Miao tribe • nl9 
"Lufeng. Siakvlan. Tali Yungping·-Min-Chia tribal 
oen tors, and soma Yao and Miao infiltration about Rrh Hai 
lake," 20 
18 Reconstruction of the Burma. Road, op. oi t., 
p. 15, 
19 Reconstruction of t11o Burma Road. :Public 
Relations Officer, Y-Foroe Operations Staff, United States 
Army, p. 15, 
20 Loo • cit. 
23 
"Mekong--Mingku tribe • n2l 
"Yungping to Paoshan-·I'eopJ.e of the J,olo tribe, 
though not of the more closely unified Indo pendent Loloe, 
whO live further northeast of this a.rea,n22 The Lolos, 
the aboriginal tribespeople of YUnnan, look upon the 
Chinese (who have been there for centuries) as 100re new-
comers. They are a simple and hardy people living mostly 
in the inaccessible heights of the mountains. They have 
no written language, but they possess a distinctive cul-
ture, and they particularly love singing. 
Wo100n occupy an important position among this race, 
Their counsels are highly respected, As moat of the men 
were busy hunting or farming. the women worked at the road 
buildirlg • 
The J,olo women are strong. They are short, stocky 
and so sturdily built that any one of them could easily 
lift a 150 pound rock by means of a thong across the fore-
head, 
The Lolos preferred to work on the Road at night, 
for in the daytime they had to be at home looking after 
their households, They sang their old traditional songs 
as they toiled in the moonlight. 
21 Reconstruction of the Burma Road, loc, ill• 
22 Loc, Cit, 
--
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The rook for the wearing course had to be of uni-
form size, which raised the question of how to make clear 
to tl:Je. Lolos the apeoificationa that were desired, West-
ern civilized 100 asu:rcments were totally inoomprehensi ble 
to them, As Tan Tei-Ying23 stated; 
Finally I got the idea of telling them to make a 
circle of he thunb and forefinger, explaining that 
any stone that could be passed through that circle 
would be 3coeptable. 
They grasped the principle immediately and from 
that time on they cut rooks with the same uniformity as 
those turned out by a stone crusher, 
For all their simflioity, they were very shrewd. 
Although they couldn t grasp the idea of an inch or a 
centimeter, they understood a cubic yard perfe~lly, 
for that was the unit by which they were paid. 
The stonemasons were fascinating beoause of the 
lllll!ly individual ways of doing things, ways that were thou-
Banda of years old, contrary to all modern IOOthode and yet 
immensely effective for the job at hand. 
Like the carpenters, they were all old men, for 
there had been no construction in this region in many 
years, and no younger men had had any opportunity to prao-
tioe the trade. 
23 Tan Pei•Ying, "How Head-Hunters Built a High-
way," Science Dieest, 19:73. Juno 1946, 
24 Ibid,, p, 74. 
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FIGURE ~ 
KACHINS WAT.KING AJ,QNG THE ROAD 
26 
The masons built man y mile s of retaining walls f or 
the Road. They cut s t ones to the most precise s qua res or 
rectangle s by hand \'9i th hammer and chisel an cl they worked 
entirely with their own i ns t rumen t s . 
Sal ween Rive r cr ossine to north and t o west--J,is u, 
Panyi , and some Ni su and Kachins. Li eu tribes a re 
a long the China- Bu.rma. border an d sca ttered a cross 
northern Burmt.\ to the Naga. Hills t hat border the Assam 
Province of India. Panyi t ribes are a long t he Burm$-
Chi na Borcl.e r and scatte red s outh toward the Wa area 
above t he Shan States. Kaohins are not Chinese but 
strictly Burmese, s orre of which are i n we s tern Yinnan 
I?r ov in ce of China • 26 
The Eastern J,issu, strong virile-looking men a.n d 
good worke rs, were very conspicuous i n t heir white home-
spun clothes • 
"Lungling to Mangshih-- Pieh (or Ti a ) tribe . These 
peo ple are ver y clean of pers on a nd all bathe in a s t re am 
t wice daily." 26 
We s t and South of Mangshih--Lisu and Panyi tribes 
along t he China-Burma border and Wa tribe f urther 
wes t and south . The Wa tribespeople are scatt ere d 
from the are a east and south. The Wa tribespeople 
are scatte r ed f rom the area east and south of Bhamo, 
Burma, southeast t hr ough a strip be tween Lashio and 
Want ing and on sout hward as f ar as northern Thail an d 
( Siam) . Wa tribespeople a re not ne cessar ily pro-
Japanese but de f in i tely are not pro-Alli ~~ · oo d rooge 
from indiff eren t t o potenti ally hostile. 
25 Reo~nstruction of the Burma Roa d. loc. cit . 
26 Loc . c1 t. 
2 7 f.£2.. ill· 
The head-hunters were wildest, although the most 
loyal and dependable of all the Bord.er peoples who worked 
on the Road, 
27 
These people had lived in their mountain fast-
neases for thousands of years with almost no contact with 
civilization. 
Among the head-hunters, ·a man's social standing is 
Judged by the number of skulls that adorn the ·walls of his 
hut, 
The ranks of the Chinese workers had been thinned 
by malaria, dysentery, and other afflictions until only a 
few remained, 
Then, in a very short time, the rest either died 
or ran away • 
At this point, the Central Government had to send 
a call for the headhunters. The chief of the headhunters 
acknowledged the call and gave the following instructions 
to his men: 
You are not to kill them or mole at them Chinese 
in any way. You must be kind to them, But you are 
at liberty to steal ~11 the pigs, cows, and chickens 
you want, as usua1,2e 
As a result of the plea, the Chinese were supplied 
with 300 zoon. hardy, diligent, and skillful, With their 
28 Tan Pe i- Ying, .9.:£• ill•, p, 75. 
help, the Chinaae were able to get construction moving 
again, in spite of the rain and the malaria. There was 
never any in oiden ta or discord of any kind. 
28 
Word was sent back to Paoshan that Chinese engi-
neers were at work in the Shan country during the monsoon, 
defying the old tradition. Before long, the men of 
l?aoshan began to drift back and a sizable crew was onoe 
more at work. 
Men and woman often traveled together, but on the 
job they lived and worked separately. Their huts were 
often separated by a stream, in Which both sexes washed 
their clothes and cookin e pots. The temporary roads ide 
huts were of easily collected materials such as heavy 
stocks thatched with straw and dried cornstalks fastened 
together. In some cases, roadside caves were used. "oook-
ing was done in a hole in the center of the floor, and this 
smoke escaped where best it could, usually through the 
:f'l oor • "29 
At times, the Chinese worked under armed guards, 
and were allowed to return to their home villages only when 
they had completed grading and repairing the section of the 
highway assigned to them. 
29 Schuyler Csmman, "China's New Road to the See.," 
~. p, 127• March 1939, 
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The reason for the pressure was to speed up the in-
flux of supplies from abroad. 
Because of the polyglot traffic which poured over 
the Burma Road in 1941-42, there are still some along the 
route who apeak some of nearly every language. The tribes. 
along the road probably have picked up more Enelish than 
the lffifliBh•apeaking visitors have absorbed of the native 
1 an gu.age a • 
Languages and dialeots spoken by peoples indigen-
ous to southwest YUnnan tracts bordering the Burma 
Road represent several hranohe a, groups and sub-
groups, moa tly in the Indo- Chinese Family, but ala o 
inoluding so~re from the Austro-Asiatio Family of 
Languages. Written language is the same throughout 
China, end the Indo-Chinese is written in charaotera; 
however, the Austro3~eiatio has an alphabet derived from Hindu sources. 
Evidence of the variety of adjacent and intermixed 
dialects and language becomes clear to one when he tries 
to orient hir.rself by map. English and other foreign lan-
guage spellings are largely phonetic, and for a lack of 
unifying au.thori ty there has evolved a divergence of 
Jffigliah Bl)ellings, 
Fang-kuei Li of the Institute of History end Phil-
ology, Academia Sinica, highest research organization 
under the Chinese National Government, in writing 
about "Language'' (pages 48-54 "The Chinese Yearbook," 
1943), classifies the Indo-Chinese Family main 
30 Re~onstruction of the l3u.rma 
Relations ~H' icer, Y-ForceOp(Jra.tions 
Army, p, 16. 
Road, J?u.bli c 
Staff, United States 
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branches as (1) Chinese , whi ch Honan excavations 
found bones and tortoi se shell in scriptions dated 
about 1400 B. c . , ( 2) Kam-Tai , ( 3) Mi ao-Yao, and (4) Tibeto-Burman . All of these are repre sented in 
conve~iation of the tribespeople along the Burma 
Road. 
30 
In and ne ar western Yunnan Province , t here are 
people whose native tongues are from the Indo-Chinese Fam-
ily of his torically related l anguages . 
"In modern Kam-Tai l anguages people 11ossess eight 
an d sometixm a nine or more tones . I n China , most of the 
Kam- Tai l anguages have no v1riting of their own . "32 
The Miao and Ya o groups seem to have a definite 
relationshi p, and are spoken by the fairly pri mitive 
groups of mountaineers throughout the Southwest . There is 
no writing of their own , aside from the occas ional use of 
Chinese cha r acters . 
"Among t he Lolo group, the Lolo with its dialects 
is spoken in a large portion of Yunnan . • • The Lolo has an 
independent syllable of its own , us ed largely i n religious 
texts . " 33 
During the five months of the r ainy monsoon 
season , from May through September , t~e Burma Road oper-
31 Reconstruotion of t he Bur ma Road. 12£. cit . 
32 Loc. cit, 
33 fE_£ . ill· 
----
ated at half capacity, barely sustaining the armies of 
Chiang Kai-ahek with a thin trickle of supplies. 
Throughout the length of the Road, the rainfall 
averaged close to 200 inches a year, which is about five 
times as much as the rainfall on the east coast of the 
United States. 
The best months of the year, from the standpoint 
of weather, are from October to May, when the rainfall is 
very light. 
There was an extremely low cost of construction 
for the Burma Road, According to Feng,34 
31 
It is highly doubtful if more than $25,000,000 
Chinese 01.1.rrenoy was eXIJended. I know that there was 
an extremely small sum set aside by the Provincial 
Governl!Yilnt of Yunnan in 1937 for the improvement of 
this highway, In the salll!l year the Central Government 
appropriated $6 ooo,ooo for the same purpose; and 
later, an additlonal $10,000,000 sum for meeting the 
costs of improving the highway. purchasing equipment 
and for operating the transportation system. 
The outlays for the various types of work done, are 
&ll follows: 
Work d ooe by the Government was as follows: 269 
bridges (e~cluding the Mekong and Salween Bridges) 
totaling $743,657.023 big culverts totaling $27,740,118 
temporary timber bridges totaling $50,927 rock excavation 
of 922,957 oubio meters totaling $1,070,336 special work 
suoh as retaining, drainage, etc. totaling $26,220. 
Total expenditure including 
34 C.T. Feng. "China and Her New Back Door," Vital 
Speeches. 6t43, November 1. 1939. 
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the above mentioned compensation to the various adw 
ministrations totaled $2,646.220. (Explosives, tra~ 
veling expenses and various equipmenta are exoluded 
from the above oost figures. 
~otal compensation for the road surfacing was 
$651 18~7 and3total compensation for the culvert work was ;w75,443, 6 
32 
Most drivers were paid at a rate of approximately 
Chinese $80 a month, which was about u.s. $4 at 1941 rates, 
~racking over the Burma Road in 1941, was very ex-
pensive. \'{estern firms estimated it oOEJ t them around Chi-
nese $2,754 (about u,s, $137) to ship a ton of goods from 
r.ashio to Xunming. This would be the equivalent of aboo.t 
u.s, nineteen cents per tonwmile, Government shipping 
costs were estimated at thirteen cents a ton-mile. 
"ln 1938, the Universal Trading Corporation of 
China received a $25,000.000 five-year oredi t loan through 
the li'xport-Import Bank of the United Statea,"36 The loan 
was made to IMintain overland truck connections with 
Lashio and Xu.nming by means of the Burna Road and the 
French Indo~Chinese Hailroad. Between 1931 and 1938, 
$52,051,412 in loans had been made to China. Up to Oct-
ober, 1940. loans totaling $ss.ooo.ooo had been made to 
China. On the reopening of the Burma Road, Chinese offi-
35 Reconstruction of the :Surma Road, .Q.E• ..9.!1·• 
p. 13. 
36 Business Week, p. 36, December 24, 1938. 
oials in Chur1gking irJllJlored the United States and Britain 
to lend them :ru.rther air. 
Most of the repairs on the Burma Road ware done by 
hand, The only modern equip~mnt the Chinese had wore a 
few compressed-air drills for drilling holes in which to 
plant dynamite charges. Stone rollers were used to smooth 
the road. The rollers ware chiselled out of rook by hand 
and drawn along by bullocks. Earth was dug out of the 
oliffsides and carried in baskets, whenever it was needed 
to make fills. "The Chinese are philosophical about bombs 
and air raids, It cost Japanese a thousand dollars for 
bomb to malre hole and it coat Chinese eight cents to fill 
it up, "37 
The Hoad would round and round like the threads on 
a screw on many of the mountains, If the top segment 
washed away, it would fall on the one below it, At tiroos, 
the retaining wall on the lowest stretch fell away and it 
would often take with it all the levels of the road di-
reo tJ.y above. 
Most of the landslides oooured at night when the 
rains ware the heaviest, and when possible. the removal 
as begun at once. On some nights the alarms poured into 
37 J. Bainbridge! "Hu Shih's Musketeer," New 
Yorker, 17:23, January 17, 1942. 
33 
34 
headquarters one after another, Emergency orews, under the 
direction of each of the twenty~si:x: seotion ohiefs. were 
ready and equ:!.}lped to go in to action at a moment' a notice. 
It was imllOSSi ble to keep a full crew on the pay-
roll at all times, as nobody could forsee when or where a 
landslide might occur. So getting the laborers was a 
little oomplioated. The magistrates would go through the 
villages at nirrht calling for workers. Whole families, 
including the women and small children, would leave their 
warm beds and go to the rescue, 
A lot of Chinese were killed in landslides, When 
a ~ln was killed in a landslide, another member of his 
family would take his place immediately. 
"In October of 1940, the Chinese had some 75,000 
workers doine nothing but make repairs ,n38 
On July 12, 1940 Britain oapi tula.ted to Japan by 
agreeing to halt traffio via the Burma Road for three 
months. beginning July lB. with a proviso that Ja~n 
in the interim seek an honorable peace with Ohinu, \1 
The British viewpoint was that traffic would be 
limited, 8nyway, at this time of year. because of the mon-
soons. "In any case, as Prime Minister Churohill told 
38 Harold J, Shepstone, "Symbol and Highway," New 
!2!l!; Time a Magazine, p, 5, Ootober 20, 1940, -
39 ''The Burma Road. Japan IVins an A11peasement," 
Newsweek, 16:31, July 29, 1940, 
Commons, Britain was in no position to antagonize the Jap-
anese,n40 Quo Tai-chi, Chinese A.lnbassador to London, told 
newsmen that rains did not ent:l.rely close the Road last 
year 1939 and due to improve~rents made in the highway 
since, were not likely to do so this year 1940. The AJn-
bassador already had made an official protest to the 
British Government, "The United States disapproved it, 
saying trade routes should not be shut so arbitrarily."41 
35 
On October 16 1940, the Chinese national spirit 
was riding high again as the British decreed the reopening 
of the Burma Uoad. "After three months of closure, an ac-
cumulation of 600,000 tons of war supplies. valued at 
$20,000,000 could be disp<ltched to the Chiang Xai-shek 
armies • n42 
The Japanese retaliated with bombs shortly after 
the Hoad was reopened. With air bases in Indo-China, the 
Japanese claimed their first day's bombing had closed the 
Hoad again, However, the Chinese insisted that traffic 
was moving ate adily along it. 
40 "Burnn Hoad Cloaed 0 " Our rent History, 51:11, Auguet 1940. 
41 I!Q_£. lli· 
42 "The Tough Chinese. Heoren1ng of the Burma Road 
Heightens Will to Hang On," Newsweek, 16:27. October 26, 
1940. 
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In 1941. the United States was sending both men 
and machines to fieht so that u.s. goods would reach Oh:l.na. 
The Hoad has been within 350 miles of the Japanese 
airfields, since the Jape oooUIJied French Indo-China in 
January, 1941, The Hoad was peculiarly vulnerable! it 
passed over two bridges slung in the gorr:es of the Mekong 
and Salween Hivers, "That it has not been permanently out 
has been due to the halfheartedness and poor aim of 
Japanese bombers, and to the amazing Chinese capacity :for 
regeneration ,n43 
The beet way to see that U.s. E!UPI'l.ies reached 
China was to keep the Japanese planes away from it. Since 
the Chinese anti-aircraft equiprrent Md technique were in-
adequate Dnd the Chinese fighter A.il" Force was practically 
non-existent. the only solution, therefore. was air patrols 
by U ,s, planes flown by Arne rica.n fighter pilots. 
By June, 1941, one hundred Curtis P-40 planes had 
arrived in llurma,44 In the mearJtime, many tall, bronzed 
American tlirmen had slipped into Asia from east and west" 
coast ports, These pilots were not just a crew of barn-
stor!OOrs, but orack, seasoned U,S, '~rmy Air Corps pilots. 
43 "Convoys to China." !!.!!!!!. Ma.eazine, 37: 33•34, 
June 23, 1941, 
44 Ibid,, p, 34 
-
To take on this combat job, they had been allowed 
to resign their Air Corps posts , enlist in the 
Chine se Air Force on the understanding that their u.s. 
Army seniorities would not be affected . .Another some-
what whimsical technical understanding is that they 
will not 'take the offensive ' against the J~ganese 
Air Force, but wi 11 merely defend the Road . 
J apanese bombers from Indo-China have hurt traffic 
somewh at , but quick repair work on t he Road keeps the 
trucks rolling. 
The principal trucker is the Southwest Transporta-
tion Co • Southwest trucks make only one round trip a. 
mon th• and only one per cent of those going in to 
Chin a bring anything back•46 
At one time, 500 trucks were left sitting on the 
docks of Rangoon f or three months because the company had 
ne glected to mke plans to s tore them. 
"South\'Vest control s about 6,000 trucks , though no 
one lmows t he exact number operating on the road , n47 For 
some time, the trans port of muni tiona suffered seriously 
because independent truck owners, known as ticke rs in 
37 
Han goon, f ound it more profitable to ca rry goods for com-
merica l shippers. "H'ven such govern ment agencies as the 
Yunnan-Burma highway commission tried to bribe truckers to 
45 "Convoys to China, n Time Magazit1e , 37:34, 
June 23 • 1941. 
46 "Echoes From the Traffic Roar of Burma. Road, 
Chiang Li f eline," Newswee k , 17:28, Jun e 2 , 1941. 
47 Loc . oi t . 
carry non- military goocls • n48 A Burma decree had been in 
force malting it compuls ory for all truck owners to make- a 
minimum number of trips a month _carrying munitions to 
China . The basic rate was eleven cents per ton mile . 
In a se r ies o:a_9articles which have not been denied• Mr . Leland Stowe has re ported that unchecked graft , 
thievery an d corruption in almost every known f orm 
have flourished alon g t he Burma Road, which is the 
lifeline of the Chinese Government. It is esti mated 
that not one-twentieth of the military supplies which 
have been provided and which the road should be able 
to carry _ hav~ never reached the armies of Chiang Kai-
shek. Stowe 0 goes on t o say that: corruption has 
caused (1) swollen profits of greedy trucking firms; 
( 2) indiscriminate dumpin e; of war ~m terials just 
within China's borde r s; ( 3 ) the failure of needed med-
ical goods t.Q.. g_et beyond Rangoon; ( 4 ) use of the 
Roart's limi ted capacity to haul luxuries, to be boot~ 
legged a t fan t astic prices . 
Chinese officials then pointed out what was un-
known or unrecorded by Corresponden t Stowe: 
~he Southwest Transporta tion Co. which Stowe ac-
cused of lush war-wrung prof its, is a 100% Government-
owne d subsidiiry. All its profits go into upkeep and 
maintenance . 5 
Just before Pearl Harbor, China was afraid that 
Bri tair1 an d the United States would close the Burma Ro ad 
48 E'choe a From the Traffic Roar of Burma Road, 
Chiang Lifeline, ill• ill• 
49 "Charges Graft 1\ules Burna. Road ," Christian 
Century, 59:37, January 14, 194 2, 
50 "Na tional Disgr ace ," ~ Magazi ne, :59:32, 
J anuary 12• 1942. 
51 Loo. cit. 
38 
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again, so she hauled as much material a s posei ble in a 
short time and stored the material at safe points under her 
own flag . Many of the supplies sent from abroad have been 
left to rot in warehoo.se s at Ha.ngoon; othe rs have been 
stolen in tranei t along the road and turned over to private 
buyers at inflated prices. "And the reason why this 
shocking state of affairs has persisted," accoJ:ding to :Mr . 
Stowe • 52 "is that the trail of corruption le ads to too top 
pos ts in the Chinese government." These facts, have sup-
posedly, been known to everyone in China for quite s ome 
time. 
Manhatt an Businessman Al f red Kohlberg, director of 
the American Bureau of Medical Aid to China, flatly dis-
agreed with Leland Stowe's th:ti-d poillt. Mr. Kohlberg made 
a trip to China and checked on arrivals of medical a id at 
Hed Cross headquarters at Kweiyang . "At t he t i me I was 
there , said Kohlberg, everything had arr ived intact and 
checked to the dot wi th the detaile d lis ts f orwarded fr om 
New Yor k .n53 
The Chinese didn 't deny many of Stowe ' s minor 
points, such a s petty thiever y a nd bootleggin g of gaso-
line , but the y said they are combating these abuses , and 
52 Charges Graft Rules Burma Ro ad, 12£• cit. 
53 Nationa l Di sgrace, loc. cit. 
40 
they baok up the statement with figures showing increasing 
efficiency. 
China suggested that an Allied Commission, headed 
by Amari oa, take over the administration of the road. 
"At present May 1941 about 300 tons of muni ti one 
pass over the Burma Road daily and about 300 tons of other 
goods,n54 The Chinese hoped that they could receive about 
900 tons a day, rod it was believed that new improvements 
plus the large orders for trucks would make this possible, 
"In July 1941 the road carried 3,864 tons of mili-
tary supplies, In November it carried 17,500 tons,n65 
There was a tremendous improvement and there was no com-
parable improvement in war effort in the United States at 
this time. 
~ring August of 1941, the tonnage of U.s. and 
British war rna terial s hau.le d through Burm to China had 
more than doubled the figures for JuJ.y,56 At this time, 
the Chinese people had hopes that the Road's original es-
timated capacity of 30,000 tons a month, could be exceeded, 
~ring September of 1941, the tonnage rose to 
54 "Echoes From the Traffic Roar of Burma Road, 
ChiangJ,ifeline,"Newsw(!ek, 17!28, June 2,1941. 
55 National Disgraoe. loo. ill• 
56 "Burma Roadster. Arnstein's Report,"~ Ma~­
azine, 38:24, September l, 1941. 
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15,000 a month . 57 The s oods werP. pass ing ov er the road in 
4, 000 s ix-whee led Ame rican tru eRa . Furthermore, the Road 
was in such satisfactory condition at this time, that the 
monsoon rai ns . now at their heighth , had not done any s ev-
ere damage . All alone the highway were drun:e of asphalt, 
to be used when the r a 'lns s topped. 
At the time of Pearl Harbor, in 1941, about 80% of 
the traffic on the Roacl was res tricted to military ne eds •. 
Tre zoon dous shipments of American trucks and gaso-
line were coming in to Rangoon . !n addition to trucks, the 
Chinese were usin g pack an imals and bullock carts. 
"To supp1emen t truck transport, the Burna Road Ad-
ministration in 1939 obta ine d 3 , 000 automobile-type axles 
with rubber-tired wheels .n58 These axles were nnde into 
two-whee led car ts similar to the wooden-wheeled carts s een 
all over China • These were capable of carryin g a ton or 
more of g oods , when pulle d by horses or mules . The carts 
were found ve r y suitable for moving supplies aroun d l an d-
slides g1 d for long dis tances where trucks could not go •. 
In tha spring of 1941, word got to Chian g Kai-shek 
t ha. t the Burna Hoad was stoppe d in a hundred bottlene eke •. 
5'7 "Burnn Hoad Boo s t ." Ne\7sweek, 18 : 25 , Septembe r 
22, 1941. 
58 Magazin e Page of the Christian Sci en oe Monitor, 
November 2, 1940, 
42 
Million s of dolla r s worth of f ood an d munitions were piling 
up along the road and in di stant warehouses . They were 
sorely needed by China ' s armies. 
Chian g. in panic . appealed to Lauchlin 0urrie , 
Lend-Le ase Administrator for China • ncu:t·rj,e cabled Harry 
Hopkins and Hopkin s sent for Danny Arnstein . n59 To ex-
cabby Arnstein , t he Btrr.ma Road was just a. name in a. nevis-
paper headlin e . But Arnstein immedia tely re plied i n the . 
affirmative . when as ked to go to China to straighten out 
the knots in the Chinese lifeline • Arnstein . as hea d . of 
Terminal System taxi company in Uew York, was well quali-
fied f or the job • 
Arnstein took with him t wo business associates , 
Harold s. Davis and Marco Hellman--both experiences au-
thorities on trucking and road transport p roblems.60 The 
three man spent virtually every waking and sleeping moment 
together durj.ng their · sojourn in China. Arnstein was 
spokesman and boss , Hellman handled the c1iplomaoy an d the 
cash , and Davia took photographs, helped. out taohnically· 
and kept the diary, 
The three men spent eighteen days looking over the 
5~ G, Kent , "Cabby on t he Bunna Road, " Asia . 
41:687 , December 1941 . 
60 Loc. oi t . 
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road , a.ncl then shut themselves in hotel rooJne 1n Rangoon , 
where they worked on their report. Hu.ncl:reds of pages were 
dictat ed which railed at inefficiency and made sweeping ra-
aommenda tiona . for i mprovemen ta. The final report wae 
boiled down to thirty-five t ypewritten pages , When Chiang 
Kai-shek received the ~eport. he immediately began to act . 
"Within eighteen hours , the Wan ting customs office, 
on the Chin a.-Bu.rme se border • was ordered to remain open 
twenty-four hours a day ."61 The office had ·11r ev1ously 
closed at six ea ch evening , even though a mile an d a half 
of trucks . loaded with munitions might be waiting to get 
through. 
"Thirty-six hours l ater, ano ther order concentra t-
ed the operat ion of trucks in a singl e agency."62 Pre-
viously, authority had been scattered through siXteen sep-
arate government depa rtmen ts who refused to cooperate. 
Truoks of one department would be l a i d .u.p, while ware-
houses in other departmen ts would be packed with t he very 
parts needed. ~here were delays of convoys of f orty 
trucks while clerks fu.mbled with papers, 
nchiang Kai-shek ordered MY truclr delay of more 
61 Kent • 1&.i. ..91.!. 
62 Loc. cit •. 
--
44 
than half an hour repol·ted to him peraonally."63 
Since a good half of the road is one way only. 
tl'Uoks were started at both north snd aoutn ends at the 
same time, allowing for unimpeded going for two thirds of 
the route • 
?!h.us, with these reforms • creeping trllOk columns 
were jerked into motion, driving time was out in half. and 
freight tonnage jumped from 6,000 to 15,000 tons montnly 
delivery, Chiang regarded Arnstein 1s report aa a bible. 
"Out of 2,887 government truckS, 1,407 were out of 
oomrnillsion when he arrived • "64 Those in oommiasi on \Vere 
sent on runs without a jack or tire iron, and there was not 
a single service station on the whole road. Hepair shOps 
were lacking. 1'/hen a tl'Uok broke down it usually was 
abandoned. "Arnstein estimated that the Ohinese were 
WEtating from 25 to 40 per cent of their gaa,n65 Loading 
wus hap~hazard. Front springs were snapping constantly be• 
oauae the Chinese were stacking the hea~ieat freight in tht 
front of the trucks. One-and•a•half ton trucks were being 
loaded as heavily ae four-ton trucks should be, When a pri-
65 lbi4 •• p. 688, 
64 Kent, .12.£. oi t. 
66 J. Bainbridge, "Hu Shih's Musketeer," liew Yorker, 
-17:26, January 17, 1942. 
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45 
vate truck broke down, the government trucker would stop 
behind and sell M1Y part of his truck to the private 
trucker. 66 Untii the gove r nment repairmen happened along 
the truck driver enjoyed himself with the loca l girl s . 
Since the Burma Rou.d was opened, about thirteen hundred 
trucks have careened off the ro ad to damage or destntction . 
Six t e rmina l s are being s et up along the road at 
intervals of a day ' s run . Besides me chanics and 
equiproont for greasing and repairing trucks , each ter-
minal will include comfortable overnight accommoda-
tions for drivers. To man the termin al s , six man-
agers, a muintena.n oe supe rvisor , and eighteen inspe o-
~~=t=~~ ~~h~;~=~.~;r~=~i~n~h~~~6~icked by 
Since there were no telephones or a telegr aph 
office on the Road, Arns tein had ordered through Lease-
Lend authority. a fle e t of police prowl cars with t wo-
way radio . These oars saw that traffic ke pt moving. 
Private trucking was highly lucra tive , because 
people were willing to pay w1y price for luxuries. Spe cu-
l a tors in RanBoon would buy a truck, load it with priva te 
merchandise and then send it for one or two trips into 
China. At th e end of the tri p or trips the truck would be 
sold a t a. tremendous profit, Men were doubling their 
66 JA:wiel G, Arn s tein , "An Ex- Taxi Drive:r: Cheoks ' 
Up On the Famous Burma Road, 11 Life Mnt>azi ne • 11:18 • Oct-
ober 6• 1941. 
67 Bainbridge, ~· cit •• p , 28 , 
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money eve ry thirty days, 
Arnstein ' a s ueges tions to Ohian g soon took the pro-
fit out of this, 
Now the first two loads oarried by a priva te truok 
over the Burma. Road must be all government frei ght--
nothin g els e--and the third load ~1st be gasoline for 
their own u se . The fourth load may be private mer-
chandi se . Again the fifth a nd sixth loads are e;overn-
ment freight; the seventh . gasoline; t he eighth. 
freight of their own choosing, and so on , 68 
Arnstein ' s report was very va luable to China and 
soon monthly traffic doubled, and in a short time there-
after , the traffic volume quadrupled. 
"Gene ralissimo Chiang Kai-shek aske d Arnstein and 
his associates to s tay in China and t ake over control of 
l3urma Roa d. and all the roads in China . u69 
Another of t he innumerable obs t acle s that hamper-
ed eff icient oper a tion of the :Burma Road was removed, 
"The British Governmen t announced abolition of u 1 pe r cent 
t ax levied by Burma on a ll imports into China , n70 The t ax 
was for the 1mrpose of reimburs ing Burma for the cos t of 
the ro a d, Las hio to Vtanting, a.n d f or te.rmi nal :faoili ties . 
The abolition of t ho t ax was symptoma tic of a 
68 G. Ke.nt , "C~bby on the Burma Road , 11 ~. 
41:689. De oember 1941 , 
69 "Diplomat Rxtraordinar y , 11 Scholas tic , 40; 15. 
February 16 , 1942 . 
70 "Burma Ho ad Boost," Newsweek, 18: 25, Se ptember 
22. 1941 . 
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r apid i mprovement in the oper a tion of the Burma Hoad . 
The a rea hordering the Burma Road has never been 
accura te l y mapp~d . ~~he maps ava ilable are best us ed only 
for genera l rela tive i nformat i on . ~he only American map 
work in the region has been confined to aeria l photography . 
First survey of the Burma Road to give engineers 
recorded information with which to work, was complet-
ed by the Chinese government .in April 1943, 23 yea rs 
after the road was sta:rted, Mr , c. o. Kung . then new 
chief engineer and director of t he Yunnan-Burma High-
way Engineering A.dministratioil . ordered the survey . 
Thit. s was a thlan d mtieasure~en 1ttsu.rveyt oft thd· ~1road and did no cover e en re are a · pene r a e · • 7 
71 "Recons truction of the Burma Road . '' l~blic Re-
l a t:i.ona Officer. Y-Force 0})era t1ons St aff , United States 
Arnw, p . 14 . 
Ol!Al?Tli'R IV 
1'Hli' JAPAUii'Sli' A1'TAOK IN BU.RW\. 
The British were satisfied that Burma was suffi~ 
ciently protected by the naval base at Singapore, and 
therefore d.id not develop a secondary naval base as they 
might have on the Araka.n coast, Burllll:l was left wholly de• 
fenseleas against lend attaok.by a modern power, for it 
was not believed that the Japanese could rea.oh its fron-
tiers over the thousands of miles of territory which lay 
between. 
Japan captured Canton in 1938 1 and seized Hainan 
Island in Februar.v, 1939,1 
Though this brought them to the borders of Indo-
China, the Government of India still did not move to 
put China in a posture of defence, not was the sale 
of war material to Japan interrupted,"' 
In June 1940, France fell which allowed the Jap~­
ese to take over Indo-China, The road to Singapore's baok 
door was left open, Japan did not strike again for eight-
een months, 
On De oember 7 • 1941• Japan made her infamous t>t-
1 Maurioe Collis, !t'he Burmese Soene, (London! 
John Crowther Ltd,) p. 42:--
2 Loo, oit, 
--
tack on Pearl Harbor, and the United States and Great 
Britain were thrown into the war in the Pacific, 
Asia seemed to be the critical point of disaster 
for America. 
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Thu·e 1 the Japanese had seized I!ongkong, iSolated 
the Philippines, invaded Malaya, occupied Thailandt 
and seemed on the point of sweeping away every tUlled 
defense point north of Australia, 3 
On January 18, 1942, u.s. Chief of Staff, George c. 
Marshall called in Major General Joseph w. Stilwell and 
gave him his assignment, 
Co-ordinate and smooth out and run the road, and 
get the various factions together and grab command and in 
general give 'em tho works. Money no object,4 
On January 22, Chiang Kai-shek replied to a letter 
sent to him by George Marshall, vi a T, V. Soong, the Chin-
ese ambassador in washington, The main points in Chiang's 
letter were as follows1 
Chiang Kai-shek has replied, agreeing to e:x:ijcutive 
control and a United State a chief of staff, Brings u:p 
point of dual control in Burnn: Specifies a lieutenant 
general and that he must be chief of staff on Chiang Xai-sh~k 1 s headquarters stuff,6 
!rhe Chief of Staff, Marshall, had such tnen as Stil• 
3 Joseph w. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers. (New York: 
Arranged and Edited by Theodoie"l!. IVhite, IVilliam Sloane 
Associates, Ina, Publishers, 1948), p,29, 
4 Ibid,, p, 26 
6 Ibid,, p, 27 
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well •. Drum, Joyce , Richa rdson tmd B'ichelberger to choos e 
from, in picking a commander for the Burma Front •6 
On January 23, t he Chief of St aff notified Stilwell 
tluit he would be the new oommo.n der for the Burma Front . 7 
In the rooantime , the British seemed t o be having d.ifficul.-
ties in t heir preparations in :Burma . Chi an g K~i· shek of-
fered the use of t wo Chinese cor ps , but Supr eme Commander 
Wavell refused on the grounds tha t he did not wan t the 
dirty Chinese in .Burma . The r eason :for t he refusal was 
tha t the Briti s h fe ar ed t h e Burme s e oi vil gove rnment. The 
mili t a.ry had to work through them f or the use of the rail• 
road. The Burzoo s a hated bot h the Br1. t ish and the Chin ese . 
In the l ast feeble a ttemp t to co-ordina te t h e de-
fonae of Southeas t 1~i a and the Indies, aging, tired Gen-
eral Six Archibald Wavell wa.s made Comm81l de r in Chief of 
tha lla oifio Area . As Kl dridgeO states • 
Wavell e ither f a ile tl to underst and the 
importance of .Burma. to the enem;v, or el se 
to concede the enemy' s ability to a dvan ce 
So Burma wae garris oned by t wo divt s ions, 
Bux-ru:1 and the 17th, 
atrntegio 
he failed 
that far _ 
the lst 
On to p of thi s , nArohie General Wave 11 novJ cla ims 
6 See appen dix, 
7 Stilwell, ~ · £.!J. , p . 30 . 
8 Fred Eldredge • Wr ath .in Burma . ( Ga rden City , New 
York : Doubleday a ncl Company. Trio ., 1946,) IJ • 40. 
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he rt~ver . re~aed help. Said he'd take two Chinese di~­
isiona • and f or the time being leave the other division 
where it wa.s .''9 To make the pi cture a. little more con-
fusing• wa.vell oomnanded British units in Burma, Chian g 
Ka1•shek commanded in China , an d if Chinese units worked 
in l3u.rma, the United States re·presen tative was to oomn)t:md 
them; subj ect to reQall , after .wavell was warned• 
General Ohennault 1 s famous Flying Tigers~-or the 
AVG--was converted into the u.s_ 23;rd Pursuit G:rou.p and 
placed at full strength.lO 
The ABDA, or Arnerican , British, Dutch, Aus tralian . 
joint command f or the defense of the South Seas . in Janu-
ary of 19421 set up a defense for the area t o be under the 
a ttaok of the Ja.pane se • The setup i s the de:t'en se of the 
barrier-.. Ma.l aya, JaVtJ. and llorth Austra lia--with its two 
ends anchored in :Burma. and Austra lia . ll While flying 
to Burma , on Februt~ :r:y 18 , 1942• Stib?ell learned. of the 
oollapae of one of the e;re a t bulworks in the center of the 
-de-f~n e e-,-as-a e-t - up b¥- the-;) o-1n t o omman d-.--" Sin g-apo l!e--haa 
9 Stilwell• ~· cit ., p . 35 . 
10 Joseph W • Stilwell, ~~h St ilwell J?a pe ;rs. (New 
York: Arrange<\ and Edited by e odore B. V/fii te . V/illiarn 
Sloane Associa tes , Ino . Pu.blishers •• 1948) • P • 3 2, 
ll Loc. oi t. 
~ ............... -
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surrendered-· Go. 000 men . nl2 
When Stil well set foot in Bu.rDll in March 1942 , he 
was confronted by many obstacles . Dritish forces we re com-
ple ta ly demorali ze<l and wero inte:r.ea ted only in escape and 
saving their hides. Incoming Chinese troops were hos tile 
to tho Briti sh for a l ways refus i ng them until things were 
des perate. The loss of the Philippines was looked upon by 
both Chine so and :British as just come down for a ooQky gang 
al ways shooting off 1 te mouth o.nd s econd-- guessine defeats 
suffered by both nation s in the months and years of the 
war , The Chinese and British ne eded the l ast indignity t o 
counterbal ance some of the f a ce the y had los t during the 
war , All in all , it was a sad :picture. 
Stilwell was one of the ve ry feTI realis t s i n the 
Ame :d can Mili t a.ry Mission . On Assuming command o:f the 
Chinese he looked over the situation and. remarked; "We 
can be thankful for one thin g a t l east: The Chinese are 
too f a r from home to de sert."13 
The Briti sh were respons ible for the defen s e of 
Burna , but Burma ' s i mportance was far greate r to the Ch:l.n-
e se t han to the Br11.i sh. 
12 Joseph w. Stil~Jell , The Stilwell Pa.~rs. (New 
York: Arr nn eed an d Edited by Theodore H. White , Wtlliam 
Sloane Associa t es , lnc. Publi shers ,, 1948 ), p , 40* 
13 Fred. Eldredge , Wr ath.!!! Burma. , (Garden City, 
Ne w York: Double day and Company, In<.:., 1946 . ) p . 4•7, 
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Already the Chinese had sent two armies-- seven 
divis ions in a ll--to the .Burma borde:r; one of these 
divisions was al1·e ady in line of battle , 400 miles to 
the south . The British • under the oomman d of Lieu ten an t 
General T. J . Hutton , had t wo divisions and a brigade 
of t anks disposed against the Japanese dr1ve , l4 
Cniang had evidently told the Fifth and Sixth Chin-
ese Armies i n Bu.rm~ to t ake 01·dera only :from Stilwell. as 
soon as he arrived . There was st:tll confusion on every-
thing . No unified over- all command and no general pl an for 
operations in Burma, On as~uming command. Stilwell de-
ploys d the Chinese so that the Si x th Army re placed the 
British on the Sal ween River front in the Shan States; the 
Fifth assumed defensive !JOSi tiona in the Si ttang River 
Valley with the front just south of Toungoo , while British 
f orces conso lidate d in the Irrswad<ly River V~1lley s outh of 
Prome . l5 The British had previously pulled their forces 
out of Rangoon , look:tng upon the oi ty as bein g untenable • 
The Briti sh held the s hortest and most def·ensible line , 
and had a t their rear the be s t avenue of escape to India . 
just i n case . The t a.oti cal s ituation also hal d some hope 
for the Chi nese • With a di v is :I. on , the Chine sa 200th, just 
s outh of Toungoo facing the enemy, t he rest of the Fifth 
Army was acrose the l)ogu Yoma Mounta i ns in the Si ttan g 
14 Stilwell , .2l2~ ill• • p . 43, 
15 Eldre dge, 12£• ~· 
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Valley . The left flank, held by the Ch inese Si xth Army in 
the Salween Valle y, was protected by the surr oundin g Shan 
Hills . 
The War De partment, under f ew illus ion s about the 
kind of fight t he Chinese had been making , wan ted t o 
give them sufficient suppl'ie s to keep them in the war, 
and tra i n t hem to the extent tha t they could use the 
arms America i n ten de d to furni sh . By thus ke eping 
China in the \Va.r. the War JJE! partlll:) n t reaaone d, many 
could be used against Mao Arthur in the Pacific. 
Further, by keeping China i n the war, the country was 
denied as a possible haven f or a fugitive Japane se 
Govergment. if and whe n the J apane se i nvaded f r om the 
sea . 
Chians Kai-shek never devulged his reasons f or 
as king f or an American chief of staff.l7 
Stilwell was s elected on the bas i s of his knowledge 
of China. . the Chinet se , and the Chinese ;Language, be-
cause of this knowledge of both t he Chinese and J apan-
ese a rmies , an d be cause General George c. Mar shall 
knew him as an incisive. aggre ss ive officer and a good 
s9ldier, whos e determination and s i ngleness of pu rpos e 
wore s~Hh that he could ge t the job done if anybody 
could. 
All of Burma was now at the stage of being f este red 
with dis conten t an d treachery . 
The strategy of the entire Burma campai gn was cen-
tered about the north-south railway line that ran t hree 
16 Eldredge • .2.12 , ill · • p . 48 . 
17 See appendix . 
18 Fred lUdre dge • ,!!:~!!! .!£ Burna . ( Garden 01 t y • 
New York: Double day an d Company, Inc •• 1946.) p . 48 . 
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hund-red miles from Han goon to Mandalay, and then another 
two hun dre d. and fifty miles more to Myitkyina , in rooter 
gauge, Somewhe re i n central Burma the Allies hoped toes-
t ablis h a. front cutting acros s the r a ilway from e as t to 
we s t , where t he J t\pa.nese inigh t be stop1)ed . 
The actual line of comba t was about one hundred 
miles north of Ha.ngoon , runnine eas t an d wes t for roughly 
one hundred miles . The J apanese were on t he offensive 
pu shing north, whi le the Allies we re trying to shield the 
r ail way as t hey withdrew in order to av oid a route over 
pathless mounta ins and jungle s . 
On March 13 , Field M9.r shall Sir lla.rold Alexander 
arrived to t alte command of British troops in Burma. 
"The J a.pane se i n their swift drive north had al -
most encircled the 200th Divis ion ( Chin ese ) at Toungoo 
in the conter . "1~ In so doing t h e· 
an d Stilwell saw an opportunity f or a oounter~ attaok . He 
wan t ed to conoont1·a te his forces at l)yinma.na on the r a ilway 
s ixty miles north of the front , an d he wan te d to brin g 
do wn the 22nd and 96th Divisions of General Tu Yu-ming ' a 
Fifth Army from the north, where the y were usele ss , to 
the Pyinmana area, wh ere t hey could rescue the 200th Di-
19 J ose ph w. Sti l well , The Stilwell l?ar~rs . ( New 
York: Arrangerl and K'dite d by 'ffi'o[ore H. Whi e , William 
Sloane Ass ocia tes , Inc . Publi shers . , 1948) , p . 58 . 
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vision, S c~ttered across Burma, the Chinese divisions 
would be amashetl one by one, but oonoen trated, they might 
stop the J apan ese ad van oe. The con cen trat:J.on of di vision1:1 
in the ba ttle zone for a counterattack meant not a multi-
plication of opportunity to the Chinese, but a multipli-
cation of risk of loss . The Chine se had a defeatist a tti-
tude on offensive warf are. 
Stilwell gave Alexan der his pl ans for attack and 
Alexander seemed relieved and agree d to cooperate. Chiang 
Kai-ahek had two convictions tha t he har1)e d on con s istently 
to General Stilwell . One was t h.a t Mandal a y was the key to 
the defensive front , en d the other was tha t the Fifth and 
Sixth Armies were not to be tlefeated , 
Actually, M!mdal ay ha d no military s i gnificance 
an d offe red no advantage as a position for defense. 
Onio.ng had never seen it, but a.p]?arently thought o:f. 
it as a walled oit;1 and therefore a s trong point . 20 
On the se oond point , Chi ang ha d similar ide as to 
Churchill, in tha t he was more than willing to let others 
fight China 's ba ttlea,21 Also , the Chinese may have been 
t hinking about the post-war s truggle with the Communists . 
A:fter much arguing, Ch:f.ang finally and partially 
submitted to General Stilwell by giving permiss ion t o 
20 Ibid., p . 67. 
-
21 See appen dix. 
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Stilwell to move the 22nd Dj.vis 1.on from Mv.nda.lay to the 
south to support th o 200th Divi s ion in cuae it was needed. 
On March 23, the J apanese attacked Toungoo. An d 
on March 24 , J ap a ir raids about cleaned out th e American 
a ir su pport • 22 The 200th Divi sion was presse d hard and 
took the brunt of the early J apanese a tta ck . Stilwell or· 
dered the 200th to break out of its encirclement a nd f a ll 
ba ck to ~Jinmana . The 22nd Chinese Division was getting 
set a t Pyinmana to support the 200th as it r etreated. All 
of Stilwell' s orders fo r the 200th were i gnored wi th ex-
cus e s . Fi nally, a Chi nese officer told Stilwell that 
Chiang Ka :J.- shek was persona l l y countermanding his orders .23 
March 26 , there was a riot umong British soldiers 
at Yenangyaung . The l3r1 tish lH3gan destroying the oil 
fields. 24 On March 27, the Briti sh had s t a rted t o n'i th-
draw from Pro roo • 
.At this point, Chi f.l'lg Ka i- shek agreed to over-all 
comman d of Field Mar shllll Alexan der in Bu rnn . General 
Stilwell was r educed to Commande r of Chine se Fifth an d 
Sixth Armies in Burma • Lo Cho-ying re ])l a oed Lin Wei a s 
22 Jose ph w. Stilwell, "!~!he Stilwell Papers ." (New 
York: Arranged and Edited by Theodo r e H. White • Willia m 
Sloane Associates, Inc . Publishers . 1948). pp . 69-70. 
23 Ibid.; p . 78. 
-
24 !ill. • p . 7 2 • 
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Stilwell ' s executive officer. 
Genera l Stilwell left for Chungking, on March 31, 
and a conferen ce with Chia ng Kai-shek . On return , Stilwell 
found that the front h ad withdrawn to the north but was 
still inta ct . The stra tegy was to f all ba ck to Pyinmana , 
where one division would bloody the noses of the Ja~nese 
on d the two otners would be used in a double envelopment. 
The maneuver de pended upon the Bri tiah holding a t Alla.nmyo, 
covering the Chine sa ri sit t fla nk, and on the Chine ae doing 
what they were t old . The Chinese Si xth Army, un der Run Li-
oh ' u, was to figh t south of Loikow and watch the approa ch-
es . 
Before the pl an could be put into ope r a tion . the 
Japs s truck on their l eft flank against the Ih:itiah forces . 
"The :Sri tish , Burna.n , and India n t r oops we re terribly bea t-
en u p, exhausted , and without faith in t heir comman ders . "25 
Desertion be came c ommon, and the Japanese were n ot even 
dela yed by the demolition of bridges . Magwe was l os t an d 
there was nothing left to stop the Japs . Stil well had e. 
conference with Alexander on Jpril 15 , at which time , 
Al exen der tt.dmi tted tba t 'there was no fig ht left in the 
Brf ti sh. The :polyglot l s t Burmese Division was traJ)ped an d 
25 Fred Eldredge , Wra~ ~ Burma , ( Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday and Comrany, Inc ., 1946 , ) p . 66 . 
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a l l but de s troyed . The r e mn ant s of t h i s f o r ce f l ed t o 
Yenangyaun g , t he oi l center . On April 19 . the Japs ca p-
tu:r·e d Yeon ongyaun g, an d on the f ollowi ng day, a r egi ment of 
Gene r a l Sun Li - j en ' s 38th Di v i s ion , ordered the re by 
Sti l well , r e capt ur ed the tovm , 26 The f ree d 13ritish t r oops 
pr o ce ded north , 
Wha t mobile r e se r ve St i l 'l'lell had wa.s behi n d his 
Fi f t h Ar my . " Thi s r e s erve shoul d have bee n r e t a i ned t o 
h andle any un f o1·eeen c..; a tustrophe on the Si x t h t'l. .. r my :front , 
or u se d of f ensively on t he l!'if t h Ar my f r on t . n27 Tho s it-
u a tion ha d be come s o deSI>ero. te to the Britis h t ha t 
Stilwel l, wi th Chi ang ' s consent , had s witche d t wo div-
i s ion s t o bols t er the ri e;ht f l unk . Thi s le f t the li'if th 
Army urea dar. gerous l y weaken ed and wl th p r a cti cally no re-
serve f or poss i ble ne ede n a i d t o t he Si xth Army . On t op of 
t hi s , a s Ma j or Pr unk Merril l had pr evi ousl y s t llt ed , t he 
11 story of t he Bur ma cam})ai en : n o pl an , n o r econna i s san ce ; 
no se curi t y , no i n te lligen ce , no pri s one r s . u28 
On Ap ril 20, ni sas te r s truck a t Loikaw , on the 
Si x t h Ar rey front , cove r i ng the R'astcrn f l ank . ~'he f)5th 
Divi si on was c omple t ely smnshed by the J apanes e . At one 
26 St i l well , .21?. • .EJ: ., p . 90 . 
27 b7l dredge , ..2J2 • ei t ., p . 69 . 
28 St ilwell , QE • ui t ., pp . 59 - 60 . 
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minute Stilwell had a division and a t the next there was 
none ; it disintegrated into units of two three and 
headed north in the general direction of home, General 
Stilwell obtained permission from Alexander to take the 
200th Division away from the British and move it east , in 
an effort to intercept the Japanese ai ming for Lashio. ~he 
i nterception was to be made at Kal aw , Contact was made 
with the Japanese at Taunggyi , but the 200th Division was 
not able to take the tatVn and thus proceded toward Loilem. 
In the meantime• the 96th Division in the center of the 
line \vas chewed up oo d thus Meiktila wa.a left wide open . 
The military situa tion had now c1ete r iorated to 
auoh a point t ha t further offen sive moves seemed senseless . 
The British had already started their exodus from 
Burma . 
An a ttempt wae made by Stilwe ll to get most of tb.e 
American personnel out of .Burma . " Vfe are sendin g 40 pe ople 
Americans to Myitkyina , 1 2 to Katha, and leaving 20 
he re , Shwe bo •• "29 :aut due to the Q on di ti on of the r ailway 
tra cks , and the l ack of a highway t hrough the jungle , 
American he aclquarters p9 raonne l found themselves trapped . 
It was a matter of walking out of Burma , or of waiti ng to 
29 Jos eph w, Stilwell , The Stilwell Puters . (New 
York: Arr ange d and Rdited by Theodore It. whre • William 
Sloane As socia ted. Inc . Publishers , 1948, p . 94 . 
be captured by the J apanese. Stilwell chose to walk, 
Aooording to Rldredge ,30 there we r e ten main 
causes f or the ~llied rout in Burma• 
1. Initia l lack of appreciation of Japfmese cap-
abilities. 
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2. Insufficient garrisoning of Burma with gener-
ally inferior troops, 
3. Laok of mode rn a.i rcraft, 
4, lmprope r training methods baaed on line r a ther 
than all-round de fen sa • 
5, Lack of co-ope ration from the oi vil s overnmen t, 
which seriously hampered military oper ation s . 
6, Un suitability of arms . equipment, and motor 
transporta tion to mounta in and jungle warfare. 
7, Lack of pr oper demolition plans and poor exe-
cution of w.ch pl ans as were devised . 
a • .Paralysis of easentiu.l military utilities by 
the wholesale desertion of native l a bor, 
9, Lack of ageress ive and unif ied command . 
10. Laok of a political l')hilosop·hy that could have 
been translated i n to a cause for the defenders, an d 
an induoemen t to obta in the oo•operation of the civ--
ilian population in the face of the slogan nAa i a for 
the As i atics," 
30 Fred E'l dro dge • Wr ath in Burma (Garden City • New 
York: Do n.ble day and Company, lnc •• 1§46), p . 78. 
Tlffi' PLIGWl' l•'.ROM BUHMA 
Gene:r.tll Stih;ell proceeded to tiuntho with his 
staff and then decided to leave Burm.1 immediately, He J'e-
ceived three garbled wires from C:hiane Kai-shek and an in-
definite wire from General librshall. Stilwell decided to 
take a train to Myi tkyina, but on learning tlv;. t the road 
was jammed, took the only other route out, lie turned off 
on the Katha Hoad and took the western route, 
The Stil we 11 party was corn}>OS e <l. of Arne ric an s, se r-
vo.nts to clo the cookinr:, various Chinese and Anglo-Indian 
truuk drivers and llll chm ics v1ho had worked for the ATG, 
Ts'enr: and Stilwell 1 <> Ch:l.nese bod.yguard, Case, the American 
Jlaptist agricultural missionary, and the Seaf\'rave group, 
which was brir:ging up 111 e rear, The Stil vJe 11 party was 
j o infl d at Wun tho by the St. John party. 
The parties were le 'l by fl<ides and had the use of 
trucks and je eiJS on the early part of the voyap;e, Stilwell 
m1<le every effort to stay ahead of the cl.eluge of Chinese 
th01t follov1et1. ile also continually pre~>scd hi<l party on-
\'iard at a steady 105 paces per mtnute, in o:cder to nvoid 
an ambush by Ja}lane se troopB who were moving rapi.dly up the 
Chindwin River. "The Stilwell f,TOUp was in a perilous JlO-
sition, It 17as threatened by three thine;s: the JapuneEe. 
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the mon s oon, and the Chinese. nl The partie a traveled a a 
far as possible i n the vehicles and then aban doned them. 
The packs were reduced to ten pounds . On May 6. the group 
started off on a two day journey on foot. When t he Uyu 
River was reached, the group shifted to rafts and traveled 
dom the river to Homalin. wh ere tho Chindwin River was 
crossed b y dugouts and freight boat, 
The :Sri t ish m3. t the Stilwell }X\rty at Kawlum. 
Food. dootor, and ponies were made available , After four 
days travel over the Man i pur Hills • the party rea ched 
Ukhrul . It arrived in Impha.l on May 20. 
Quoted a t New Delhi• India , after his trip out 
Stilwell declared: 
Burma i s a vi tally important area f or re-entry into 
China . now blocked from the Bur ro9. Road s upply route .' 
Here • in his own salty words , i s Villa t happened t o the 
1\.llies in Rurma: 'I ola.im we got a hell of a beat ing . 
We go t run ou. t of Burma and it i s humiliating as he 11. 
I think we oug~t t o f i nd out what cau sed it, go baok 
and re take it , 
1 ~~red Rld.redge • Wrath i n Burma (Garden 01 ty, Ne w 
York: Double day and ComJ)l:m y, lnc •• 1946}, P• 103. 
2 Joseph w. Stilwell, The Stilwe 11 Pafera (New 
'Yor k ; Arrange d and. Edited b y "flilieo<iore H. Whi ·e , Willi am 
Slooo e As s ocia tes , I nc . Publi ~3hers , 19 48}. p . 106 411 
CHAPTE Ji VI 
'l'.'!T\ I'!•:HIOD Ol!' l'OJ,ITIC<,J, ciN D HILITAHY l'I,J\NNIUG; 
li'AJ:UY HOAD CONS1~lWCTIOU 
The British ,.,ere obd.urate in their attitude that no 
offermi ve could be mounted to retav,e Burma because of the 
India l'rob le rn and be caue e the Ir111i a Comrll'l.nd was in capable 
o:f defeating the J<\panese in the jungle,l Raised agili.nBt 
that philo;;ophy were only two voices with My power, One 
belonged to Stilwell and the other to Charlo s Orc1e Vline;ate, 
the British found.er oj: the I,ong H>.mge J>enetration GrOUJlS, 
who died. in a plane crash in 1944, "In due course these 
t1~o became the rnoEt bittel·ly hated 1ren j.n India,"2 
Immediately after the JapaneBe victory in l3urnK~, 
Amer1ct< developed nn airplane line over the :umalaya.n HuljlJl, 
and ntartecl J'ly1np tiUpplie>J to 'rleste:m Cilim1, ~:he Hump airline 
was j<J.st an emorgen cy e:xpeclient, and the ultimate solution 
was to cut a road_ through the Jr\]'ane se blockade so that 
11hole 0.rmies could be su.pplied with Buffie;ient materj.al, 
":Burma soemnd. the lor:ical place to ber;in, nn d ti1erefore 
the reconquest of 13u.rU¥.; became an obsession, a primitive, 
2 ~'red Intlredge, .irath in l:urnJa, (Garden City, 
New York: Double clay H!ld Compnny, Inc,, l\l46), I'• 130, 
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sing],e-minded passion at Stilwell ' s oo adquarters • n3 
The co- oper ation of bJ th the British and the 
Chinese was required in order to drive the J apanese out of 
the North Burma jungles and out a 1·oad through the moun-
t ains of. Burma an d China , To Stilwell went the job of 
urgi ng , pleading, threaten i ng and begging both the Brit ish 
and Chinese to or ganize for the inunedi.ate reconquest of 
North Burma and thus end tll) blockade . 
Stilwell ' s strategy was three- l>ronged and wont as 
follow a: 
11 It would require a Chineee drive into eastern 
Burma from her ovnt Yunnan ·fronti er; e. co- Ol'dina te 
drive by the British in South Bu.rrna fr om the Indj.an 
:front:l.e r or f rom the sea; en tl a third drive into 
northwes"te rn Bu.rma from As sam province in northern 
India . Thi s last drive Stilwell4hoped to mount with a joint Chinese-American force," 
In Chungking, StilvJell l a id hi s p l ans before Chi ang 
an d Ho Ying-Qhi n . 'the Chineae Mi ni ster of War. · Previous ly, 
Stilwe ll h ad r eceived a grudging approval f rom Lor d 
Linlithgow an d Wavell on tu.rnihg an Italian pris oner-of -
war own:p in Ramgarh . 13iha r Province • over to the 9 • 000 
Chin EHH~ already comir1g i nt o India . So in return for 
Stilwell ' s promise t o fu rnish an India trai ning site and 
3 Jos e ph w. Stilwell. The Stilwell Paiers (Ne w 
Yor k: .Arrwged and Edited byTheodore H. Wi1 te , Willia m 
Sloru' e Assoc i a tes . Inc . l'ublishe re, 1948), p, 100 . 
4 Loc . !!.!· 
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the necessary instructors and equipment. Chian g promised t o 
furnish unlimited manpower. In order to spread the burden • 
the l3ri ti.ah were asked to continue paying and feeding the 
Chinese , and to furnish unifo rms . All arma and a.mmu.nition 
woUld be furnil:lhed from the United States, with the excep-
tion of Bren guns and some Dren Bun carriers , The Ameri-
cans were to have exclusive control over training , Finall y , 
the United States Qovernroen t su.cceeded in getting Ohurohill 
to p:3rmit additional Chineae in India , 
For the ro-taking of Burma , - Wavell was made Supreme 
Commander. This post was asked for by Wavell M d waa 
agreed to by Ohiane Ko.:l.- shek. Stilwell knew that either 
Chian g or himself wool d not ee t 1h e com)~le te backing of the 
British, so Wavell was the only choice , Stilwell would have 
agreed to almost anyone if some i mmediate action f or the 
re-takins of Bttrna could have been achieved . 
On June 25, 1942, an i ncident oooured that was t o 
. signal the beginning of the long p9raona.l f'eud between 
Chd.e.ng and Stilwell. American e. ir units auddently V1i thdrew 
' . 
f~om Indiu to mppprt the perilous situation in the Mi ddle 
Rae t, whel'e Rommel approach.:! d the gates of Alexandria , 
Stilwell suddenly found himself con:fron ted with a Chinese 
ul t ir.na tum .. - the famou s ~hre e Demand a : 
Chian g derw.nded that three United Sta tea di via i ons 
'be (lispatched forthwith to the Burma f1•ont; that 600 
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planes with concomitant replacements be assured him; 
that the United States guarAntee him 5.ooo t one a month 
of airborne supplies ov.er the Hump by August,''o 
The alternative was that the Chinese would make 
other arran gen:ente . As too demands were ;.mpoas ible at that 
t'i me . Pre a ident l~oosevel t po:ti tel y re j ectec1 them. Chiang ' a 
wrath was thenceforth focused on Stilwe ll. 
In the me an time , Ramgurh began to t ake sha~ • 
"The infoo try school was under McCabe • a rtillery under 
Sliney, and tre sos unde r Uolcomb . "6 Chiang agreed that 
the Americ ans would handle the train:l.ng oo d the Chinese 
gena r al s would absorb t a ctics an d furn :l.ah the pupils f or 
the classes , ru.ong w.i th mindin g their own business . The 
~Oth end 22no. Divis ions we re react1. vated and placed at full 
strength, . They remained under the generals who had com-
man ded them i n Burma, Genel.'al Sun r~i-jen and General I,iao 
Yuo- hs ien g. 
Ramgarh was a wonderlan d for the Chinese s oldiers . 
They were well-fed, practiced on the ran gecl with live 
shells and real bullets , their he a lth wae well cared for, 
an d most important of' all--they \Vere paid. 
At first , the Arne r ic un s t aught by example and the 
5 Jose ph w. Stilwell1 TOO Stilwell Parers ( New York; Arranged a1 d Edited oy~ odore H, Whte. William 
Sl oane Associates, Inc . l?u.blishert~ , 1948) • p . 118. 
6 Eldredge,~ · cit. , p . 139 , 
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Chine s e copi ed , and gr out mimics they were . Between 1942 
a.nd 1944 , four Chinese divisions were created and equipped 
hore of an effectivene~ls ne ver before known i n Chinese 
hi s to r"jr . 
"All the Allies agreed tha t the Burma campai gn 
would be gin in mid-February of 1943 , "7 Stilwell took it 
upon himself to urge both of his reluctDn t alli es to a cti v-
i ty , a(~ the autumn of 19 42 , was t o be pe riod of hiP,',h 
preparation on both s ides of Burma . In China , Ho Yin g-chin , 
chief of s t a f f of the Chinese Army promise d tha t tl)3 thirty 
di visions for the Yoke f orce , with divi sional desie;nutions 
on paper , woul<l be based in Yunnan Province and be re a tly 
for Ame r ican tra ining . 
The t:omb1ned chiefs of s t aff i n Washi ng ton i nf ormed 
Stilwe 11 t h at he co n.l d expe ct rl o i nc re use i n e qu. i pmen t or 
supplies for his projected offen sive , but he ur ged the pro-
ject on . 
Howe ver, early in De cember , Stilwell ' s plans f or 
the spring offens ive we re shaken . 
"Generul Wavell in India decided tha t the Burma 
offensive was much to o diff icult a 1)roje ot t o unde rta lm a t 
the t irre . "8 Stilwell flew f rom Chungki ng to Delhi to rein-
7 Stilwe ll , .2.E • _21t . , p , 160 . 
8 Jo seph 1'1 . Stil v;ell , Tm Stilwell Papers ( Nevi 
York: Arrene;ecl and i~ cli ted by 'rr.~e odore H. White . Willia m 
Sloane .Assouio. tes , Inc . Publishers , 1948) , p . 175 , 
'10 
still him with confidence tha t the offensive would succeed. 
but the trip was only partially successful . Wavell cut the 
limits of the objectives previously agreed on, and out down 
on the number of British-Indian troops promised. 
A month l ater • Stilwell learned through channels, 
third-hand , that Chiang Xai- shek ha d wired President 
Roosevelt decla ring that the ill1inese would not fight in Burma 
that spring. 
A sprin g off ensive in 1943 seene d impossible so 
Stilwell set about organizing his f orces for a f all off en-
sive instea d. 
Wavell• having previously turned down a plan by 
Stilwell , f inally agreed that the British would substitute 
a very Srll\ll diversionary attack on t he Ara.kan . down the 
lAayu Peninsula , with Akyab as the objective and send Win-
ga te into North Central Bu.rma. . The remainder of the plan 
was to attack Kalewa with the 17th a nd 23rd Divisions from 
Impha l, and reach and hold the line of the Childwin. ''The 
oetens ible re ason for the capture of Akya.b was to establish 
fi ghter plane bases to support any future amphibious 
attack on Han goon. n9 
The Americana didn 't like the Arakan thrust 
9 Fred Eldredge , Wrath in :Burrna ( Ga rden C1 t y , New 
York: Doubleday and Company, lnc. , 1946) , p . 149. 
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because it was of dubious s t r ate gic value. but with British 
superiority victory seemed assured. 
The Briti sh moved slowly to Chittagong , grouped. 
and prepared to advan ce. Then they inched their way down 
the coas t al pla in of the Mayu Peninsula• with only slight 
patrol action. In doing ao. they paid little attention to 
the Kal a.punzin River Valley on the other side of the Mayu 
Mountains to their left, but they were progre ssing . By 
the middle of ]1ebruary, after a month of slow going, the 
Jape stoppe d the British along the coas t al plain. The 
British had a division an d the enemy force did not exceed 
a regiroont. Suddenly t he Japanese in the Kal apanzin 
Valley crossed the Mayu. Range in t he British re ar. The 
British, findin g they were t r apped, turne d an d f ought their 
way back to Chittagong with only the remnan ts of . their 
origi nal f or ce. And t ha t was t he end of any British activ-
ity for the season. 
The Chinese 38th Division, well-trained a t Ramgarh. 
was moved t o the Ledo area in prepar ation f or an off ensive 
down the Hukawns Valley, but Generaliss i mo Chiang Kai- shek. 
wi thout warn i ne directed Stilwell t o cancel his attaok . 
Due t o t he summe r monsoons ther e was no hope f or an of f en-
sive unt il t he f all, 
The Ledo- ~witkyina oombat an d road assignment was 
not t aken by St ilwel l by choice. He had want ed to build 
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the road along his e s cape route. eas t f rom Implml . The 
terra in . although rugged an d. jungly was e as y oompar~d t o 
what he kne w he would have to :face in the north, Hcmever , 
Stilwell was told that he could not builcl the road from 
Imphal because it wae being reserve c1 as a supply route for 
Briti sh troppe . "It was , of course, unthinkable to let 
StilweJ,l use the Imphal area to l aunch an attack from a 
British bas a garrisoned .by British troops,nlO 
In t he construction of t he Ledo Road, the first 
attempts were known as the British Pe riod , 
When t he Japanese Armie a took Rangoon on Mar ch 8 , 
1942; and out the Burma Road , it be came obvious tha t a new 
route of l an d supply would have to be opened if the United 
St a te s w.e-r e t o ca r ry out its co mmi tments to China . 
Early routes which were cho cke d t ncluded the North 
1\fghan &ld Trnns-Iran i an r outes , both of whi ch would 
utilize Huasia ' s Central As i an Ratlway . ana. both of 
which we re long and i nvolved with diplomatic compli· 
cat i ons on1£he que stion of neutrality between Ruasia and Japan • 
'rha Bri tiah • 1.n the l ate 30 ' s • had surveyed a route 
s temming f ro m Led.o up over the Patka.i Mounta i ns and down 
t hrough t he Hukawng a nd Mogaung Valleys of nor t hern Burma . 
10 El dredge , 12£• oit , 
ll Fi rst Convot Over the Ledo Roan, Public 
Re l a ti on s Of~icer . Y- 7oroeOpe ratrO"ila ::3 t aff , Un ited Sta te s 
Arley' : P• 3 • 
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In 1942, this route was planned on ly as a jeep ro~ te • 
Ori8inally it was pl anned to have Chinese labor 
build northward from MogaunB. and the British build east 
an d s outh f rom Ledo. but Japanese pene tration of northern 
Burma soon ruled out t he poss ibility of the Ch:tne se effort. 
In Ootober, 1g42• General St ilwell an d Fi eld 
Marshall Lord Wavell (then General Wavell) met and 
de cided t hn.t the cons truction of the Loclo Road would 
be an American respon sibility, aubjeot to the approval 
of the Gene~alissimo, f rom whom it wou~d be necessary 
to obtain the rele ase s of Lend Lease stores of roa d 
buildi o2 equiprront whioh coul d not be moved in t o 
China •1 
Later. American Army official s met in Delhi and 
drew up plans for the Ledo Hoad project. These plans were 
submitted to Gene r al Stilwell on November 5, H>42 , Al-
though the pl ans were i nde:f.:1.ntte . it was genera lly a cce pted 
that th e route of the ro ad would roughly :follow the Refugee 
Trail to Shingbwiyang. 
On December 1. 1942. the advan ce contingent of 
Americ~m t roops a rrive d in Ledo and went to work on 
the roa d \d th the J3ri tish engi neers, who had , by that 
time, cut the road to a point which i s now Mil e o.oo 
on tne Ledo noad.l3 
. The British started t heir se ction from Makum. The 
Roa d becaroo officia lly an Ameriosn J> roject on De cember 10,. 
1942 , 
12 I bid., pp . 3-4. 
13 ,!ill., P • 4 . 
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On January 18, 1943. the appoin tment o£ Ch 'en 
Ch ' ong, as commander of the Y f orce was confirmed, In Yun-
nan , the Stilwell 30 Divis ion Pl an had s tarted, en d infan-
try and artillery schools were established near Kunming. 
Cadres of officers and men selected from Chinese divisions 
' 
came t o these school s . These cadres were trained in the 
use of Amer::l.oan arms and sent back to their outfits to 
carry on the training in preparation for the receipt of 
equipment as soon as it became available. Stilwell was not 
too optimistic about the ultimate success of this program. 
beoauae of the short tra ining period that appeared t o be 
ahe ad . 
In the meantime , the lOth Air Force had been built 
up in Inida t o a point where it was on more than a parity 
.. 
with the Japanese. and had commenced to take the offensive , 
r ather than assume a purely de:fensi ve role . Ma jor General 
Cl ayton Bi ssell had previously been appointed as command• 
ing genera l on August 18 , 1942,14 Since Bi ssell was 
bran de d as a Stilwell mrul , f riction developed between 
Bi ssell and Chennault over air planning f or the war agai nst 
J apan , 
Chennault was obsessed with the idea tha t t he Jap-
anese Ar~v could be conta ined in China with air power 
alone. In addition, he i nsisted o·n an ~1ir force com-
14 J o tH3ph W, Stilwell , The Stih·1ell Pafers (New 
York: Arr anged and E'dited by ?~heodore H. Whi ·e, IVi lliam 
Sloane Associa tes , Inc. Publi shers , 1948l, p . 130 , 
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posed of fighters and medium bombers, with a primary 
strategy of destroying the Japanese Air Foroe in 
China. Chennault further wanted what Hump tonnage was 
avai.lable eiven to his air force. without regard to 
United States collll£itmenta for training and equippir1g 
the Chinese Army. 5 
Chennault and the Chinese wanted advMoe air bases 
to be used against the Japanese, but Stilwell and Bissell 
refused to ag1·ee until the Chinese A:rmy was strong enough 
to hold them 1 
In December of 1942, a small group of American en-
gineers. under the oomoond. of Brigadier General John c. 
Arrowamtth, started the construction of the Ledo Road from 
Aeeam Province in India. The 13ri tiah had allocated the 
necessary tonnages on the Assam-Bengal Hail.way and the 
Brahmaputra Darge Mne to support the construction of the 
road. This phase in the building of. the Road is known as 
the li'arly u.s. Period• 
When this phase began there was relatively few 
American Engineer troops und little moderr1 construction 
maohine ry on hand to carry on the job. The B'ngineers 
could count altogether fifteen rock crushers, five steam 
shovels, about fifty dilapidated British trucks, a few 
small bulldozers. a few Chinese mule pack trains. and an 
15 Fred E'ldre dge, Wrath in Burm (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday and Compan'Y; Inc,, 19461, p, 152, 
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assortuent of untrained native laborers . l6 At one period , 
the trucks were kept on the road only by resorting to can-
nibalization, a practice which consisted of appropriating 
enough parts from one truck to keep others running. 
The Engineers set to work pushing the road up into 
the Pa tkais from the Mile o.oo mark. By January 1, 1942, 
the lead bulldozer was at Mile 15 • Access road. A and ma.in-
tenanoe operations were discarded in an effort to make as 
much progress as possible before t he onset of the monsoon . 
lndi an l abore r s we z·e imported in l arge numbers when 
a critical shortage of heavy equipment threatened to hamper 
the progress of the road trace . These l aborers were workers 
from the t ea plantations of Assam and Bengal , Kachin and 
Travenoore cooli es, and porters from the Garo and Darjeeling 
hill country; all cleared the new trace by hand. Their 
labor was never wholly satisfactory, a1 though 4\Ccompliahing 
a useful purpo se , beoauae most of the men were untra ined and 
the term of their contract ran f or only three to six months. 
When the se contracts expired, the men usually returned to 
their homes, thereby necessitating the hiring of new. un-
tra ined laborers . Very ofte n, l abor contracts stipulated 
that IOOn be stationed in high altitudes to which they were 
1944, 
16 Magazine Page in the New~ 1~. March 19, 
accus tome d, thus , creo. t i ng u problem in the l)l u.cemen t of 
workers. 
"On li'ebru.ary 26 , 19 4 3, t he l e ad bulld.ozer crossed 
over Panp,suu Fass i nto Burma-- Mile 30 . 50 of the new 
tra ce . "1 7 Tha t eveui nr.; a forma l retre a t was held by the 
77 
office rs un d enlis ted men of the Engi neering units att a ch-
ed a t t he poin t . celebra t i ne t he entran ce into Burma . 
In the mi dclle of Murch t he torren tial rains of the 
1943 mons oon soason turned the ne VI highway i n to a sea of 
mu.d . All su.pplie ~~ . i n cludine the f uel for the lea d bull-
dozers . ha d t o be carried f orward by coolie s , Rivers rose 
aa much as forty-five feet in a few days , Bulldozers , 
trucks , an d. eve n mule s , fell ove r shee r clif f s on Pangsau 
Pass . 
By the end of Ma rch , the le a d bulldo ze r v1as at 
Mile 4'1 , 3 .18 Not much new tra ce was completed a t tha t 
time us the Eng ine ers battl eel to mainta in and hold the 
roadway they already had cu t agai nst the en cr oa chmen ts of 
the torrential dovmpours . 
On March 31 , 1943 , a l a r ge Jt~. pa.n cae pa trol wa.a re-
ported beyond the poin t of the r oad. Security 
17 F i :rst Convoy Over t h e Ledo Road , Put lic 
Relut:lons Officer, y-.E'orce Ope rations ~tuff, United St a tes 
Army: p . 4 . 
18 !Jo o • cit • 
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patrols were sent out by the h'n ginee:rs but were with-
dra.wn i~ three weeks when no con tuc t was made with the 
enemy . 
r .. ater it wus lea rn ed that a l arge for ce of Japs ha d 
advan ced beyond 'l'agap , but VJere forced to withdraw to their 
supply baso at Shingbwiyang when their native porters and 
el ephant con tractors de se rte d t he ex1)e di tion , t aking the 
el e})hants with them. 
"Prior to the advent of the rains , the f irst sub-
dep ot was ~et up at Hell Gate (Mile 30 .78) . 11 20 When the 
monsoon made even t he native porter supply line a pre ca r-
ious and uncerta in affair , air- dro pp::i.ne units were organ-
ized and supplies were dropped to the forward units by par-
c llu.te . 
'.l.'he Eneinee rs underwent untold hardships c1uring the 
r a ins . Thos e wh o slept in water- l oe r:ed tents or ba m1)oo 
le an-tos , were soaked to the ski n all o f the time . 
l~very sar. i t a r y precaution was t aken to protect the 
health of the men . Recreation programs ancl movies we re put 
on to boost morale . 11 The greatest morale bo osters , howover, 
were the ne w trucks an d armored-bulldozer s , und the esta~-
19 .B'ir s t Convoy Over the Le t'l o Houd, l'u.hli c 
Relat ion s Offi0er , Y-Foroe Opera tions Staff , United States 
Ar my : p . 4 . 
20 I bid . , p . 5 . 
liehment of maintenance de pots manned. by f i rst-cla.sB 
me chanics . " 21 
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Stibvell rep orte d tha t Arrowsmith was do i ng fairly 
1)2 
well wi th the road , but he was no ball of f ire . r.;, The 
Road a ppea red t o be etCI!l djng ur> well . In the early stages 
there was poor uomn~nd i n the 823rd and the 45th ( U. S . ) 
Engineer ba ttalions , whereas , the Chine i'ie lOth En gineers 
were doing BOO cl. work . 
From an Americ an viewpoint , the Stih'lell Road was 
an absolu te neceosity i n conductine; the war in itB begin-
ning stages was progr essing i n fair Bhape . 1'he Bri tj_eh took 
from the start and continued to take a differen t an d en-
tirely oppos j. te view on the s itua tion . 
Th e Brit ish fough t the construction of the Stilwell 
Road from the day it was f i rst ment ione d until the day 
j_t was completed , The y fought i t i n every oonceivab_le 
vw.y , 1mt a l ways behi nd the scenes ,even after t hey had 
approve d it . They ne ver dared come out into the open 
because of the i mpa ct a ' refusal to he l p China ' mi gh t 
h ave had on Ameri can J?Ublio opi nion aml thetr fu tur e 
relat ions "vi th the Chinese . Bu.t i n the se cret stuff 
sessions of Delhi , London , and Vhu·Jhine;ton , the best 
British brni n g co mb:in ed to prove that th i s road was 
i m11 0m1ible , that it was non ~1en se . The :Briti sh :f ou.gh t 
thi s ro ad be co.u s e th ey were afr a id of' t he Chinese , m d 
because its cre ati.on mi ght threaten t he gre a t shipping 
21 \~ayne Whittaker , "~he Uoad ~~hat Couldn ' t 13e 
J3u. il t , " Po;Jula. ;r Me ohan ics . 83 : 5 , May , 1 945 .. 
22 Jo seph w. Sttlwell , 1'he Stilwell: I:a.Eers (New 
Yol'k : Arranged and Edi ted by Theo dore H. Whi t e , William 
Slo ane Ass ociates , Inc • .Pu.1)1ishers , 1948 ) , 1' · 202 . 
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monopolies that controlled all traffic between India 
and Burma, 1 Busine as as usual' never went out of 
fashion in India, Oddly enouo;h they were still fight-
ing the road when lllountbatten'rs :press people. started 
to maneuver the publicity so that Mo1,1,gtbatten could 
r.;et the cretlit for its construction."' 
'rhe British furtr.er agreed thD.t the construction of 
the Still'lell Road was impossible for various reasons, 
It was imposs.illle because of the r.;rea.t land mass 
between J,edo and Shingbwiyang, because of the jungle, 
because of the hip:h incidence of malaria (125 per cent 
among the native popule.Uon), because of the mom~oon 
rains, because of the lack of any gravel in the 
Hukawng Valley, be cause the Assam-Bengal line o:f com-
munications could not del her reqaired tonnages ,24 
' 
In April of l'J4.3, Stilwell, Chennuul t, Brigadier 
General William D. Olcl, chief of staff of the lOth Air 
Forue, and representing J3issell, Colonel :ll'rank Merrill, 
OBI G-3, uncl Wavell tmd his air and ground commanders, were 
all <mmmoned to appear before the ~'rident Conference in 
iVasilineton for a r:ene r,11 review of 'Jtrategy in Asia. All 
testified before the Combined. Chiefs of Staff, 
The :Britiflh presented a solhl front clalwing that 
the arr:JY in Inclia lt~cked the l"esonrces or training to 
laun uh a 13urma campair:n, 
Stilwell ttl d Old areued in behalf ol' conl:truction 
of the road in order to move he nvy equi11men t to Chin a 
lo3 I!' red li'J.d.re <lr;e, \'ira th in Burm,t. (Garden 01 t .v, 
New York: Doubleday and CompanY. Inc,, 1946), pp, 133-4, 
24 ~ •• p, 161, 
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which it would be une conomic:a l to f ly . They ar gued i n 
f avor of incre ased Hum~) tonnage to be alloca t ed pre-
domina tely t o Stilwell s Chin ese trainin g and comba t 
commo.n d. a l rea dy tra inin g Chinese cadre s , and desir-
ous of equipping clivisions in Yunnan . Stilwell con-
temptuous l;>r tossed a side t he argumen t tha t n o overlan d 
offe rJ sive could be mountec1 to retake North Burma .• a nd 
sta ted that &I aggressive combined effort the J anu ary 
before woul~ have made a dee p penetra tion before the 
r a in s came . 5 
The Bri tl. sh were united on stra tegy but the Ameri-
cans were not. Chennault pre s ented an enti rely i nde pendent 
line . He promised to drive the J aps right out of China in 
s i x months . 26 He argued f or a lmost a ll the tonnage t o sup-
port his China Air Task Force. and aske d f or more planes 
for the Chine s e Ai r Force . 
The Combine tl Ch iefs :ruled tha t top priority must 
be given the Air Tr ansp ort Command to build up capao-
i ty until it was capable of moving 10. 000 tons per 
month over The Hump . Nine te nths of t he tonnage was 
a lloca ted to Chennault by direction of Prestdent 
Hoos e vel t . At the same t t me Stilwell an d Wavell we re 
directed to t a ke vigor ous a ction to be g in a Burma 
campai en at the end of t he mon s oon in October. Add-
itional a~~craft f or the Chinese Air Force was dis -
approve d .• 
The code n arm of Saucy was agreed upon :ror the of-
fensive in t he fall . 
Be hi nd the politica l s cene s the British maneuvered 
to have their ene my Stilwell reca lled , and Stilwell asked 
25 Fred El dredge , Wr a th in BurnYl . ( Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday a nd Compan y , Inc., 1946) , P. · 161. 
26 Stilwell, _QJ2 . _c:it •• p . 204 . 
2? E'l dredge • 2.12 . ci t . , p • 16 2 • 
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that Wavell be replaced by somebody willing to fight and 
not bound by defeatism, At the same time • the Chinese de- , 
manded Bissell ' s recall on the basis of his hostility to 
China aid and pe rae cu tion of Chennault. Out of the s oram-
ble. Bissell soon was recalled to become G-2 of the War 
Department, deapi te violent Stilwell opposition. "The 
Ohina Air Task Force became the 14th Air Forae , with 
Chenna ult in oommand, and General Howard 0, Davidson sub• 
aequently assumed command of the l0th~"28 Stilwell was 
politically untouchable because of his standing with both 
the War Department and the Arne r:l. can :public. 
Unsatisfactory as the Washington conference had 
been, it• a t least. set a t arget date f or new action. 
Upon returning from Waohing ton. Stilwell made an 
inspection of the new Ledo Road , He found the road 
stumbling along inefficiently under lll·igadier Genera l 
Arrowsmith and abl~ptly directed Wheeler, the SOS command-
er. to relieve him f orthwith, On too sale otion tha t took 
place, General Stilwell staked his re puta tion , a nd the 
success o f the Allied campa i gn in Burma. • on the ability to 
Louis A. Pick not only to build the Road but to do it in 
record time . Colonel Pick , l ater to becorm a major gen-
er al. relieve d Arrowsmith and did a f ant as tic job of al-
28 Eldredge, 2E• £!!., PP t 163-4, 
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most killing h1.mself ood his ~mn to complete the road. 
Lewis A, Pick was born at Brookneal, Virg1.nia, Nov-
ember lB, 1890, He is married to Alice Cary l'ick. ;1tl d 
has one son, Lewifl ,,, Pick, II, 
Pick attenc1ed Virginia l'olytechnic Institute, 1914 
to 1917, ood graduated as a civil engineer, In 1923 
to 1924 he atteno.ed Engineer School at n•ort Belvoir, 
Virginia, In 1932 to 1934 he attended the Student 
Command and General Staff School at ~'ort Leavenworth, 
Koo s as , In 1 \J 38 to 19 ~?9 he was a stu den t at the "\rmy 
War College, Washington, D,c, Pick entered m:l.litary 
se1•vice May 15 1 l\Jl7, and was in training from this 
date until August 15, 1917, ll'rom Ilovember, 1917 to 
June, 1919, he was company comnlD.!lder of the 23rd En-
e;ine era, He served in the Meuse- Areonne Offensive 
with the 1st Army of the .d.,E',E', As a full colonel he 
was asstgned to this base October 16, 1943, d.s D:l.v-
ision 1.\'ngineer, MisBouri Hiver Division, Omaha, 
Nebraska, March 1942 to September 1943, l'ick was in 
immediate charr:e of war construction in nine states of 
the Missouri Valley amountinp; to 1-1/2 billion dollars, 
In 1943, he developed the 'Pick l'lan for the conrpre-
hens ive development of the Missouri H:l.ve r for flood 
control, navie;ation, hydro-electric power, ana. irri-
gation to cost about one bHlion dollnrs as a post-
war undertakin!f, for the ernploymon t of men on a worth-
while project, 9 
r.ewis l'ick, as a xule, srloke softly, with a South-
ern drawl, Men v1ho worked. with him on the roa<l could not 
remember a s:l.ne-1e occasion when he blew his top, He could 
get smolderingly angry ood impatient, but in a way that 
jibed with his genemlly :Jubdued behavior, He rarely 
laughed outrie;ht, but smiled slowl,y, the urj_nkles about 
his mouth and eyes x·eflectinp: his ever-ready sense of 
29 First Convo;y Over the Ledo Hoall, Public 
Relations Officer, Y-Force Operations-mff, United St.•.ttes 
Army: 11, 2, 
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humor . 
He bore his f ifty-four ye urs 1945 well an d st ood 
as stra i gh t a s a jun gle handwood . On the Ledo Road, he 
diS l)l a ye d umc1. zing ene r gy, heine out on the job f rom 'twelve 
to fifteen hours a day , v:al kinr; , jeeping, inspe cting .30 
During the me.ny months thu t he ~upervis e d cons truc-
t i on of the Roa <.l , Pick invariably carri ed a stick out from 
the june le. As a result, to t hoAe he comrnande d along the 
Ledo Roacl , he be cl:lme kn own as "Pick , the man with the 
stick, " aptly des cribing the driving fo r ce he dis pl a yed in 
pu shi ng a he ad thi s i mmense eng ineering project , 
Wh<·m Bri p;a<.lier Gene r a l I'ick e.s sumed col1l!M.nd of the 
Le do Road project on October 13 , 1943 , progress on the Hoa d 
s eeme d hopelessly sta.ll e(t :i.n o. mo.ze of aense l y junr.;le d an d 
preci1)i tous mount a i ns . The :~ir s t a ttempt t o hu1J d the Hoad 
was r e r.;urde d as a failure . For more than a year , engi neers 
h ad s trugcrl e d with the Road in pushirJg it for f orty-five 
mj_les through the Naga Hills . Many men ha0 broken unde r 
t he pressure of the t ask . Ei ght y per cent of the crews 
were hospitalized wtth mu.l ariu . Idttle equi pmen t and just 
a few compe tent workers we re uvutlable . The crews we re 
wo rkin r but one eie;h t-hour s !Uft a day . 
30 Arti<.:le in t he New York Ti mes . li'ebru ury 11 . 1945 . 
The proje ct see med hopeless when , on hi s f irst 
eveni ng in Le do , in October , 1943 , J?ick cal led a s t aff 
meeting i n the Officers ' mess hall . 
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"I ' ve hearcl the same s tory all the way fr om the 
St utes , n he told his s taff . "It ' s u.l~ays tho 'Same - -
the Lcdo Road can ' t be built . Too much mud , to o much 
rain , to o much mal ari a . .b1 rom now on we ' r e f orgett t ng 
t h i s defe a tist spirit . The r~e do Road i s go?.ng t o be 
bui lt, mud und r a i n an d mal a r i a be damned ~ " 31 
General Pic k ' s f i rst act w~s to move Road Head-
quarters up to the poj.nt . Nex t he i nstituted a 24 h our 
workin g s che dule . When told thu. t there was no lieht for 
workin ~ nights , he roun ded up all the ava ilable lip.hti ng 
equi proont on the buse ~1.nd shj.pped. it f orwa rd . When this 
proved i n t1dequa.te , :Pick i na.ue;urate d a rrethod of burn ing 
f l a res i n buckets of oil . Thi s method \Vas wi o.ely us ed for 
n i ght work o,lonr.; the roa d . 
General Pick now SJ)ent four f i fths of his time with 
hi s men i n ·the juneJ.e . He was with t hem on the job every 
day , s harine their ha r dships , r oin g about with a lmo s t clos -
ed eyes and swoll en face <.t.S the result of a jungJ.e infec-
tion . .As -the men saw him, their sp i r its r ose an d t hey 
worked wi th re double d ener ey . Pick knew hundreds of his 
men by n a. ITJ3 , got fSOO d f ood for them, and best qu.a rtern 
th~ t could be provide d , an d .fre(1uent movie s . 
31 IHrst Convoy Over the JJedo Roat't , .Q.Q• <.:it ,, p , 5 . 
Genera l Pic k onue sv.id.: "I can lr:ee p u p with 
Stilwel l as fas t as he uan drive the Japs out of t h:l.s 
urea . " 32 He did . 
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:~.f ter Stilwell ' s retur n r eturn fr om Washington . and 
during the per tod of the monsoon , the 38 th Chine se Divis j.on 
was deployed i n the june-l e he yon d Ledo , giving outpos t 
pro te c tion to the .Americ a n r oa d builders . 'l'he training of 
t he 22nd Division con t inued a t Hameurh . 
Severa l events h~ppeno d on :::>til \Vell' s r etu rn to 
i ndica te to him tha t milita r y ac t ion was f orthcomi ng on 
the let-up of the mons oons in October. 
On June 19 , ;htvell , who had been £l t horn i n 
Stilwell ' s s i de , was pushe d ups t a i r s to repla ce Lord 
JJinli thga.w as Viceroy of I n di u, and Genera l Sir Cl~ude 
Attchinle ok be ce.roo Comnnnder in Chief . 
ll one with the previous directive from the Com-
bined Chi e f s of Staf f , StiJ. ,,vell wan bols t e red by the 
s i r:;nef1 Sau cy :pr opos ,•.l s of ChiMe Ka i-shek . Further-
more , authority was obta i ne d , ov er British an d Ch1.nese 
ob jectionH , t o move ove 1: the Hump to Ir1di o. mor e Chi nese 
troops ; enough to activa te an othe r divi s ion , less one i n -
f an try re gi ment . 
Thi s pt\ r t i a l d.ivision , the 30th , wus moved t o 
a2"Pick ' s .Pi ke" , 'l'ime Magazi ne , 44 : 30 , Jul;y- 17, 
1944 . 
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North Bur!1l'l early in 1\!44, where it y.erforllX!d in-
differently against the Ja1J0.nese but ;?as of consid-
erable assistance by be1.ng present and available to 
relieve tired. troops of the other two divisions. The 
38th 1ll1~322nd, after muddling beginnings, became crack troops, 
In Aup;ust of 1943, the ~uadrunt Conference was held 
at the Citadel in c!uebec, Out of it a new command for 
Southeast Asia was developed that offered promise at long 
i ~4 last of some activ1. ty aga nst the enemy in As1.a.."' The old 
IntUa-Burma command structure was scrapped and the new 
Southeast Asia Command, reB})Onsible for air sea, and e;rou.nd 
operat1.ons ae;a1.nst the enemy was substituted, The India 
Command. was relee;ate d to an adwinistrati ve posit ion, The 
China-Burma-Intl:l.a Theater was integrated w1.th Southeast 
Asia Corrrnand with ~ltih1ell as Der>uty Supreme Allied Com-
mantler, J,or£1 JJou1.s Mountbatten was made Supreme Allied 
Commander, However, Mountbntten was put in the t'lelightful 
military position of Bupreme Allied Cornmaniler with subor-
dinates of his own race, but of the old hierarchy (i, e,, 
Gifford, Peirse, ilomerville l, but not completely 1l.llswnrable 
to him, makinf, it a comtro.nd that wasn't a command, 
Between the ,,~uadran t Conference and the Cairo Con-
ference Ma,Jor General Dan I, Suttan was relieved from oorn-
33 l!'re d Ill dredge, \iru th 1n Burm!cJ, (Garden Ci. ty, 
New York: Doubleday 1l.lld CompanY: Inc,, 1946) p, 16li, 
34 Ibid,, p, 167, 
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mand of un a rmy corps and ~cnt to CBI to becom3 Stilwell ' s 
deputy . As he 1)ecame established, he assumed most of the 
the a ter ' s adminis trative loud . Sultan ha d the unique a.bil-
i ty o:f:' getting along with the l~ri tis h and. getting many 
thine;s t ha t Stilwell wanted from the British . 
The Quebec Conference had set a supply goal t o 
China o:f 20 , 000 ton s pe r month over The Hump . 65 , 000 
ton s ove r the Sti lwell Road , and 54 , 000 tons of 
petroleum products through the pi pe linea , which were 
scheduled to run from Calcutta. to Ass am and then a l ong 
the Stilwell Hoad to Kunmi ne; . 38 
On the basis of 7 , 000 tons per ship , about twenty 
Victory ships per month would be needed to transport the 
139 . 000 tons to Indi a , for trv.ns:fera.l to Chj na . By way of 
comparison , one could contras t the 13~ . 000 tons with the 
1 , 900, 000 ton s unloa ded i n Brita i n the month precedine the 
l andings i n Normandy . 
I n order to build t he roa d and pi pe 1 i ne f rom J,edo 
it was ne cessary to cle ur the Ja.pu.ne se from the roa d trace . 
1'he Japanese were well aware of the J>l a n , l ong before the 
actua l ron d con struction started . The J upu.nese l)rondcast 
the plans f or the Stilwell Hoa.d t:md Stdd the Americ ans 
woulcl uc<:o mplish t v1o t hi nes in building it . 
In the f irst place , the y will tea ch the British 
how to bu:ild roads-- s ome thing they never have l earn-
ea--se cond , the ro a d will be f i n i shed jus t in time 
35 Ibid ., p . 177 . 
for us to use it to invade Indi a . :36 
The J r.qn me se t hemselves had built a dry-wen ther 
road from tho railway town of Mogaurtg north to Shingbwi-
yung . American pl ans were to buil d the IJedo Hoad to 
09 
Shingbwiyan g , und then proc.:eed c1ovm the J apanese roa d , an d 
i m})rove it so as t o make it a n a ll-weather roa d . 
In a ttempting to build thts rood the United St ates 
Army Corp s of Engineers was embarking on what was 
generally conceded to be the ~re ate st eng inee rtng pl·o-ject i n tho history of the United Sta tes Army.37 
On Se ptember 2 , 19 43 , Chief of Staff Mar shall con-
sentec1 to let Mountl)a tten have 3 ,000 u. s . comba t u nits f or 
use in the Burma Offensive . 38 The Arne1·icnn infantrymen .. 
were recruited from the Ca ribbean and the Southv1 e s t Pac-
i fic . They we re known by the code na me "Go.l ahad" a.ncl ~ere 
to be used on the ope r a tion "Ste pchild . " The for ce l a ter 
be came Merrill ' s Me. r aude r s , when stn.w ell relieved the old 
commander and eave the rcr,iment to Merrill , hi s G-o . The 
i ns truction s were t o e;ct it to ge ther and reacty for combat 
as quickly as poss i ble , 
Stil well vum ted t he Marauders to SpfJ. rkplu.g the 
36 lbid ., p . 1"10 . 
3? ]'red R'lclre dee , Wr u th in Burma ( Garden Oi ty , New 
York: Doubleday and Com}lu.ny--;-rnc. , 1946) , p . 178 , 
38 Jose ph \'/ , Stilwell , 1'he Stilwell Fa firs , ( New York: 
Arran eed and lrdited by Theodore-11 , White , W:rl. a m Sloan e 
Associates , Inc , Publishers , 19 48 ) , I> · 219 . 
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a tta ck , l)y proer essively outflanldne the Japanese un cl 
force them to retire in front of the Chinese. 
Moeuune was the primar y objective .. md Myi t kyina the 
ultima te and main objective . Sin ce commanders mus t have 
written directive s , Stilwell aske d Mountba tten for a di-
rective orde ring him to t o.ke },1yi tky ina . The British were 
reluctan t a t first , but chan ged as it became cle ar to them 
tha t Stilwell could not capture Myi t kyina in two ye urs 
time . The Briti sh p riva tely ho pe d f or a <le cis ive Stilwell 
de f ea t . 
The pl an called for Stil well t o a dv an ce f rom Ledo , 
for t he Briti s h 14th Army to ndvance f rom Impha l over 
the Tiddim Roa d to t he Chindwin, with Mandal a y the ul-
tima te oJJ ject ive. The Win ga te f orce was to be fl own 
i n to North Cen tra.l Bu rma by Americ an gli de r s, wi th 
t he ob j ective of cr eating a divers ion , to cut J apanese 
lines of reinforce ment ancl suppl y to their troops 
f acing Stil well . In addition , t he British were to 
a ttack down the Muyu r oninsul u af t e r Akyab ar,ai n . 
Thi s l as t was cons i dered to be mili tar y n onsense be-
cause the J apane se f orce thus co nt a i ned would be only 
about one f ourth the si ze of t he Briti sh f o roe ne c-
eas ar y to co nt v. in it . ~,he Briti sh , however , ha n be-
come ob s esBe d with the (l e si~e to avenge the previous 
humiliation on t he .. :~rakan . 3 
In the ea rly man t hs of 1944 , t he Chine s e a{)reed t o 
a tta ck cl own t he Sal wee n f r o m Yunnan , wi t h t he Yoke f o r ce of 
six teen divisions . Wei IJi-huang assumed command of this 
39 l1'ldredge , .Q.l2 • ci t ., p . 181. 
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f orce when Ch' en Ch ' ong beca.rre s tck and coul<l not g o on . 40 
The J a.p ane st~ , wt th nine divis :tonl'l i n Burma , h ad 
been re i nfo r ced s i n ce J anuary 1 943 . To '[lit aga i nst this 
f or ce , the .U lies ha d s jx tee n British ro d I nclian tl ivisjons , 
three Chi nese di v i nions , an Ame rican re gi rren t under 
St j.l we 11. f i vo Brit i sh oo cl India n briga des under Wi ngate , 
nn d s ixteen Ch i ne s e divi sion s under ~lei J~i-huang • ..Ul 
told , ab out thirty-six Allied divisions opposed nine 
J ap:w ese d.i vi s ions . 
Even wi th thi s superiori ty , t he Briti s h tried to 
b uck out again . 
Moun t bn t ten s a id : 1 Wave 11 shou1 d hav e a ttu cke d 
when there were onl y four J up d iviSions . Now tmre 
a re ni ne an d we l ack ne cessa ry resources .' Stilwell 
r ep lied : ' De l ay another year and the re will l>f! more 
Ja p r einfor ce ment s . Let ' s go . We can do it,41 
They f ell ba ck on t he old a r gument oi' logi stic s , 
a r gu ing tha t the Ass am- Bene .J.l .tlailway could n o t support 
both Stil'sell an d t he l!,our t eon th Arrrw . :~l so , they sa id 
tha t the nati ve l abor in the port of Cal cutta was unre li-
able . 
The Ame ri<: J.ns hacl t he answer to both problems . 
' IJot us ,' they s a id, ' t ake ove r i.hc As sam-Beneal 
Hailwny and operate it vdth our ovm r tdlroad batt al-
i ons in Ca l uutta to handle the unlou.di ng of ull Amc r -
40 Stil i·;e ll • .2.£ • cit ., p . ?.~18-9 . 
41 Fred E'ld re d~e , Wr ath in Burma {Garden Ci ty , Uew 
York: Double day un d Comy:a ny, Inc., 1946), p . 18 2 . 
icun und Chines e cargo . 42 
In November of 1943 , the Viceroy ' s Council approv-
ed tuming the line over to the United St tites Army . 
On October 16, 1943 , Stilwell lea rned through 
Genera l 13rehon Somervell , who was visi tine; the CBI The a ter , 
tha t Chi m1g had asked for his relief. To rescind this re-
quest, the two Soong sisters Madame Kin e an d Madame Chiane 
convinced Stilwell t oo t he should stay tm d the three finally 
settled the mltter with the Generaliss imo . Stilwe ll wa s 
ba ck in the good gra ces of Chiang , for how long he knew 
not . 
General Stilwell was g iven the duty of repre sent-
i ne; China at both the Ca iro and Teheran Conferences . At 
the Ca iro Conferen ce , which convened on November 23 , the 
Allied a e reed to the Cnpi t a l pl an , a major off ens ive in 
Burma to be set i n mot ion a t once; it was to be a f ully 
mounte <l offensive with a he avy British l t ..ll1ding in south 
Burma a nd a t wo-prone ed attack i n north Burma by the X and 
Y f orce s . The British ob ,j ec ted to thi s pl an , preferr j.ng 
an a ttuck on the -indmrr.H1 I s l un a s i n the Bay of 13engul . 
Stilwell fo ·ught t he Br i tinh on this l)Oint be cause he knew 
it was un other a t te mp t to sta ll for time . Lan ding c raft , 
n ee de d in the ore r el tion , were l a te r diverted to Anz io . 
42 Ibid ., p . 183 . 
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Mou.n t batt en ' s s t aff had s t u.rte cJ. pl ann i ng another 
change in t he basic thea t er s tra te gy wh ich , had it 
been a oce1') te d, would have canceled the Capt t a l ope r -
a tion . The n ew pl an was g i ven t he code n ame Axiom 
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and ca lle d for a by-pass i ng of Burma a l t oge the r r..nd an 
amphibi~gs operation agai ns t Sumat ra , J ava , an d 
Mal aya • 
.Axiom was a pl an in which th e Brit i oh could make a 
g re at show of s trength and i mpress t he na tives, an d a t t he 
smoo time f1.ght the che ap war . 
Axiom was f i nc1.lly e;iven up b y t he Briti sh , aft er 
many weeks o f a r e;uing . 
At Teheran , where Stal i n d.omi nate d and t he Ameri-
can miJ.i t ary agreed, the decisi on was made to make a muss -
ive cross-Channe l i nv as ion i n 1944 . Th e p l a ns for this 
i nvas ion f or ce d t he Am<1 ricun- J3ri tish pl anners to curta il 
s h a r p l y the quant ity of l an ding e;ra f t the y hacl a lloted t o 
the s outh Burma landin~ an d therefo re altered the en tire 
s t rategy of the pl an f or the Bur ma of fe nsive. 
After t hu Te he ran Conferen ce . Roose vel t an d 
Churchill returne d t o Ca i r o and re - fJ t u.die d all the Cle cis -
ions t ha t ht.l. d been ma.c1e there . nwi t hou t a s trong south 
Burma l.o.nd i ne , the J3ri tiBh r efuse d t o g o through wtth tho 
ov er- a ll Burma ope ra a on to which t he y had previous l y com-
43 I b id ., p . 1 97 . 
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mitted tmmselves . 11 44 
After many months of patient efforts in trying to 
convin ce Chiang K' a i- shek, Stilv?ell, on December 1 8 , 1943 , 
got one of his greatest breaks of the war.. For the first 
time in histo ry , he wa s e iven comrnand 'of Chinese troops 
X force with full control over all officers and n o 
strings a tta che d . 45 1'he permiss ion was given in writing , 
with Madame Chiang us a witness . 
On December 29 , 1943, General Stil well left 
Chungking for Burma an6. the sta rt of a ten-·mon th ca mpaign 
in wh ich the Chinese not only le arned they could. fi ght but 
1 ea rn o d t o 1 i ke it • 
44 Jose}lh w. St ilwell , Tho Sti l well l'ay{:t:'S {New York: 
Arranged ~md Edited ·by ~Pheodoreu . White , \ID um Sloane 
Ass oci "ltes , Inc . Publi s her:..~ , 19 40} , p . 250 . 
CHAPTER VII 
VI CTOHY l N JJUHMA AN D CHIN A; 
THJ~ COAU)LETI ON OF 'li.H.E' STILWJSI,L HOAD 
Northern Burma , a ·dld and virgin countr y of jun-
r,le-cove red mounta ins un cl swampy valleys , virtua l ly u.n in-
ha bite d exce pt for scuttere <l se ttlemen ts of primiti ve hill 
tribe s and a few semi-civilized pe ople~ . i s wedged i n be -
t we en Indi a an d China . The te r r a i n of Upper Bur ma i s chur-
a~te ri zed by s evera l r anges of mounta i n s , offshoots of the 
Hi malayas , r unninr, genera lly i n a nort h- s outh nireotion a nd 
forming ride;es of s teep acclivity , These mon.nta i ns ~tre a 
formido.b l A l ml d barri er , re uohi ng a ltitudes of ei ght to ten 
thousand f eet , . .md with very few acces~~ ible pas s e s . 
Nea r Ledo , the shar p , f orested s lope of t he ratkai 
ran~e <.lef i nos t he I ndia- Burma border . Bef or e t he I,ed o Hoa d 
was buil t , only n refue;ee trail led from J,edo i nto these 
mountains . 
1'hi s tra il met cl.e i ts way south f or a hundred mile s , 
u p ovc r Panrsau [).rl d Na thkaw l)asr-;e s , 4 , 205 an d 4 , 257 
feet i n altitude re spe c t ively, !nd down into t he 
Hukawn e; Vulle y a t Shine;lmiyang . 
Defore the war the t r a il ~as trave l ed by opium 
1 Build tne the Le do Road , Public Re l a tion s Off icer , 
Y- E1orce Operations"""Staff:-Unit ed St a tes ... ~rmy : p , 1 . 
· ~ 
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smugel e r s wh o <.;arrie d t he contruban d a cross from Yunn an to 
As s am und down to Cu.lcuttc.l , where t hey reaped 500 pe r cent 
profit . Fr om Shi ngbwi yarl r, , a wider t r a il fo llowed a cours e 
t h r oup;h the jungled vulley to t he town of Moeaung , approxi-
ma tely 130 miles t o the southe as t . 
The Hukawne -¥nl l ey i s low- l ying and swampy nnd 
forms an almo Ht pe r:f'e c t bas i n whose only outle t is a na r -
row r orge a t i t s western ex tremi t y . There a re many s mal l 
streams and t wo rela tively l a rge rival'S, the Tartwg a11 d 
Tawang , which empty i n to the Tanai Hlw., or Chind.wi n Ri ver , 
f l owi ng out of t he valley throueh this goree . J ambu Bum, 
a Sll'lall hill se ction , separ ates the Hukawng from the Mo-
ga.ung Valley t o the sou t11 . 'l'he Moeaung fill d Hukavmr, re-
gions a re ver y simil ar i n topoeru.phy . 1-,urthe r t o the 
eas t , the Irrawaddy Ri ver f orms an eff e c tive water barrier 
travers i ng from north to s ou t h , the enti re country of 
Burma . As far n orth us Myitkyi na , thi s river i s a pproxi -
mately 1 , 300 f eet ·.'V ide an cl f rom s i xty t o e i ghty feet deep 
a t low VJater . To the wes t a re t he famous "liump" mount a ins 
of Yunn an Province i n Chi na . Eas t of Bhamo, these peaks 
t aper off i nt o o. l ess er ranee of moun t a in s called the 
Sinl umkabtl. Hill Tracts , which separate the Irrawaddy f rom 
the Shwe l i Hiver by a puss of some 4 , 472 feet . .~ lon e: t he 
Shweli , the old Burma Hond winds i ts way irlto Yunna n . 
The jungJ. e growt h in northe r n Burma pre s ents an 
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even more rugged aspect to the already forbiddirlg l and-
scape . !l'o.ll, vine--covered trees l'ise from the dense an d 
impene~rable undergrowth belov;. forming a dense l.>lanket 
over the broken hill s and sodden valleys which nourish it . 
The few natura l clearings are perm~ment swamps overspread 
with elephant er o.sa . whioh often reaches a height of ten 
fee t. 
furing seven months (March through October , 1944) 
of the fifteen-month const1·uction pa riod, 175 inches 
of rain fell in the moun ta :1.n ~ and 100 inches o:f rain 
were re corded in the valJ.ey. 2 
In addition to battling rain and mud , the soldiers 
we re confronted with othe r enemiea-·mosquitoos an d leeches . 
The leech abounds ill the Burma juneles , but served onl y as 
a nuisance . Howeve r , the mosquito · requi re d the utmost 
caution and strict preventive measures on the part of 
eve ryone :in ordex· to keep down the incidence of mal aria . 
So , a.u Gerleral Stilwell entered Burma armed with 
Chi a1g ' s vermilion seal of command, he \'I O.S bette1· f orti-
f ieu to corom.1Jld the Chinese trOOl)S . Sttlwell had previous-
ly compl ained tha t Chi MB h a.<'l clon.l)J.o-crossed him :l.n Burma . 
" He never gave rna tho lruan fang official seal as tsung 
2 First Oonv~ Over the Ledo aoad, Public 
Re l ations Off icer , ~Force operation~aff , United States 
Army: P • a. See ~ppen dix . 
ssu ling commander in chie:f n3 • 
Never i n history ha d Chi nese troops l u.unchecl a 
succ essful s tra te gic offensi ve aga ins t a mode rn ene my , 
su oh as the J apanese . 
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I n t he se ooncl Bu.rma campai gn , Stilwell proposed. to 
re write h i s tory i s t u.kine; his re puta tion on the un-
proven thesi s that , given proper equi pment and tra i n-
ing , Chin ese Holdi er s were , man f or man , us r; ood as 
any i n t he world . I n his be lief i n Chinese va lor , 
Stilwell s tood a lone . n ot only ttl d the British and 
t he overwhe lming portion of the U.s. Army staff in 
As i a 'believe it was imp ossible f or the Chinese to a t-
t a ck and de s troy ba ttle-prove d J apanese divi s ions of 
roughly equal s -trength i n northe rn Burma , but the Chi-
ne se e;enera l s t aff i n Chunekin r; held the same low 
op inion of i ts soldiery . 4 
Stil well pro.posed to t ake r aw troops , de pr ive them 
of t he p os s i bili t;\' of retr e a t , ab an don f i xe d supply lines , 
an d make h i s u r my de pen dent on a i r drops a lone . Then 
drive t !1em two hundred mile s t hrough jungl e , s wu.mp , and over 
rnoun t a i nt'i t o conquer a skillful , e ntren che d , and despe r ute 
enemy . 
The great obje ctive was the open lowl an d of north-
oen trr:1.l Bu.rmn , en di.ne i n the r a i l V7a,v tQ wns of Mogaung an d 
My:i.tkyi na . "Myi t kyi na was a vwrd , a phra se , a l abel on a 
dre am that ex i s ted i n Stilwell' s mind a lone . "5 Many geo-
3 Jo beph w. St ilwell , ~he Stil well Pape rs (New 
Yo rk; Arr anged an d B~ d:i.ted b y Theodore H. White , William 
Sloan e Assoc.d ute s , I n c . Publ5.s he r s , 1948), p . 11 6 . 
!:) llli ·· p . 269 . 
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graphical and m111 t ary obstacles re ru.a.:f.ned before the dream 
could be roali ?.ed namely: the Tanai River to be oleared. 
the Hukawng valley- - studcled with Ja}mn ese gar:rison~. t .he 
Jambu .Bum hills an d more J~pa , t he Mogaung valley. and 
My1 tkyina. an c1 i t s ga.rr:1.s on . 
All three of Stilwell ' s Chine se divis ions , the 30th 
an d 22n d on th~ Ind1a-J3urmn border an d the n ew divtsion a t 
Ra rosarh , totaled ab~ut 50,000 man . About f orty to sixty 
t housan d battle-tes ted J apa. dug in deep , opposed them, 
The Chinese divisions held the main burden of com• 
bat, but they \"Yere ap tly supported by British Comman do 
for ceo under Wingate and Lenta:lgne in central Bur~U.\ , Mer-
rill ' a Marauders on t he flanks , and 1\a.chin acouta--under 
Americ an direotion .. -aga.inst J apan ese outposts , 
Stilwell realized t hat he would need a co-ordinated 
drive by the Yoke force a ttacking out of Yunnan in the east 
and under the direction of Brigadier General Fr ank Dorn , 
before ul timn te suoooss oou.J.d be had in bre ak:tng the block-
ade . Chi ang ha d r efuse d Stilwell this co-operation after 
t he Ca.iro conference , lm.t he hoped t o wrin e ~t out of 
Chian t~ ' a pr ide by o.n example of personal action and suooeee 
i n f ield operations in north Burrra . Stil well kept up con-
stant pressure on Chungking to commit the Yoke f orce to 
action. 
The fol lowing i s a list of s orne of the name a of the 
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commanders with whom Stj_l well de alt : 
Maj or General Dan i el Sultan , u . s . A. -- deputy uonr 
mander of the Chi na- Burma- India theater , whos e off ice 
was in Delhi . 
MaJor Genera l F'r ank Me rrill-- communder in chief of 
the Mur a u de rs . 
Brieadi er General Lewis Pick-- Genera l Pick was the 
en r, i nee rinp; of ficer j.n oomman d of' the construction of 
t he Le(1o Roo.d . 
Brigad i er Generul Dona ld Old-- uoUlll'l::lnder o f t he air 
supr or t operations that supplie cl. the campai gn with 
fo od , munitions , and airborne tro011s . 
Colonel Fr ank Hunte r--executive officer of the Mar-
aude rs , who exe rei Bed f ield coiilliOnd on the march to 
Myi tkyin a v'lhen Merrill was invalided . 
Colonel Hothwell Brown--Ameri can commande r o:f the 
Chine se-Ame r i can t ank un it us ed in the north Burma 
oampo.i gn . This outfit c onsis ted of approxi mate ly 
n i ne t y 1 i gh t an d medium t anks . 
Lieutenan t General l'allio. m Joseph Slim--British 
Ar my . Slim was Moun t ba t ten ' s o.ppoin tee i n commun d of 
the e ntire Bur ma f ron t , both Bd .tish a nd Chinese . 
St ilwell' s operations i n north Burma were technically 
subordi nute to Slim, thoup-h i n the h i erarchy of com-
mand Stilwell outr anke d Slim. 
lvlu jor Genera l Sun Li-j en , Chinese Ar my- - Sun VIas 
e; ommo.nder of the Chi nese 38 th Division an d Stilwell 
was fon der of Sun , a Vi rgin i a Milita r y In s titute 
p;radus. t e , than of o.ny other Chinese l eader i n his 
c'ommJ.nd . Sun was l u te r promoted to command the Chi-
nese New l!'ir s t Army . 
Major General J"ia o, Chinese Army-- comnv.'l.nder of the 
Chine se 2Encl Division , l a t er commander of the New 
Si x th Ar my . 6 
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Brir,o.clier Gene rnl Ptek ' s f i rn t uct was to move his 
Road Headquarters up to the po j_n t of the new Le do Roa d . 
P:f.ck , en tiroly cUfferent than Arrowsrni th who conuna nded from 
his cha teau , used a r a in- s oaked tent a s his jung le office . 
It was there that the f ir st me etitlg of StilvJ ell and Pick 
took IJl a. ce on November 3 , 1943 . The conv orsa.tion v;en t a.s 
follows : 
Where c:.1re your de t a il maps'? ' General Stilwell 
aske d . 
' I ha.ve none , ' Genera l I>i ck said . 
' Where a r~· your pr ogress charts? ' 
' I h ave none ,' 
' Whe rA is the point of the ro a d now? ' 
General Pick took a small - scale map und mar ked a 
point in the shade d Pa. tka i Mounta i n se otor. ' Here . at 
the 50-mile n~rk ,' he said. 
Genera l Stibvell studied the map for u mometlt , then 
aske d1 "When can y ou buil d me a jee p r oa d to ShinelJwi-yane? 
' I oa.(l ' t lm t ld you a jeep rou<l ,' General r ic k an-
swered . ' But I ' ll buil d you a mili t a ry hi r·hway to 
hun dle truck traffic .' 
' .4..nd when can you e et t he tru.ck r oa d through to 
Shin r:bwiyung'? ' 
' When do you want it? ' General I>ic k countered . 
1 Can you r;et it t hroue;h by J anuary 1 ? 1 Stilwell 
asked . 
General Pi(;k sai d ' Okay .' 
11hen Gen e r a l Stilwell und Generu.l Pick hiked up t o 
t he point. They l abored. throur;h knee - dee p mud , pas s -
1 04 
i ng do zers stalled h~ mud 11:p t.o the s t a cks . When they 
returned, Genera l Sttlwell turne Cl to General Pick an d 
said ' When did. y ou say you' d. have t ha t r oa.cl t hrough? ' 
''By the f i rst of t he ye a r . 7 
G·ener al Pick fa ced many ob stacles when he be gan 
build.:lil p, t he Roa d . 'l'he Hoa.d would cross s even summits of 
the Patlm i Moun t a ins , whose peaks in the i mmed. i ate vj.cini-
t y of the hte hway t ower to 6 , 000 f ee t . in the first hundred 
miles . At Pangsau J?u.ss , one me.y s ee a t on ce , India , Chi na, 
Burma . and Ti bet, on a cl ear day . "Dttring the stretch fr om 
Hell ' s Ga t e t o the l'a.ss , the cli mb would be s tra i p,ht up , 
necessita ting two hundred hair})in curves wi th i n a dia t ance 
of Beven miles . " B Here , the i de al c omb i nation for ea rth 
slide s was f ound , the soil l)eing cla y \N i th a tricky shale 
f oundation . 
Ne ar the end of t he monnoon season substan ti al re -
inforcernen t fl of En gineer troopB and modern machinery, ln1.11-
dozers , carryal l scrape r s , dump truuks , un rt power s hovels , 
begar1 to arrive . ~~he Hoa. d assumed a more vi t a l s i gn i f i-
can ce for the i mmediate f uture , that of :furni s hi ng a s upply 
a rtery f or the victorious campai gn a he a d . 
7 Firs t Conv o:y Over t he J.Jedo Hoa tl , I>ur)lic 
Re l ation s Off ice r , Y-Force Opo r a.t ions St aff , United St a te s 
Army: p . 5 , 
8 Dav id J~. Cohn, "The Ol r:l M~m Wi t h the Stick--
Gene r a l Lewis A. Pi ck . " Atlantic , 176 :87 , ~i.ugu s t , 1945 . 
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The newl y- arr i vecl Engi neer troops were rushed up to 
t he fo r wi-.trd part of the Hoad, f ir s t by truck an d then by 
f oot . With determin ed onersy an d s truggle tho r oa d trace 
was pushed f orwu.rd clos e on the he ala of tho a<lvan c ing com ... 
b a. t troops • 
The Chi nese 22n cl Divi s ion had been rnovecl into com-
ba t in Janua ry an d , like the 30th , was f i ehti ng but making 
mtmy mis t akes \IJhile doin g i t . Stilwell atte mpted to devel-
op combat conf i den ce b y pl acing them agai ns t the J a1Hmese 
in ove rwhe l min g numbers . Two Ch in ese compan i es w~1re se n t 
against a pl antoon of Japanese , or t"Wo batt a lions agai nst a. 
Japanese compan y . 
The vil l age of Shi ngbwi yan g was taken a.s t he Rngi -
nears cl eared the Road clos e be hi nd . 
On the morn i ng of De ce mhe r 27 . 19 43 , the lea d bull -
dozer broke t he t ape s a t Shi ngbwiyang in Burma ' s Uy-
kaw.nr; Huku.wnr; Vull ey, tlnd the Engi nee r s hlrd conq ner -
e rl t he J?a.tkai s four days ahea d of schednle . 9 
Tho I'nrr t nee r EJ ha<l pcrfo :cmecl the f eat of building 
fifty-one miles of roa d i n u.s ffi iJ'l Y days th r ough the rueeed 
mountain r vne;es , whic h was perhaps t he mo s t outs t o.v: cting 
Engineering feat on the ent i re roa d. 
A c on voy of 55 trucks carrying Chinese combat 
trOOJ)S an cl equipnent :followe d tile l eud do zer in to 
Shj_n gbwiyang , m:t.rkine the firs t Allied troops to be 
9 J!, i rst Convoy Over the J._,edo Ro arl , ..Q..n• ci_i . , p . 6 . 
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b r ought i n to North Burma by ve hicl e , 
Late r . i n the day , n. ce l e bra t i on was h el d a t till en -
gi neering camp on Chi nglo Hill , Mile 9 5 , 65 , f o r membe r s of 
the H'ne inee r re e;i ment whi ch h ad ou t the r oa d . A ban d, a 
s t age show, movies , a mime ogr aph ne ws pape r setup, PX s up-
plies and f ood were provided by :1pec iD. l Servlce . !\.'he 
.American GI ' s ce le bra te d t he hi s t oric occ:asiO[l wi th the 
J aps le ss than t wen t y mil e s away . 
A ma jor su.b- cle pot , unde r the d1re c tion of Lt . Col . 
Hobert A. Hirshf i e ld, was set up a t Shi ngbwiyang to au.e-
men t smaller cle pots a t I;ogli Logl a i an d Ta eup- - Mil e s 
50 .. 8G an d. 79 . 40 . 
'!'he wors t of the r oa d c ons truc t i on was ove r a s 
there we re no mounta i ns u hond comparable t o those of the 
Pa tka is . ~~ho d ry- ~ .. u~ nth;r r oad , bui l t l >y the J apanese , 
could be u se d from now on . It "· ~s n ow a ma tte r of cl ear -
i ng tm one my fr om the tra ce , r e rou tin p.; the Hoad :tn some 
pl a ces to hi r.;her ground in or der to a.vo:l.d monsoon f l oods , 
bu t in genera l to f ol low and :l mprov e the ro ad t he J apanese 
h ad. buil t . 
Al t houp,h i t was s uppos e d. t o be the dry seas on there 
we re he avy r a i ns wh ich put t he Hoa d in su ch cond i t i on thut 
10 l!'irs t Convoy Ov e r the Le do Roe.d , .L1.tbl i c Re l a t i ons 
Of f i ce r , Y- l!1or ce Ope rat i ons St aff ,U nite d St a teo Ar my: p . 6 . 
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it was a lmost ou. t OJ? the que s t t on to use convoys t o sup1)ly 
the comba t t r oops . Convoy tonnacre that e ot through \'len t 
t o the sup})J.y a no. r oa d.- bu.i 1 ding troops i n t he re tU ' areas . 
The re f ore it became ne c.:e ssnr y to s upply lJy a ii'. PiJ.oto 
and crews , i n mnny case s , gave thetr l ives to kee:p Stil well 
8v.ppl t e o. i n an y type of woa the .r, be cans e St ilwell ' s Ch i De s e 
were fighting and advan cin g t n North Burma . 
C.fene ral Stil V7e ll Vlan te a. to ge t out fr om unde r Gen-
era l Sir Ge ore;e Gifford ' s Rl eventh Arrey Gr oup . 11 St1.lwell 
drea.dA d so me s leight of hand in which Giffor d ruieht not 
only h i n de r , bu.t actually s top hi s a.dvan c.:e clown the Hu-
kawng Valley , "ll Stilwe ll, consequ.en tJ.y , tnJ.ked Mountba t-
ten in to permi ttin e; hi s Northern Combat .Area Commm d t o 
puss (lirectly Lmcle r Mountbatten ' s con trol of Shir. p,bw j_yang . 
Giffo r d s 1i~h tly oppose d it. but Moun tb a.tten promrltl y 
a greed , 
"In a dd.i tion it was a gree d th':1 t th e Chi nd i ts , the 
f ive brj.gades oommande d by Wi nge.te, \>V ould come under 
Btilwell ."12 Stilwell r)rOl)OSed to move t he Chindi ts 
sou.th of Moeaun g <m el :Myi tkyin u to cut a ve nues of J a1n1nese 
11 Fre cJ El drede;e , Wr a th j.Q Burma (Garden City , New 
York: Doubleday a nd Company, I nc. , 1946) , p . 204 . 
1 2 I bid . , p . 205 . 
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supply und reinforce men t , as his own f or ce s moved to t ake 
the t\"10 to r:n s . 
In order t o t ake Yupbu.ng Ga. , St ilwe ll had sen t a 
bu tt e-lion of the 38th Div:i.si. on to outf l ank the t own f rom 
Taro on t he south . \Vh ile in Ca iro, he l earnecl indirectly 
throuah Pri me Mi ni s te r Churchill that t h i ngs we re i n a 
mess on the North Burma front . A message to t hi s effe ct 
wa.s clecode d and g iven to General We clemeye r b;y- mis t ake . 
Wedemeyer promptly turned it ove r to the Britis h; who used 
it as an a rguin g point aeai ns t the North Burma offens ive. 
On returll to t he comba t area from Cairo, Stilwe ll f ound 
t hat the messaee had been corre ct. Things v'lere in a ter-
rible mess . The Chine s e battalion o. t Taro had sat down f or 
three month s and done not hing, })e rmitting the J a1)s t o r e-
inf orce ut Yu.pbang Ga . 
I t Ul)pearec1 that only two pl a toons of J apanese 
we r e tn front of t he Chinese a t Yupbn.ng . _ The J aps we re 
dug in a t the river and we re using a bi ~ banyan tree us 
the s t r one J)Oint of the de :fer.se . 3 t:i.lv; eJ.l gave orders to 
attack with artillery and ai r Bupport . By t a kin g out Yup-
bang , Japanese 1:roovs t o the north r1 oul d be bagged . On 
Chri s tmas day, December 25, the poeket at Yupbung Ga was 
cleaned up, wit.h fue rema i n in g J ape ktlling themsc lve s . l 3 
13 Stil~ell, QQ . eit., p . 274. 
FIGURE .6 
MAP OF TH:S: BE-TAKING OF 
'l'HE ROAD 
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On J anua ry ~1 . J. S)44. Stilwell rece i ved \>:Ord that 
Merrill ' s Ma r a.uclers we .ce to a rrive ~'. t J~edo on J anuar y 20 . 
They Here n tou.crh bunoh , ~\ d. at the worl d for various ra n-
sons . When tl'Y:Jy were recrnitell for "this miss i on ; t hey were 
promised a fur l our;h j.n Inclia . On rea ohin e; India the fUl' -
l ough wns denied, with the re sul t tha t a bout on e- t hi rtl of 
t r1er:1 went AWOL , Mer rill asked for a uthority t o narch the 
rren fro m J.~etlo to t he i r jump-off a re a ne a r Ningbyen , a d:l. a-
tance of abou t 130 mi les over the pre ci pi tous Pa t ka i Moun-
tains and thr ough the mud of the r a ins . "They ~?e re dis -
I)U.s t ed be cause of the unfa.miliarit:v wi th the peculia ritie s 
of mule s , s horta ge of men caused by l uck of repl a cements , 
and becau s e of. t he grueline; mar ch . "14 
On J anu9.r y 1 3 , General Stilwell h £H1 a long t ulk 
with Sun Li-jen , commander of tro 38th Divis i on a nd i m-
pre ssed on hi m t he e x t reme i mpo rtance of t akinG Ta i pha Ga . 
On .I!1e bruu ry 1, Sti l\I!Je ll p;ot vrord that Trd. }Jha Ga. vw.s t aken • 
With Yu pbun e Ga and 'l'ai y ha Ga. , th c Chine s e h ad 
t us ted the i r f i r s t jungl e vi ctorins . The ba se a t Shtngbwi-
yan~ Wi.:!.S now ae cure • 
In the mc ~m ti rne , Gene r a l St ilwell had been uncler 
f i l'c in Wa.shi nrston , London , !:llld New De l h i. 
14 Rl tlre dge , ~ . c i t • , p • 2 15 • 
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Critics said the new Ledo Roa d from Indi a to China 
was n ot worth the effort; constru ction would tuke too 
long, even at be s t it would never ca rry sufficient 
SUPl)lie S , 
Stilwell re 1) l i ed to h i s critic s : the Ledo Road ful-
fills t wo u.s . obje ctives% ( 1) to get a t le ast some 
supplies to blockaded China ; ( 2) to set up a situation 
in whi ch Japs are killed , 
The Ledo Road said Stilwell , ' has stood up very 
we ll to monsoons and we are using heavy trucks over 
com1)J.eted 116 mil es • portions . • • • The Japs ••• 
h avn·'.t ~topJ!ed construction . • • • The Chinese a re 
fighting well . their morale is high and they ' ve in-
flicted heavy ca.su~1.1 ties on the Japs . • • • Chinese 
and American troops are r;ettj_ng a long very we ll to-
gather . ~~hey ' ve been together for e ighteen 1~on ths and when you d i e side by side tha t means o, lot . 0 
This me ant t h at as long as Stil v1eJ.l commanclecl. U. s. 
forces in the China , 13uroo . and I nd i a The ater , building of 
the rJedo Hoad and the killing of J aps by .. Americ ans and . 
Ameri can-tra i ned Cldnese would con tinue . 
With the sn]!ply base a t SM .. ngbwiyang secure , and 
Chinese troops in ~:aipha Ga. , the Allied foroes we .re now 
rea dy to s et out on the conquest of the Hukawng Valley . 
Mainglcwan ; about fifteen miles south of '.l.'a.ipha. Ga 
and the ma in J apanese supply and communi ca. ti on base in the 
Hukawng Va lley, \Hts the next obje ctive. The main line of 
the defense r an down the J apanese Mogaung-Shin e;bwiyang 
Road , with the Japanese lBth Divj.sion defending s tubbornly 
15 "Differences of Opinion . Le do Road. from India 
to China , " T:i.me Magazine , 43 :33, February 14 , 1944, 
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f or every i n ch of ground won . This was the famous J apanese 
division that ha d routed the British a t Si ngapore un d again 
through Burma. i n 1942 , 
The l>l u.n of battle was to have a ba ttalion o:f the 
22n d Division put their teeth in t he J a ps f ron t ally dovm 
the Road , an d o the r un i ts of the 22od were to eo arotmd 
the right flank . The 38th Divis ion was to turn the l eft 
fl unk by cu ttj.ng a round i n a ti p-)1 t a rc to hit the J apanese 
fl ank and re a r . Merrill ' s Mar auders were to get their bap-
t1.sm of fire by swee ping wide around the left fl ank t o 
s trike north and south of Wa.l awbum, cutting the J a J>S off 
eieht miles to the s outh of Mai ngkwun . A Chinese t ank 
corps , consi s ting of n inety lir;ht and medium American t tm ks 
under the command of an American , Colonel Hothv1ell Br0 \1.n , 
was scheduled to cut through junrrl e t r ails and drive i n on 
t he Japanese communi ca t ions be t ween Wal awbum and 11~dnekwan . 
On J anua r y 21 , Brown ' s t ank un it arrived at Shi ng-
bwi yane; . General Sttlwell eo.ve Brown three days t o re s t 
and refit. On .b1ebruar y 15 , t he t ank u.n i t advan ced to Yup-
lJune Ga over a new pontoon briclee thnt had just been put in 
across the Tarune Hiver . 
On Fe bru.ary 21 , St i l well went to N t n gbyen to in-
spect tho Marauders, who had jus t a rrived , He was impress-
ed with their touglmess an d was e;l u.Cl that th ey were fie ht-
ine on hi s s ide . 
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The iz· n tt i tude was exemplif ied in t he f ollowing 
sen ten ce spotted by a. censor i n a sol<l i er ' s letter 
home: ' My pack i s on my ba ck, my gun is oiled an d 
lo aded . As f
6
wal k i n to the shadow of dea t h I f ear no 
s on ofab i toh . 
On Februa ry 24 , Me rrill ' s Maraude rs s t ar t e d off on 
t he ir envelopment c.lr ive t o Wal awbum. On the same day , 
Stilwell r eviewed the s i t uation t o t he war corr e sponclent s . 
He was n ot s ure of t he s i tua ti on aroun d Lakyen and Yaung-
b awne but f elt t h ey we r e about t wo days l a t e in eff orh> to 
trap two Jap battalions in the area . The Oh j.nese were 
t hen withi n ten mile s of Mai n gkwan by r oad . Te nt h Air 
Force f i ghter pl ane s we r e con centra ting on MaJ. rlgkwan and 
Moea.unr; , hitting the br i dee s and t r yi ne to kee p ou t and 
divert J ap traffic . 
On Ji'e bruary 25 , Me rrill' s pat r ols r ea che d the 
1'awane Hiver , an <l on Mar ch 3 , a messae;e was r e ceive d t hat 
he would rea ch Wal awbum by n oon of t hat cla y . At 8 : 00 p . m., 
the same even j,ng , a messap;e was re ceived to t he effect 
t hat the Maraude r s had hit th(l Japs a t Vle su an d Lagang , 
wtt h n o U.s. casual tie s . The se t wo towns were to t he eas t 
an d southeas t of Wal awbum . ~Chen a suc cess ion of message s 
came i n . The Mar auders , aftering Wal awbum were dri ven 
ou. t t empor a r ily . but f i nally ca1) ture d t he town . Drown ' s 
York: 
1 6 Frt~ d E'l dre d.gc , Wr a th i n Burma (Ga rden City, New 
Dou.bledn.y tmd Co mpany , Inc . , 194-6) , p , 218 . 
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first message sta ted tha t the y had entered an ene my trap 
and were suffe rin g he a.v;>r casua l t i es . Another mess age 
s t ?J.te d he would att a ck Hgam Ga. at c1aun . A third message 
aske d f or a ir support t o keep the a rtillery down . Stilwe ll 
then contracte d Brown and tol(l hi m to contact Jtfurrill an d 
ge t unde r Merrill ' s command . The Sixty- sixth Regi me nt cut 
the roa d s ou th of Mai ngkwan and ambushed the Jupane s e . 
The J apanese were n ow i n a pre ca rious pos i t ion , 
but the J a.pane se Hl th Division mJ.s defending s tttbborn ly 
and wi th cus tomary de fensi ve effici en cy . "Enemy troops 
had to be dug out of every pos ition a lmos t by hand duri ng 
any kind of frontal action . nl7 To avoid the he avy casual-
tie s tha t would result from such action , Stilwell maneuver-
ad h i s tro ops in s uch a way tha t he avoided bu. tting he ads 
wi th the J apanese as far us pos s ible . In other words , 
Stilwell was doinr, to the J apane s e what the J apanese had 
clone to the British in 1942 . 
Attrition had cut down the J apanese lOth Divis ion 
a nd the enemy was forced to move in the 56th Division as 
reinforcemen ts. When Me rrill reached Wal awbum, it was 
confi rme d tha t the en tire 56th, a long with arttlle r y , was 
at Mv.i ngkwan . The J ups were now using enei neer s , artill-
17 ~ldee uge , 9~· cit., p . 216 . 
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ery and cooks u. s i nfan try . 
Ja pane se messages intercepted : • • • ev.suaJ. ti es 
very l a r ge , we cann o t pro te ct r ivor oross ings • • • 
every man in t he next f ew days mus t f i ght hard. En-
e my i s very s trong an d we must de s troy him at a l l 
cos ts ••• cannot hold much longer i f help does not 
come • •• n o he l p ava ilable , fi ght to the end . l8 
The Chine se got pu trols i nto Mai ngkvnm on Me.rch 5 , 
and the whole a rea was cleared u p by March 7 , 1944 . 
"On Sun day n1 r;ht , March 5, Colonel Philli1) Coch-
r an ' s Amer i can Air Cornman dos s t arted to fly Win ga te ' s f rur 
brigade s in t o the trianele Mogaune; , Katht1., Bhumo . "19 An-
othe r br i gade marched tlo wn from the north, pa r allel t o 
Stilwell ' s advan ce , but t hrough the mountai ns to the west 
of it . The a irborne troops were to l and i n ope n pl o.ces in 
the jun gle ca lled Bro adway , Picc adilly , and. Chowri nghe e . 
"Tho operation was called by t he code name Ope r ation 'l'hurs-
day • ,, 20 
American oombn t engj.nee rs we re f l own in f irst to 
convert these clearings i n to a i rf ields . In the f irs t few 
days , ull the e;llders l .:.mded on Broa<lway, because of obs t a-
cle s tha t were pl a ced a t the l ast minut e on t he other 
18 Jose ph w. Stilwell , ~:he Stilwell .-?u.pe rH (New 
York: Arranged and Rdi te d by Theo dore H. V/hi te , W1.1lia.m 
Sloe.ne Ass ocia t e s , I n c. Publ i shers , 1948), p . 282. 
19 Fred E'ldre <lge , Wr a th in Burma ( Garde n Ci t y , Ne VI 
York : Doubleda y and Company , Inc., 1946 l • p . 248 . 
20 r)oc • ill· 
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fie lcl s . 
The })Urpos e of t hi H mi ss i on was to cut the J upan-
ese line of communications and s uppl y to the f orces f a cing 
Stilwell . The ~'/j.nga.te f or ces were withi n s triking r ange 
of the Man dal a y-Myi tkyin u r ail way and the ro a d s ys tern 
wh ich served the enti r e rea r of the Japu rmies . 
On his visit to Taipha Ga in March , Moun tba tten 
broue;ht up the old agreement about the change in command 
af ter the captur e of Kame.i ng . He su gges ted that the sta-
tu.s quo be mai ntai ned . Stilwell refusecl , i ns i sti ne- that 
the agreement be kept . Mountbatten co ul cln ' t do anyt hi ng 
el se but aeree . 
On ffurch 17, 194 4 , Stilwell' s pl ans were suddenly 
affec..:ted by t he offe nsive the J apan e tle l aunched nr;a i ns t 
t he Briti sh I ndi an bord.e :r , t wo hundr e d miles to the s ou.th . 
Three J apa nese di visions , i n a sur prise drive, 
s t ru ck a cross t he bo r der with their appar ent t a r ge t 
I mpha.l and their purpos e t he penetration of Indi a 
dee p en oueh to out o:ff i~Ssam prov i n oe and the Assam-
Be ngal Hailv1ay lin e o f communica tions . J upunese s uc-
ce ss i n c..:uttin e; off Aeso.m \'IOUld not on l y breo.k off 
Stilwell' s re a r supply but o.l s o put un en d. to a ll 
supplies f or China wh ic~ de~nded on t he llump air-
bases loc ated in Assam. 1 
Even t hough Chiane ur r;e d Stilwell to hal t his ad-
vance before he over-extended h i m..C!e lf and lost what ha d 
21 Jo s eph 1i . Stilwell , 'l'he Stilwell Pape r n ( New 
York: Arrunge<l an d B'di ted b y Theodore }1 . Wh i te , William 
Sloa ne ,l..ssociu.. tes , I n c. J?ublishers , 1948) , pp . 283- 4 . 
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be en eeJ.r.ed, Stil ·:ell <le cide d not to break off hiB cam-
pai en i n the junele jus t to bra ce the 11ritish . b'u r t he r-
more , British resour ces excee de d his manyfold. Stilwell , 
along with the British , ago. i n urged Chi ang Ka i- shek to 
thrust across t he Burma border ~ith the Yoke f o r ce fr om 
the east. Stilwe 11 wi red Bri gadier Gener<ll Darn , s en ior 
Ameri c~n officer with the Yoke f o r ce, to pre ss We i-Li -
huane , commander in chief of the Yoke f o r eo, f or some a c-
tion . 
11 Chi ang had been impress ed enoueh by Chinese su o-
cess unrle r Stilwell to y i eld to this urging . n22 The Chi-
nese 50th Div iston wa s f lown a cross the Humr> for direct 
ac tt on under Stilwo 11 . A promise was r,i ven to set the 
Yoke f o r ce in a c tion . 
~'he fi r s t J ap column f orde <l the CM.n dwin at IIorn-
al in .:ltld a. se eon d uolumn made the cr ossing n t Thaunedu t , 
thirty miles s outhward . The J aps murched r-; il ently und 
swiftl~r , CJJ.l<l were more l i ehtl y equipped than any s oldiers 
who had previously se t f orth on b"U.Ch a mi ss ion . Spee d 
was essenti nl as they ha d to re a ch Imphal ant1 Koh imu be-
f o r e Allied reinforcements could arrive . Screen s of pa-
trols h .. .tel been 01)era tine; t~o:t·o ss the river , t\he.ud of the 
main assaul t for ce s , for severa l days . 
22 lbi d. ' p . 284 . 
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Said Genera l Mutaeuchi ' s Or der of the Day to the 
J apanese invasion forces on the operdne of the campaign . 
' This ope r ution will engaee the a ttention of the whole 
world , and ts eage rly awaited by a hundred million of 
our countrymen. Ita success will have a profound effect 
on the cours e of the war , and may even le ad to its 
con clusion . We must therefore expend every oun ce of 
energy and t a l en t to achieve our purpose . 28 
The Japs followe d s ome of t he SaJD3 tra ils Stilwell 
ha d use c1 on hh~ retre a t in 1942 . The British cla imed they 
could not su ppl y themselves ove r this rout e . but the Japan -
e s e not only moved infan trymen over the s e trails but also 
t anks . 
On March 22 , f ive days after the atta ck started , 
they hit the British . The 17th DivisiorJ , garr i s on i (le Tid-
dim which i e 164 miles south of Impha l , f ound itse lf cut 
off . Ukhrul wns outf lanked. Other ene my columns appeared 
a round Kohima und a long the Imphal-KohirruA-Dimapur Road . 
The J apanese ro ached within thirty miles of the As sa m-
Bengal Ha.ilwuy . 
Without the r a ilwE..ty Stilwe ll was not only f i n i shed 
off ens ively but wa s le f t with a dubious choice of try-
ing to fi eht his Chinese ba ck throuBh an enemy which 
could be a t him to As Bam, or try once again to escape 
over uncha rted tra ils and jutl l)les of the Himal ayas to 
Ch i no . • ~4 
23 Article i n the Sea c Souvenir Ne w Delhi , lndt a , 
April, 1Y44 , p . 13 . 
24 Eldre dee , £E· cit • • p . 253 . 
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The i mmedi ate ni version of a l a r ee par t of Ameri can 
air oomba.i -careo ancl troop- <;arri e r re sources to the support 
of the Fourteenth Ar m.y was agree d to by Stil we 11 and Stra t -
enY:Jyer . Ai ded by the HAF , t\vo divis i ons were i mmedi atel y 
fl own from t he Ar akan to I mphal . 'rhe Br i tis h started mov-
i ng the 33rd Cor ps across India to rel i eve the small , bat-
t e red garrison a t Kohima . The 17th Division was ordered 
back to I mphal; a i de d by the 23rd J)ivision . i t f i nally ex-
tricated itse l f f rom Ti ddim, a l thourh both di v i s ions we re 
badly reduced by casualties . 
Kohima appeared to be the key to the J apunese at-
t a ck . Genera l Sl im consolidated his f orces a t Kohima and 
on the I m11ht\l Pl a i n • 
He orderecl the 3 , 500 men of Kohima to hold t o the 
l ast man , i f ne ce ssary , to deny the Japanese this 
bridgehead to Indi a until the 5th 01l d 7th di vi sim1s , 
flown from the Ar a.kan , could f i ght t hei r way through 
from Imphul . 1'he se divis ions were to hold until r e-
lieved by the 33rd Corps , cross i ng Indi a by r ail . For 
forty days t hese .Briti sh an d Indian troops withstood 
t he s iege , af ter which the 33rd Corns drove toward I m-
pha l and joi ne d wi th the 4th Corps ,~5 
The J3ri tish. now f i eht:i ns and f i ght i nr i nte lltgen t-
l y , outflanked Ukhrul and Bishenpur . For the J apanese , n o\~ 
out of supplies . retreat was made perilous ut every turn . 
"They were be i ng beaten by British and Ind i an a r ms , but 
25 Fred IU dre dec , \'lr a th in Burmu ( Garden City, new 
York: Double day nn d Company . In c ., l 946i , pp . 255-6 . 
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even more were they beinB s l aughtered by the monsoon . u26 
The J ttrJaneae had ga.mble<l on a ligh ting thrust that 
woul d cu. t off Upper Ass am before the Bri t i sh could react . 
The att a ck was started sever a l weeks too l a te . Even though 
Slim' s troops di.d some great fip;hting . the monsoon was the 
deaiding factor . The l a st of t he J apanese inva ders s tag-
gered out of India on August 25 , and a f ew days l a ter the 
Fourteenth Army advan ced t o the Chin dwin River . 
While the British were havirlg their troul)les on the 
I m:phal pl a i n . Stilwell wen t on wi th the Allied advan ce i n 
Nor th Burma . The Sixty- sixth Regiment was orde r ed t o ~lt­
t a ck at J a rnbu Burn . The t own was captured on Stilwe ll ' s 
birthc.lay, March 19 . Si nce Jambu Bum is the di vid1ne line 
be t ween t he Hukawne a.nd Mogaung valle ys , the Stilwell 
f orces were a t l a st on the downgrade into the Moe;aung . 
General Wi nr;ate mude hi s l ust f lis-ht on March 24 . 
As he was flyi ng back to Indi a i n an Ame rican 33-25 , the 
shi p be came lost in a store an d crashed . The entire party 
cons istine; of Wi nge.te, the crew , and two Brtti s h newSl)aper-
men were ki lled. \'line;ate was succee ded by :Ma jor General 
W. D. A. Len t a i e;ne , commander of one of the J.~ong Rane e Pene-
trat ion bri e;ades . 
On March 29 ; Genera l Me rrill ha d a heart attack , 
26 ~ • • p . 256 . 
1 22 
for which he was hospi tali 7.Cd f or some t i me . 
The Allies move rl on be low Sho.duzup, wi th t he Si xty-
fifth He e iment a ttacking Laban agai nst lieht opposition . 
On M.o.rch 31 , the Si xty-fif th took I~o.bun . 
I n u conference at Jorhat , I ndi a , on April 3 , Sti l-
we ll was told. to e; o a head with his attt~ck by Supreme Com-
mande r Mountbatte n , 27 Much t o StilVJel l ' s Aurprise, the 
British did not ask f or any hel p t o ass i s t the m in their 
own flieht a t Impha l . 
In e arly April , Stilwel l decided to r i nk all on a 
s trike for Myitkyin a . He knew tha t the mon s oons would come 
soon 1m d thereafter would halt any f urthe r advan ce . Myi t-
kyi n L\ was the key to the c arnpa t gn . 
It wus of grea t strategic i mpor tance as a ba se f or 
t he ATC . Its capture would me an tha t the AT C could 
alnl!l don the e x tremel y hazard ous northern route over 
The HumyJ ~md f ly the lower mountains fro m Myitkyina . 
Gasol ine <: ould be fl own directly from the ll.yi tkyina 
pi pe lines t o Kunmin e; . !l.1he ca pture of the town -al s o 
roo ant that a f i p:hter base could be esta blishe d to 
protect ~~e entire Hump run f or the f irst ti'me i n its 
his tory . .. 
Stilwell and l,1errill , who was n ow out of the hos-
p i tal, worke t1 up a pl an to combin e Ma r auders und Chi no se 
i nfantr y regiments and s ome Chi nese artillery i n to three 
comba t te a111s , Thi s f o r ce wus to be ma.r c hetl over t he 6 , 100 
27 Stil well , .Ql?. • ci t ., l) • 207 
28 Rldre clge • .Q..E . ill•, p-p . B57-8 . 
f oot rJ aura Hyke t Pass to Hi t ponR. north of Hyi tkyi na. . 
Ku. e:hi ns sa i d the sol di ers woul c1n ' t be abl e to make it un-
less the weather was dry. Stilwell an d Mo rrill decide d to 
try it on pr i l 2? , 
The t a c t ica l pl an <.Hilled f or two comba t te ams to 
strike ngai nst Myi tkyina while the third covered and 
screened the movement . The strategic pl an ca lled for 
an other Chinese division to be f lown over The Hump to 
Assam, and then f lown in gliders to the Myi tkyina air , 
striyJ af ter it had been se cur e d by the comba t te a.ms , 29 
All three comhnt te uzm made it over the Pa:s e , with 
diff iculti es , an d approached Myi tkyina , meeti ng s ome resis-
t an ce on the way . Many of the Americ ans showed up with 
typhus an d had t o be evu.oua ted . 
''On M.uy 13 Merrill radioe d Stilwell : • • • can s top 
this show up to noon tomorrow • , • i f you think t oo much 
ga mble . Pe r s onal opi nion • • , we have fa ir chan ce an d 
should try ." 30 Stil well told Merrill to ro J. l on i n and 
swi nf, on them . 
On May 14 , Hunte r , i n charge of one of the comba t 
te ams r adioed the f orty- eigh t -hour a l ert s i gnal , ana on 
the f ollowing da.y the t wen t y-four-hou.r al e r t was r eceived , 
On Me.y 17, a t 10 : 30 · a. .m • • the messar;e " i n the r i nl)" was r e-
29 J~red 'f\ l drenee , Wr a th i n Burma ( Garden Ci t y , New 
York: Doubleday on d Company , I"i:1C. , 1946) , p . 258 , 
30 I bid ., p , 260 , 
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oeive d , 31 This me ant t lnt Hun ter was a ttu.ckine the Hyitky-
i na u.ir s trip , south of 1-fyitkyina . 
The f ield was <.;apture (l shortly tlle r e after and a t 
3 : 30 ·p . m., the f :l.1· s t transports l an ded , f ollowed. by a 
stream of tranS11 0 rts and p-lide:rs . The Ameri e;uns ex peutecl 
to hav e tho whole 89th .rtee:t men i in t he next morn i cg . 
~1e outlook, ut f irs t , WdS for a brillian t an d 
quick victory , but within a v;eek ' s time i t had been trans-
f orme c1 t n to a squul id , he a r brea king campai gn . 
The 150i.h Chin ese He s iment , the first flovm in f rom 
Ch i na , was inexpc r l ence d in the a rt of war . I n their fi rat 
action , s evera l batta lions mistook ea ch other f or tTa pane s e 
and terri f lu c asualties re sulted be f ore recottnition wns 
a c h ieve d . \.s pan ic spreat1, the J ayx.mese were p-iven tt me to 
reinforce f o r u l as t- ditch e ff o r t . 
About f ive to seven tho u s<.::~.n d J ny>ane se decide d to 
m:1ke u. suh:i tle try to hold Myi tkyina . 'l.'he Mar aud er s we re 
exhauste<l 30cl deci mate d with dise t\Se after four mon ths of 
h u.r <l f i p:htine . 'Jihe monso on r t.\ in s we rc bee;i nn in g t o draw u p 
t hrouRh Bar na , to make the s i t uat i on even wo.rse . 
On May 22 , Stilwe ll a lerte d Genera l Pi ck ' s comba t 
enp jneers as re p l ace men t s for Ga l a ha d , which was practi-
31 Jos e ph ~~ . St].l well , The Stilwell Pafers ( New 
York: Arr an rre d and R'di ted by Theo <lore H. Wh i . e , William 
Sloan e \.SSo ci utes , Inc . P.u.bl:i.ohc rs , 1948) , p . 296 , 
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c ally shot . 32 Only t welve ren wer e left in the 2nd Bat tal-
ion . On May 30, the 42nd Her.;iroen t wa s mov e d i n to Myi tkyina 
by air . On June 3 , the 42nd an d 150th He gi rren ts were h it 
h ard by the J n-11unese • but s to pped the a ttack . Three hun-
dre d and t wenty casua l t j.e s we rc suffered . 
I n the Mogaun g Valley , Sun IJi-j en a nd his Ch:i.nese 
were p:ettine set to a tta ck Kama in g . Sun tlre w up a pl an to 
t ake Kama in r. an d it was approved by Stilwell , who was only 
too g l a d to p;et t re chance to drop away from the control of 
th e Ti;leven th Ar my Group , a ccor ding to t he agreerrent. On 
June 4 , Chinese troops cap tured Tu.mbou r~hka , a to wn on the 
eas tern f l ank . Kamai np; , af t er much poun d irw·, was f inal l y 
t aken on June 1 6 , by troo 11S of t he 22nd Di vis ion . The r em-
n ants of the J apanese 18th Divis ion were coo ped up s outh-
\'Jest of Kamain g and the n oose was t i e htened . 
When the Chi n di ts were pl a ced under St ilwe 11' s 
comnand , he expected them to f i ght • 
.Jt ilwell wante d the Chindits t o put a lock on the 
J apanese re ar , blocking the move me nt of reinforcement s 
and SUPI)l i es, and to keep the J apan ese retre a tin g i n 
front of him from es capin g . Thi s me ant the establish-
ment of road a nd tra tl blocks in t· trength, and ho l ding 
these bJ. o ck R for considerable l engths of time . Such 
t a(.; tio s wouJ d c ause con s i de ruble British c asual t ies . 
1\veryl)ody knew th£.t . Bu.t without suc h t a c tics St il-
well f elt tha t Lentaigne ' s forces would l)e nothi ng but 
a liabilitJr, i n th at they would a ccomplish noth·lne 
32 ~·. p . 299 . 
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concrete , while hoin8 a dra i n on J tilwcll ' s nir auplJlY 
line which ha d to keep them in food and a nmlunition . 33 
lj ince I,e nt a igne wonJ.d n ot comply wi th St i.l well ' s 
coumands , Stil\·Jell a ske d f o r the relief of the Ch1.ndits • 
.Fin ally , the Ch:i.Dd:l. ts we re rep l o. ce<l by the British 36th 
Divi s j on , un der tho comrnand of Ma j or General .l!' r u.ncis Woga n 
l!'c 8 title . 
The Chine se an d ele men t s of the British 77th Bri-
gl.l<le a tta cked Mogaung on June 22 , nod five days l a ter the 
t own \~us in Allied hands . 
Once a{Sain , the :British s onp:ht the relief of Stil-
VJeJ.l . Me rril1 r o.cti oed to Stilwell t .ha t Moun tba. tten had ap-
proa ched Marsh all , a.nc1 asked f or his relief a s de puty au-
'7. 4 pre me 1Ulie d oonmumde r . 0 In the earl y J:ll.~rt of Ju.ly , oo th 
Mttrsh~lll nnd President Roos evelt 11ut p ressure on Chia ng 
lCai- ahck to let Stilwell run the whole show i n China , es-
pecially Gince the J apanese ha<l over-run the a:i.rbases of 
t he 14th Ai r l!,orce. c as t of Ku nm:tnr; . On August 2 , Stilwell 
vw.o promote <1 to full gene r a.l. 
Towd rd the end of July, the .:rapnnec3 were makin g 
a tter.:rpts to es cape from Myi tkyina :l.n s mall groups . Man y 
were capture d or kill ed as t hey tr:i.ed to Hscape down tha 
33 Fred El dre dr.-e , \/r o,th 1£! Durmu ( Garden City , New 
York: Doul>le<lay Diltl Company , In<.: ., 194 6) , PJ.> · 26'7-8 . 
34 . Sti l we J.l , .2.l2 . c:i 1 . • , p . 205 . 
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Irrav1addy Rive r on r ufts . A pri soner of war f rom Myi tkyin u 
sa :i.d the con dition of the Japs wo.s very bud ; t he mora le \vas 
low, wo1mdecl ke p t i n line , short on ra t ione--on e quarter 
b owl of r ice da ily , und t here were only 400 l eft. 35 
On August 1 , Stilwell f l ew to Kandy, Ceylon , to 
te mporarily reli eve IJord M:ountba t ten . He r)romp tly cance l ed 
the sequ en ce of endle ss mee t i ngs that OC <;Up i e d the a tten tion 
of the hi gher brass of he adquart ers . He i n di cut e d t ha. t 
hencef orth he wo ul d hund l e a ll Ameri<; Wl i tems , un d the chief 
of s t aff could handle a ll items pe r tai n ine; to the British . 
Stil~el l proce eded t o rela x . 
On Au p;us t ~; . the Allied forces made bj.g gai ns at 
Myi tkyi na a.ncl on August 4 , 1 944 , the t own was cnptured , en c1 i ng 
a seven t y- e i e,h t- dey s ie ge . 36 ~~hus , the mili t a r y phase of t he 
Ledo Hoac1 proj ect was virtually ended . The Allies had lmt 
fo urteen mil es to e: o for a juncture with the old Myi t kyi na-
Bha mo r oa d. a cross t he I rr awaddy Hi ve r . Despi te thre a ts 
fr om Chi ang to ha lt the Y.oke f o rce , St ilwe 11 i ns i s te d that 
the Amertca.ns ancl Chi nese under his corruna.ncl , re s t andre-
grcup f or further action dur i n g the dr y se a son . 
35 Josep h w. Stilwel l , The St j.l well Papers (New York : 
Arranged und E'di te d by The odore H. V/h1. te , William Sl oane 
As soe:iates , In c. Publi shers , 1 048} , p . 308 , 
36 I bid,, pp. 3 10-11 . 
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Mountba tten ar r ive d back in Ceylon from hiS t rip to 
Lon don , an d relieved Stilwell on August 24, us Supreoo 
Conuntm de r . 
After pl·e ssurc ha t1 been put on from all s ide s f or 
many months , the Yoke fo r eo under <.;o mman d. of Wei JJj.-huang 
and as!:3 i s ted by Briga<'lier General l!' r ank Dorn , f i n ally swune; 
i nto a ction on Me.y 11, 1944 . The y l a unchecl a camptd gn 
which crossed th e Sal ween Hiver a t six teen c1i:rferent 
pl a ces on a 130-mile front , 
DurJn g t he f i rst three months of the Salween oam-
pa i en on the world ' s highe s t ba ttlefield--the 12,000 
ft . Kaoli Moun t a i.n Han ge-- the Chinese libera te d more 
than 150 popul ated pl aces an d regai ne d 10,000 square 
miles o:f te r ritory . By July , s tron g Chinese forces 
were be s ie e in g J apr Garrisons at Tengchunr , Pi ngka a nd 
Sun gshan Moun t a :i.n . 37 
Sung shan , the Gi braltar of the Burma. Road , se erne t1 
to be an irnproe;nul1le s t llmbling block i n the drive of the 
Y f orce i n retuking the old .Burma Houd . 
J apane se e uns commanded t he Hoad for a s far as the 
eye co uld re ach . Having ocoupi ed Sunghan for two years , 
t he J apane se ha cl he avily f ort ified the hdi e;hts with guns 
hidden i n p illb oxes , trenches , and even buried t anks . 
Dtle to the oun n i il{"l y pre pared f ields of f ire , it was sui-
cicta1 f or the Chinese t roo .r>S t o s torm the mounta i n f or-
37 S/Sgt , C,M. Buchanan and Sgt . J ohn H . McDowell, 
Stilwell Roa d ( Ca lcutta : I ndia n Pre ss Ltd., 1945) , ~p . 
75-6 . -
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tress . The Chine s e ha d tried a nd were rhythmi<:ally cut 
down time and again by J upa.nese rn uohine e;un and artillery 
fire . 
\'lhen it was seen th at it wus futile to a ttempt to 
t uke the su.mmi t by these frontal assaults , Capt a in Peter 
s . Hopki ns, a yolmg .American e ngi neering officer wi th the 
t as1{ f o r<:c Oper a tions St aff , got to gethe r with the Chinese 
en e i neers and a.ecidecl to di e; their way UJ.> the mounta. in . 38 
\V i th the Chj.nese dieging aVJay day und night , approa ch tren che s 
were pu che d f o rwar d . 
1'/o finully worked ou.r way we 11 up toward the ore s t 
of the mounta in and then t unne led i nto its side . The 
tunnelin g went uhe a.d night and day, urj and uncler the 
Ja:r posi tiona . We ca re full y est i.mate d the two points 
on the maJ.n pe t\lt of Sungshan where the bulk of the Jap 
de fenders were concentrate d . When the t"UJ1nel had pro-
gre ssed to thes e 17oints, the TNT v;as car rj.od j_n to th e 
tlm nel , pl uce d i n pos ition , a.nd wire s r un ou t of the 
tunne 1 back to the spo t where ou.r ele ctri o plunger wo.s 
set up . One of the Chinese pu shed do m the plune~g and 
the whole mountai n top seemed to rise i n the a ir . 
The Chinese rusho c1 up the moun tain , occu1)i e d tho 
bl a s t c raterH, a nd t hen repulsea repeated Japanese counter-
a tta cks . Gr adually , t re Chinese mopped. u -p i s ola ted J apanese 
pockets .. 
Of t he e st im~.ted 2 , 000 Jups on Suncs han whe n the 
38 Ameriu u.n Officer 1-!el ps Chine se_ Blow ~ Top Of 
Mounta i n .Defended~ 3aps , J>ul)li<: He l o.t ions Of'f i c:e r, Y:: 
li'or<.:e OrJera.tion s STaf:e, lJni te d St a tes Army: p . 1 . 
39 r .. oc • cit • 
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siege started , n i ne prisoners were t aken , about ten Japs 
e s cape d down t he mount a i n , an d the re s t were killed . 
The walle d city of IJu.ngling "~as ca1)tur e d on June 
10 , but was reca.ptu recl by the J tl.pS s even days l a ter . 
To nuke the Allie cl offen sive poss i bl e down the Ledo 
Hoad , Gener al Piek dive rte d. a l arge pe rcen t age of his Erl-
e;inee rs to clear a comba t r oa d t h rough t he jungle t o the 
front over \'Jh tch troops , supplies, tanks and equ.t pment 
c ould move. 
Mor e tha n 300 miles of ' combat trace ,~' or te mporary 
side r oads of f i nto the hill s , ha d to be built to en-
able Chinese troops to keep J aps :Lrom sneakine; i n and. 
severin g the mai n r oute .40 
En e i ne e rs, workin g on armor- pl aten. bulldozers , ad-
van ce d a head of the infantry to cu t a truce wh ich led 
thr ough the juflgl-e-te battl~ngam Saka n , Taiph 
Ga , Mn.lne;kawan , V/al awbum, Tingkawk Sakan , J ambu Burn Pass , 
Sh a.duzup m Cl. Warazup . Long lines of 'bulldo:;:e rs pulling 
ca rry- all s nn d hnge ea rth mo vers che wed away e. t the moun -
t a ·lns :tcle s an d moved. tons o f ea rth i n to the SWE~mpl ands where 
f if teen- f oot-h i e;h cauueway- :fills were l>u'iJ t a cross a re a s 
which are i nunda te <l with f ive to ten feet of v;a. te r duri ne 
the monsoon . Culve rts were installed thro ugh t his cause-
vmy sys te m t o provide proper f loo d control during the 
40 Viola 1'or r e y, "Do ing the I mpossib l e M:U.de the 
StilweJ.l Roa. c1 ," l'o;pulnr Scie nce , 146 : '12 , ...i.pril 1945 . 
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r ui ns . 
Proe;re sr:; was r apid <1own the Hukmvng Valley , wi th 
the le ad bul ldoze rs o.ve r ap·i ne better t han a mile a clay, a l-
though they we re helcl up a t several pl aces by the combat 
si tuu tion . Chin ese E'n p; inee rs buj 1 t hand-hewn t t mber 
bridges over many of' the otreaHlS whio h the ro ad crossed . 
Al l these bridges were te mporary and \7e re l a ter r epl e.oe d by 
H- 20 an d Baile y stee l br id ges . 
The Road c.t·o ssed ten pri nci pal rivers and 155 sec-
on dar y s t reams ; it r eq tdred u br:tdge every three miles of 
i t s length. The great rivors of th€ ree;1on are unp r edict-
able d.n d tre tl.cherous , an d have been hitherto u.nbridge d . 41 
1'he 'fa.wanrr , which during the monsoon ca r ries three times as 
much wate r us t he Hi ssouri in fl ood, i s one of them. Pick 
t hrew a 1400-foot t imber bridge a cr oss it, but the river 
tore it to pi eces . On u ni ght of storm, Pic k QUer ie d h is 
stuff on the possibility of rebu.ild i nR it a t once . The 
dis pirt te cl men , one by one said it could n ot l)e done . 
For a l ittle \? tdle there was s ile nce, unbroke n ex-
cep t by ra i nfall on the roo :f.' of the hut . 'l'hea r ick 
S})Oke qui e tly . ' 'l'omorrow we will build the bri dge ,' 
Ann it \"'O.S built durin~) tho monsoon . 42 
Other Knpinee r un i tfl vu~ re i mprovtng the Roa d. throur,h 
41 David L. Cohn , "The Ol d Man With t he Stick--
General Lowis A. Pi ck, 11 ~ntic , 176: 07 , Au gust 1945 . 
42 Loc • .£!!. 
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the Patkai s . climinnti ne be. cl curve o, maki ng new f ills and 
settin e up a r oad dra i naf)e sys tem. "By the time t he 1944 
monsoon struck North Burma , the r oa d di s t ance between Led o 
and Shin g1)w iyun g ha rl been whittled down from 11 '7 to 102 
milea . "43 Roa d 1)rogre ss was stopped a t 1'/ar a zup by th e mon-
s oon , t he comb ~lt situation , a nd by the fact thut Road En -
gi neers were al re ady cons tructing comba t tra ce and a ir-
f ields . 
Plans were made, during the time the r a i ns preclud-
ed actual now :t.•o ad construction , to provide for the ap-
pr eaching f a ir wea t her season . Construction SUI)plies a.nd 
new mu ohi nery we r e transporte d from base depots in Indi a to 
points on the Roa d where t hey would lJe needed . T:ru ck con-
voys moved ahe ad, irregar dJ.ess of the r ui ns , with ca.r e;oes 
of steel culve:rt pi pe , t ools , machinery , sp~.1re parts , bolts , 
s pi kes , nail s un d o the r items needed f or roadbuilding . 
Some l a r ge ]?rime mover s towed ppwer shovel a s s em-
blies , rook crushers , and other rela tively i mmobile 
equ. iprrent up to the a dvance de p ots , but a gre a t lnlny 
items such as bulldozers , carr;ya.ll scrapers , an d tourn-
apull s made their wa.y ' on foot from Ledo to Wur uzup , 
200 miles <li otan t . 44 
Survey l)D.rt i es e ne;aee d themse 1 ves i n loca. ting the 
43 ~,irst Convoy Over the J,etlo Roa d, Public Relations 
Of ficer, Y- Force-rr:Dcrutions Stafr;-unrtea St ates Army: p . '7 . 
44 ~.~ildinB' the J,edo Hoa <.l , Public Helatio ns Off icer, 
Y- li'orce Opera tions ffiff.ljn i t ed St ates Army: p . 3. 
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l as t lap of the Hoad from Warazup to Myi tkyi na. 
Durin p: the r a in s , a system was set up for util i zine; 
i n the most effi cie nt way the newly-arrived troopB ond 
e qui prne n t • 
Benefiting from pas t experience , it was resolved 
that , instead of assi gn i ng units t he mission of doing 
all the work i n a parti oul t.\r se otion , the jobs should 
be parcelled out as to type , ea ch uni t be in e; re s pon-
sibl e for a particular phase of oper ations . Thus , 
Chi nese engineer troops were to p i on eer the trace l a i d 
by the survey parties , c on structin g elezoonta.ry bridges 
and access roads for the su11Plies and equil)lre t1 t which 
were to be brought up l ater : an Aviation Battalion 
then was to follow immed.i ately, cl earing the r i ght- of-
way to n width of at least one hundred feet . Next 
were to come the ' grading oompatl ies , ' an Rnginee r Gen-
era l Service Hegimen t and a n Avia tion Battal i on . 
These un its , 8.Bs i p;ned se ctors v a r ying in l eng th from 
10 to 15 mile s , were charRed wt th the mission of 
eartll-movin e , muking t ;1e many cuts a nd fills neces sary 
to bring the road to the desired gra de . They we re 
also to be resr,onsible jointly with the Chinese Engi-
neers for installin e; the numerous steel culvert p i pes 
requi r ecl a long the roo.CI . The rema i n i ne drainage 
structu res , the scores of· br i dges of all types needed 
to span 1. he stre ams and rivers crossing the road 
tra <.;e , were to be erected by a Con s truction Batt a lion , 
workin g simultaneous l y with the g r a din g units ond be-
in g supplied w.i. th lumber from the sawmills of Engineer 
Forrestry Companies . The hundreds of timber piles 
needed were either to be sn a.ke d out of the junple s by 
tractors or pulled. out by ele plmnts hired for the pur-
pose . As soon ns condjtions pe rmitte d, anothe r Avia-
tion Battalion , au. gu"e nted hy seve ral '<),uarte rma.ster 
1'ruck Compan i es , we re to move in vd.th the e;ravel 
spre a(l an d. fin al roatl surfacing work , This r oa d met-
al l i ng materi a l coul d gene rally be found. i n copious 
qutm tities along the beds of the l arge r strea rrs i n the 
a re a . 
The Roan was kept o pen durin r.; the r ui n s , ex cept f or 
----------·-----
45 Ibid ., p . 4 . 
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occ as ional r oa d blocks . The f trst s i zeab le shi pments of 
heavy eq ui prrent from too United Stutes v1ere moved up the 
Road during the mons oon to f orward points where it could 
be put i n t o operation on the ne w trace once the rains end-
od . 
'J!hue , the e nd of the monsoon in October found a 
vas t backlog of new bulldozers , trucks cranes , 
shovels , carry- all s , roc k <.;rus her s , cul vert , bridge 
se ctions , und o.ll the myri ad vital cne-ineo r in g equil)-
men t which goes into the cons truction of u highway 
})Oised a t \Varazup rea dy for the drive down the home 
stretch . 46 
Survey c:X'e ws probed through rna tte d junel es , a c r oss 
swum})l un ds 1m d ov or rolling hill l:3 to survey the route l a id 
out by Genera l :Piclt: . The construction of a t wo- mile woocl-
en cuusewu.y ove r a stretch of f looded jungl e l and , regard-
ed as the bi ggest job of ma i ntenan c e enei neering t n the 
history of the Co rps o f Engineer s , was compl ete d. during 
the ra i ns . • • This causeway was c onstructe d of 1 , 000 , 000 
boa rd. feet of l umber c ut by two GI lumber mills i n the Hu-
ko.wng Valley . It waa built a c r oss a low-lyi cR s ect i on of 
the vu.l.ley i nunda t ed wtth four to six feet of water, o.n d 
was compl eted i n for t y d eys t o ~lvert a s erious s toppaee i n 
the f]. OVI 0 f SUP11l i c S • 
As t :OO monsoon ended, all the crack engi neering 
un i ts on the Iledo Roa d bep,un the new t race . A corduroy 
46 First Con voy Over the Le do Ho ad , 12.£. _ill, . 
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access roa d was built by Chinese eneineers across ten miles 
of swampl and south of Warazup and up into the f oothills , 
The Hoad then followed the proposed route along the hill-
s ides and dowa into Ntl.mti , a. sta tion on the Rangoon-Man-
clala.y- Myi tkyina Railway, between Myi t kyina and Mogaung , 
Leap-frogging was used alon g the access road , En-
gin eering uni ta would l>uild a four or five mile s tretch of 
roadway, and then move forw ard ahead of other units and 
start ne w traoee . "One American unit has made camp more 
than seventy times in moving a long as the road pro~reas­
e a . "47 
The fifteen-mile stretch , from Moga.ung to the Ir-
r awaddy River crossin g, was f i ni shed by early J anuary . The 
mighty Irrawaddy was a problem to bridge. nFed by Himalay-
an sn ows and the ra in s, thi s river might rise ten to fifteen 
feet overnight; its fluot i ons between low and high water 
we re as much as forty-five f eet . n48 
First , an 1172 foot pontoon bridge was f lung a cros s 
the river. It was one of the longe s t pontoon bri dges ever 
built. The swi f t , risin g wate r s would bend the bridge into 
a curve like the letter U, s o se cti ons woul d have t o he re-
47 Magazine page , ~York ~imes, Febraary 11 , 1945 . 
48 Cohn, Loc, cit • 
............. ........_ 
FIGURE 9 
PONTOON BBIDGE OVER THE 
IRRAWADD~ RIVER 
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moved i n orde r to prevent it from being crushed, 
Traffic had to be stopped u ntil the waters receded. 
By comb i ning the fe a tures of many kinds of bridges o.nd in-
venting new ones. Pick s ucceeded in anchoring a huge per-
man ent f loatin g bridge acr oss the river. During the mon-
soon. uprooted trees going downstream partly submer ged 
served as ba ttering r ams , which took out bridge pilings 
an d pi ers an d swept everythi ng clean before the m. 
Pick waan' t al ways su.re of whe1·e he was going, 
since the re were no maps of the route to be t aken. Surve y-
ors were not able to use their tranai ts in the jungle and 
the pre sence of the enemy very of ten made it i mpossible to 
send out survey parti es . Pick t ook t o the a ir, frequent~y 
locating fue route by aeria l reconnaissance and his own en-
gineerin g i ns tinct. Moe t of the Uoad h ad to built t hl•ough 
ma t ted jungl e , and much of the work went on f or hal f the 
year in a lmos t unceasing r a i n . Si gnal communica t i ons were 
provided for a constantly lengthen i ng supply line, hos pi-
t a ls an d sanitar y arrange ments were erected in the unendin g 
fi ght aeai n st disease, and recreational equ.ipmen t was pro-
cured for t he men. 
The Ledo Ho ad was constructed a t the end of the 
longest supply line in the wor ld with too few troops and 
never en ough equipme nt f rom the very start of the project. 
There were neither recorda nor means of securing 
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information as to the topography. types of soil, road 
mate rials, amounts of rain, or the oha:raoteristios of 
the rivers that were to be encountered and the jun{iles 
through which the Roacl passed were too thiok to permit 
:~~9than a rough location of the route to be follow-
~he designated mission of the troops was to con-
struct the roads, but other accomplishments were made, 
"Four airfields were constructed having a combined 
seal-coat surfaced runway area of about 540,000 square 
yards, or approximately 70 acre a. "50 In add itlon, thou-
sands of feet of taxiways leading to surfa~Jed aprons, re-
vetmants and dispersed parking areas were constructed, 
~his more than doubled 1he area surfaced for the runways 
proper. Many liaison strips were constructed along the 
route to support combat and supply operations, 
Housing facilities for thousands of men, hospitals 
for the sick and wounded, and several million square feet 
of covered warehouse apace were put up in support of the 
construction troops and the combat forces, 
Then there were the problema of providing signal 
communications for a constantly extending line of supply; 
manpower to JH'OVide sanitary facilities for fighting tropi-
cal diseases; and oonstru.cting recreational facilities for 
49 First Oonvoy Over tbe Ledo Road• Public Relatione 
Officer, Y-Poroe Operations Stafr;-nn~ States Army: p, 0, 
50 Loc, ill• 
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the men during their limite d off-duty hours • 
.An almos t unbelievable amount of earth had to be 
moved in order to push the Le do Hoad through the jungle. 
Through the 102 miles of mounta in section where the 
minimum shoulder to shoulder width of the Ro ad is 33 
feet, 100,000 cubic yards of dirt were moved for e ach 
mile of road constructed. In the valle y, where 49 
feet is the minimum shoulder to shoulder width, 25,000 
cubic yards were moved per mile. In round figures, 
a.n average of 50,000 cubic yards of earth were moved 
f or each completed mile of the Ledo Road which is a 
tota l of roughly 131 600,000 cubic yards, With this 
amount of dirt, it would be possible t o build a solid 
dirt wall three feet wide and ten feet high in a 
straight line from New York City to San Francisco. 
California. t:>l 
En ough culvert pipe was used to stretch for a dis-
tance of 105 miles. An estimated 1200 feet of culvert were 
installed for each mile of the noad, 
Since the earth over the rJedo Road is a sandy loam, 
a heavy surfacing coat was required to withstand the pound-
ing of convoys. Mountain rook was unaui table , so gravel 
dbposi ts in the rivers along the Road were used entirely 
f or surfacing material. It was necessa ry, at times, to 
transport the gravel as f ar as twenty-five to thirty miles, 
In the 102 miles of mount a in section , gravel was 
pla ce d 12" deep over a 20- foot section amounting to 
about ~1 ,865 cubic ya rds of gr avel per mile for the 
initia l cove rage. About J., 920 more cubic ya rds of 
gra~el were required for each mile to taka care of 
settlP,llle nt, shrinkage, wash and initial patching . A 
51 First Conyo~ Over the Ledo Hoa.d , Pu.blic Rela tions 
Off icer, t-Foroe Operations staf~nrted States Army s p . 9. 
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total of 5•785 cubic yards per mile. 
On tm 265 miles of virgin road through the valley 
( Shin gbwiyang to Bhamo) and on the 98 mile s of :-oad 
from tl'B t point to the juno tion with the Burma Road, 
8" of gravel were spre a d over a 20 foot se ction or 
about 2,580 cubic yards to the mile, The initial 
maintenmce here requ ired an add1 ·ciona.l 060 cub.i<l 
yards of sravel per mile for a tota l of 3,440 cubic 
yards placed on each mile of road. 1 
It would t ake a t least 1,100 fifty-car tra in-loads 
or a string of railroad care 470 miles lon g to move 
the over 1,363,000 cubic yards of gravel Which were 
placed on the Ledo Boad between Ledo and too junction 
of the Burna Hoad,o2 
The rivers cross i ng the Ledo Road seemed to present 
i nsurmountable barriers to the comple tion of t he Road. 
The Road crosses 10 major r ivers between Ledo a nd 
the junction of th e .Burna Road. From Ledo forward, 
these are the Tirap, Nanwang • Nanyunk, Tarung , Ta.wang, 
Tana.i, Mogauns , Irrawaddy, TapinB and the Shewli ,53 
Al s o, about 155 secondary stre ams ha d to be bridged 
before truck traffic could re ach the Burma Road. A bridge 
was constructed. for about every three mile s of road. Most 
of the temporary and pontoon bri dges cons t ructed dur in g the 
comba t period were repl aced by permru1ent, t wo-way, pile-
driven bridges capable of carryi ng maximum conte mpl a ted 
loads. The toal overall l ength of the ma i n bridees is 
about f ive miles, 
The Irrawaddy River , aa mentioned before, required 
52 Firat Convoy Over the Ledo Roa d. ill• ill• 
53 r~o 0. Q 1 t. 
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one of the loneest pontoon bridges in the world, because of 
its depth and fluctuations of as much as forty-five 
between high und low river stages . 
As the road point was pushed south to meet the 
Burma Road, lumbering and. logg ing ope rations followed . 
There were great demands f or forest products in the form 
of piling, b1·idge timbers , lJl anking and lumber for the con ... 
struotion of sub-de pots along the route . "It is estimated 
that over 822.000 cubio :feet of lUIIlbcr has been t aken from 
the jungle a with limited logging f aoili ties ava ilable for 
the construction of fue Ledo Road •" 54 
Thou.san ds of native a we re employed i n l>uilding the 
Ledo Road . .They were use d mainly for the building of 
bases , sub-depots , handling supplies, and 1n an ti-malaria 
work , Unbel·ievable troubles were broueht abou t by l an-
guage differences al one. Since each of India ' s 200 dia-
ls ots we re repre s ented, si en l anguaee often had to be re-
sorted to as the only solution to the problem, 
Karly in Se ptember • two Arne rioana , Donald Ite lson 
and Patrick J . Hurley went f i rs t to Delhi 9ll d t}len to 
Chun gking to s tra i ghten out Ame1•ioan poli cy :tn Ch in a . On 
fue l atter tr i p, they were a.ocompa.nic d by General Stilwell . 
54 First Convoy ~ver the Ledo Uoad, Public Rel at ions 
Off icer , Y-il'oroe Opern.t one Staff,17n!m States J\rmy : p . 10. 
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Nelson was to offer the Chinese vas tly increa sed 
quantities of lerld-le ase nnterials and discuss huge 
postwar a id in reconstruction . Hurley was cha rged 
with binding the Chinese government to certain hard-
and-fast commitnen ts : the granting to Stilwell of 
direct oomnand functions; an agreement that American 
Lend- Le ase wa r rraterial s to be distri bute d as Stilwell 
dire oted for war uses; a n a greene nt that Stilwe 11 be 
pe rmitted to bring the Communists tmder his joint 
command for use against the J apanese . 55 
In the first a t agea of the conferen ce , Chiang in-
sis ted that Stil~ell's X force at ~witkyin a advan ce ninety 
miles s cuth and a tta ck Bhamo, in orde r to r elieve the Y 
f orce a ttackine Lun~lin g . Chiang threatened t o withdraw 
the Y troops to the critical Kweilin front , if Stilwell 
didn ' t act . Stilwell refused to move the X f.oroe . 
On September 12 , Chiang Ka i-shek agreed to appoint 
Jose ph W. Stilwell a s coDlllander in chief of all Chinese 
ground f orces and give him "full confiden ce . n56 Chiang in-
sis ted on con trollin g Lend-Lease, 
On September 19 , President Roosevelt sent a shar ply 
worded mess age to Chian g to tho effect that he had better 
get busy and contribute some positive action aga inst the 
J apanese or Ame rican support would be dropped. Genera l 
Stilwell delivered the mes s age . On September 25, Chiang 
55 Jose ph w. Stilwell , The Stilwell Paper s (New 
York: Arran p:ed and Edited by Theodore H. White , William 
Sloan e Associat es , Inc. Publishers . 1948), p . 324 . 
56 ~ •• p . 328 . 
. ' · 
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reversed himself in regard to Stilwell, At this time, he 
unof f.ici ally wished f or Stilwe 11 ' s relief on the grounds 
thu.t the P1·esident ' s me,ssage had made him Stilwell ' s subor-
dinate an d he had lost the power t o direct him. 
At the end of Sep te mba r. H,H. Kung. the General-
issimo's brother-in-~aw , was invited to a dinner party in 
Washington . a t which he met Harry Hopkins . 
Aooording to K' ung , Hopkins had informad him that 
if the Generalissimo insisted on Stilwell's recall 
Roosevelt would yield to the request ana7aond another 
.Ame rio an to comma.n d the Chinese Armies . 5 
Kung cabled t his news to Chungking. 
On Octobe r 19, after a multitude of l'adious had been 
sent back and forth on t he comman d s ituation . Stilwell re-
ceived a ra dio from Ge orge Marshall recalline him to Wash-
ington . The OBI Theate r was split in two, with Wedemeyer 
in oommarHl of u. s. troops in Chin a .- and Sultan .in com:na.nd 
in the Burma-India Theato1·. "Hurley•s recommendation that 
Stilvrell be reca lled tipped the scales al though t he Presi-
dent exchanged a few mor e messages wi th Chiang after the 
rc commendation." 58 
Chiang offered ~ til well China ' s highe st decorat ion, 
but he refused it on 1he grounds tha t he didn't think a 
57 Ib~., P• 339. 
68 Fred R'ldredge, Wrath in :Burma ( Garden City, 
n ew Yo r k. Dou.bleday md Compm y , Inc., 1946 ), p , 303 . 
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soldier of his rank should accept any foreign decorations . 
Stilwell s ent a warm persona l messaee to Lord Louis . 
It• s diaappoin ting not to be able to finish my job 
in 1he theater', he wrote. ' but I ' m fflad I have had an 
opportunity to play a small part i n a l ar ge under t aking. 
I offer my beat wishes for great auooess in your 
forthcoming operations . When new a of that success 
reaches me I shall be one of the first to thl"OW my bat 
in the air,' 
With equal warmth Mountbatten replieds ' You are 
le avin g behind you the reputa.tioh of bein~ a grea t 
fighting general , and I know just how you l.l miss the 
opportunity of continuing your drive a outh and being 
in at the fin i sh . I always had the greatest admira-
tion for your fighting qualities . Your telegram of 
good wishes was very much a pprectated and I want t o 
wieh you the b~st of luck , whatever your new assign-
ment nay be .' 5 
In retrospe ct , Stilwell had this much to say: 
The pers onal experience of an individual fades in-
to insign i f icance in the enormou s scope an d ramifi-
cations of war , especially if there is a grievar:oe 
connected with it . An d when the general result is 
aucoeas , who cares about tm s quawks of the di~grun t­
led? If a man oan say he did n ot let his country 
down , and i f he can live with himself , there is no-
thing more he can reasonably ask for, 
Stilwell had go tten himBelf in ba d with American 
pe raonnel in the CJ3I thea ter on s everal occa sions , one of 
which waa in using two battalion s of Americ an Combat En-
59 Ibid., Pl? • 305-6• 
60 Joseph w. Stilwell . The Stilwell Palers (New 
Yorks Arran gad and Ndi ted by ¥lie odore H. Whi e • William 
Sloane Associa tes , Ino . Publi shers, 1948) , p . 349 • 
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gineers as replacements for the Mar auders in the etru~gle 
f or Myitkyina . On his recall , mu.ch of the ill-fee ljng was 
forgo·tten . "All a long the r oad s oldiers remarked: •say, 
he wasn't su.oh a bad EJUY after a ll. lie didn • t 1 i ke the 
Chinese any better than we do. He' s been fi ghting the m a ll 
t he t ime • 11 61 
On two occasions, October 6 and Oct obe r 23 , Gene r al 
Sti l well met wit h General Sultan at Myi tkyina and made an 
effort to olear up the command pos iti on 1n Burma and Indi a . 
General Sultan took over as conmander of the Chi-
nese ; the Mar s Task Foroe, a mixod Chine se - Amer ican bri-
gade, and the l3ri tiah 36th Divis ion . 
In September, th e Brit::l.sh 36th Division, oomnanded 
by Major General Fasting , a d:vancad a ruth of Mogaung on the 
Rangoon-Mandalay- Myi t ky:ina Hailway Corridor. "Ja.p s trong 
p oin ts on the road to Mandal ay-Uohnyin , Pinbaw, Hopin, 
Mawl u. , Pi nwe, In daw , Katha--were overcome one by one .n62 
The British drive wai3 service d b y Ameri can sapply troops , 
aided by a GI railway operating battalion • 
.As the British moved for\'?ard. t he Mare 'l1ask I!1orce 
and the Chine se 38th Di via ion spear he ade d the Chin ese First 
61 Eldre dge . 2n• oit ., p . 307 . 
62 S/ Sgt. a.M. Buohanoo and Sgt . John H. McDowell, 
Stilwell~ ( Calcutta: In di an Press Ltd ., 1945 ). p . 72 . 
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Army in an offensive aimed at Bhamo. The Chine se Si xth 
Army struck swiftly through Schwego to the west of Bhamo. 
Bhamo fe ll on December 15 , after a 28~day siege . The Chi-
nese and Mars Task Force wheeled to the eas t from Bhamo and 
began cle arine the 163-mile stretch of road to Wanting , 
In the meantime , the Y force had recaptured Lung-
ling on November 3. ~md was moving southward . The Chinese 
put road blocks both north an d south of the open t own of 
tmngshih in June , and south-bound troops captured the town 
on November 20. 
The Chinese encountered fanatical Jap resistance in 
the hill country around Wanting , The Chinese entered Wan-
tin g early in J anuary , after f orcing the Japanese back 
slowly, Agai n tho J aps took the town ba ck. but a week lat-
er the Chinese entered aBain and pushed the Jap (lefenders 
f arther down the Burma Road past Mong-yu. which was the 
junction of the Le do and .Burma Roads . 
The Mara Task Force under the command of Brig . Gen . 
John P. Willey marched against the Burma Road terminus of 
Lashio , 63 
The Jap army of Northern Burma, decima ted by 
battle casual t ies. was in full retreat . Namkham fel l to 
the Chinese . "On J an . 10, 1945 , the Y-Force and Chinese 
63 Ibid •• p . 77. 
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Armies in India linked up at the Shan vill age of Meng 
Mao . n 64 'l'he mopping up process con tinuo d . "The troops 
took Mu- Se on J anuary 22 and cle ared the l a st section of 
Stilwell Road on J anuary 27 , when the Burma-Ledo Hoad 
junction of Mong Yu fell . n65 
Few Japanese lived to escape from North Burma as 
the Mara Task Force established road bl ocks on all esca pe 
routes . The Mar s Task Force and Chinese troops captured 
Laahio , ea rly in March , to gain complete con trol of the 
Burma 11oad , 
By mid- March of 1945, the Briti sh 14th Army, in a 
dr i ve across Central Burma fro m Imphe. l , recaptured Man da-
l ay , and then drove south t o retake Rangoon . The campaign 
in Bu.rma was virtually at an end . 
64 S/ Sgt , O. M. Buchanan en d Sgt . John R. McDowell, 
Stilwell Road ( Calcutta: Indian Press Ltd. , 1945) , p . 77 , 
65 Loo . oi t . 
--
CHAPTER VIII 
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF TBF BURMA ROAD 
Burma Road reconstruction was started i n orde r to 
support the Sal ween Campaign of the Chinese Expeditionary 
Force an d to prepare the way for an i nflux of supplies 
from the United St ates to China , virtually isolated since 
May 194 2, except for a i r supply , 
In prepar ation for rebuildi ng the back- door l and 
supply route to China , General Stilwell assigne d Lt, 
Colonel Loui s Y. Dawson , Jr. , u.s . Army, Corps of En-
gineers . in November 1942, as an engineer with a 
group of eight officers ordere d fr om India to Chi na as 
a military miss ion , l 
The purp0se of the group was to help China set up 
a Services of Supply and to provide for communications and 
a supply of munitions , material and equi pment for t he Chi-
nasa ar mi es , The Burma Hoad became Col . Dawson ' s "baby" 
as a supply r oute to t he then-defensive Sal ween fi ehting 
front an d potenti a~ outlet to the mass of supplies in 
I nd i a waiting move ment to China. Until mid-1943, when nine 
other American Officers arrived , Colonel Dawson had been 
the only Aroo rioan officer on the road . Nineteen American 
enlisted men al so joined the project at about the same 
1 Re construction of the Durma Road, Public· Rel a-
tions Off icer, Y-Foroe Operations Staff, United St ate s 
Army: p . 6 . 
time, and more American pers onnel were added l a ter . 
American participation in re construction of the 
Burma Road has been with en Bineering advice! opera-
tional instructions , some auppli ea , pe rsuas1on , 
friends M.p an d J)erson nli ty of a. small, hand-picked 
group, now called Bur ma Road Engineers , 2 
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To hold up their on a. the Chine sa furnished eng i-
neers. up to 30,000 coolie laborers at a ti.ma , an d supplies 
and material. Dut without Amer:t.oan adv:J.sors it is doubt- -
ful if the roa d would have been kept open through 1943 and 
early 1944. 
ln January, 1943, an inspection party i ncluding 
Dr. Lee Wen FinB ( Ph . D,, Michigan 1936 ), now assis tant 
to chief en gineer, and Director c,c, Kung, of YBHRA, and 
Col, Dawson of the subsequent B,R.E ., made an i .ns pec-
tion tour of all the :Burma Hoad then in Free China, 
Americans in the p·arty we r e surprised at the job Chi-
nese hand l a bor ha d done in building t he road and 
erecting stone-a rch bridges , and walls , As the re-
sult of this trip the fi i•s t survey ever made of the 
r oad was run ( completed in Apr:n , 1943) by the Chi-
nese governmen t. giving the eng;l.neers da t a with which 
to estima te recons t ruct i on needs . This tour also r e-
vealed that the Chinese had some road equipment 
standing 1n the open , unused for over a ye ar , and in 
need of repairs t o make it serv1ceable . 3 
Si x months were nee dad to assemble the s ca ttered 
equipment . overhaul it, an d malte s uch re pairs as were 
possible , Amerioa . England, Germany and France had sup-
plied this road equipment to YB1lliA, 
With the aalvaeed equipment, the Chinese were pre-
2 Recons truction of the Burma Road, Lo<l • ...£!!. 
3 Reconstruction of the Burma Road. 2R• ~ •• p . 7, 
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vailed upon to organize a Joint Construction Foroe. with 
the Chinese to have an opposite number to eaoh American in 
the force. The Chinese were to furnish their equipmen t 0 
common labor, such diesel oil a.nd parts as they had and 
suoh explosives as they posessed1 while the u.s. Army 
Corps of Engineers were to furnish engineers and equipment 
operators and some parts. 
Equipment on hand included: 
3·-D4 Caterpillar bulldozers (smallest madel. 
l--;~112 Caterpillar motor patrol (smallest made l. 
1--3/8-yard Rustin-Bucyrus. 
2--German air compressors. 
1--Ingersoll-Rand air oompressor.4 
Du.ring a period of' six months the equipment worked 
twenty per cent of the time, and due to a lack of repairs 
or parts was inactive eighty per oent of' the time. This 
diffiou.l ty was ove roo me as spare parts be oame available. 
In Septembe~ 1~43, the reconstruction of the Burma 
Road was started with 40,000 ooolies working.B Alloted 
funds were a pent in widening the Road and improving small 
b~idges, with no effort being made to surface the Road. 
At the end of the project, all parts of the Hoad from Kun~ 
ming to kilometer 701, were at least six meters wide. with 
tiona 
Army: 
4 Heoonstruotion of the Burma Road, Public Hela-
Offioer, Y-Foroe Operations Sta~United States 
p. 7. 
5 Ibid., Po ll. 
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the exception of the bridges. 
By October, the Chinese had taken over operation 
of all air hammers on the Road, 
From May 1, to August 26, 1944, u.s. Arro::J officers 
and men, assisted by ~s,ooo Chine.se coolies, improved the 
Road from kilometer 709 to the Salween River. It was wid-
ened to nine meters, the curves were eased, grades lowered, 
and humps taken out. The Chinese had "tank-proofed." the 
seotion of road bet•~een kilometers 709 and 734 in May. 
1942, This was restored as a one-track road in ten days, 
In June, 1944, un allocation of 197 million doll-
ars c.N. was made by the Chinese Government for further 
improveimnt of the :Surma Road. 
Other changes. improve!llllnts, Md a.cqu1.aitione were 
made as follows: 
June 15, 1944. Burma Road Engineers were formed as 
a seotion of the Chinese Training aod Combat Colllll!atld, 
with their OVIIl \!.'able of Organization, Md th.e u.s. 
Army road responsibility was charged to the B,R.s., 
attached to s.o.s. 
July, 1944. General Dorn radioed to Hq USAF, CBI 
for road building equipment and reoeived allotment of 
12 road patrols, 6 bulldozers and B air compressors, 
all to be flown over the Himalayan 'Hump' from India 
to China. Sinoe the Burma Road aasietanoe mission 
was first assigned to Y-Foroe, General Dorn gave his 
personal interest Md backing to every effort. He 
granted the road ~ngineer the ohoioe of all personnel 
assigned to Y•Foroe. 
July Bl, 1944. Order was given to restore the 
Hweitung Bridge over the Salween River. 
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Aug, 2, 1944. Material moved to site for Hweitung 
Bridge, 
Aug, 18, 1944, Hweitung Bridge over Salween River 
completed. Japanese planes made bombing raids this 
date at 0815 and 1730 on the 6bridge completed early in morning, dOlllg no damage, 
6 Ibid,, p, 12. 
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OHAP~R IX 
THE RE-NA~m~G OF Tlllr ROAD; 
THE' b, l.RST CONVOY TO KUNMING 
On hand to see the first convoy off wer e a host of 
dignitaries, including Major Genera l Al bert c. Wedemeyer, 
the American commander in China, and !Jt. Genera l Daniel I. 
Sultan , the head of American and Chinese forces in Burma , 
Near fl ag- decked trucks were Chinese , Indians , American a, 
an d British, all wui ting for the great moment when the first 
truck woul d start rolling along t he Road . 
As the f irst convoy rolled in motion, pre para tiona 
were underway in China to re-name the highway . On January 
28 , 1945, Generalissimo Chi ang Kai-she k made his dedication . 
The breaking of the land blockade of China was ob-
served at a spe cial ceremony in Chungking attended by 
Generalissimo Chi ang Ka.1-shek, American Ambassador , 
Ma j, Gen . Patrick J . Hurloy. an d Maj . Gen . Albert c. 
Wederooyer wh o succeeded General Stil well in China . In 
a broadcast directed to tne Unit ed Stat es , the General-
issimo declared that the open in~ of the Ledo-Burma 
Road, which even in peace ti me would be extra-or-
dinary achievement,' had ' broken the s i ege of China.' 
China ' s war l eader closed his a ddress with these 
words , ' Le t us name th i s r oad after General Joseph w. 
Stilwell, in memory of hi s di s t in ctive contribution 
and of the signal part whi ch the Allie d an d Chinese 
forces under hi s direction pl ayed i n the building of 
t he road. • 
In the United States , the recipient of the honor, 
15'1 
G~neral Stilwell deoluredl '1 take off my hat to the 
men who· fought for it and built :1.t. • He said these 
men 'worlte d and still work under oondi tiona which are 
unbelieYable unt:l.l you see them ...... jungle • mountainous 
terrain, insecta, diseases, mud, r ain and dust. The 
Allied na. tiona can fee 1 proud of the hard work dono 
by their repre sentatives •• ·• , The terrain in itself 
was bad enough, but the Jape added more problems. 1 They had to be blasted from the jungles one by one, 
The first convoy consisted of 113 vehicles and left 
Ledo even before the final capt~re of the Road. On January 
28 • the convoy passed within one mile of the front lines to 
erose onto Chinese soil at Wanting on its way to Kunming , 
Along the way. almost eve ry town had its ceremonial 
a rch, 
Walls and houses were plastered with sign a s uch as : 
' Welcome Ameri can Allies~ Your coming speeds our fi· 
nal victory' or 'Hail the coming of munitions over tho 
road to China--cooper ation for viotory,2 
Thoro were reception s and spee ches a t the principal 
towns, and members of the convoy personnel ha d ample oppor-
tunity to s ample many varieties of Chinese vl1.ne . 
Ame rica.n units along the way turned out to watch 
the convoy roll by. The invariable question was ~ 'Got 
any berr aboard?' But for many Americans too the con-
voy symbolized the climax of months of difficult or-
deal as liason te ams , en gineer outfits, and air supply 
teams . ' We have been sweating this out for a long 
1 "Highway to Victory;" Soholast~.c, 46:3, D,ebruary 
26, 1945. 
2 Howard Isaacs, "Ting Haos Shouts of Welcome Me t 
:&,irst Convoy to Kunmin g," Newsweek, 25 :36, l!1ebru ary 12, 
1945. 
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time , t said a GI on the r oad . •no you suppose th~y'll 
loosen up on our rotation now and let us go home? 
At the l ast bivouac just outs i de the city of Kun-
ming. the Ar~ washed down an d spruced up all the vehicles . 
Chinese drivers took ove r the wheels f or the entry into 
Kunming from the GI drivers who had brought the convoy 
through intact without a sin gle serious mishap . 
Firecracke r s r oare d as t he convoy passe d over Chine 
Pi Lu, Kunming 'a cobbled main street . With Genera l Lewis 
Pick in the le ad jeep. t he vehicles, decked with flags and 
. 
bunt ing, moved slowly between packed l anes of children , 
students , soldiers , and the massed common people of Kunmi ng, 
their faces alight with joy ove r the sp_e ct~le that symlLQ1-
1zed the end of China ' s i s olation . 
The people cheered, waved, and laughed, and as the 
oonvoy troops became overcome by the warmth of welcome, 
they began shouting gree tinge--mostly the universal "Ding 
Hao" (very 8 00dl . 
Estimates of what could be carried over the Stilwell 
Hoad varied \Videly from 30,000 to 100,000 tons a month, 
with the road ' s engineers clai ming about 60,000 tons a 
month could be carried. 4 Of course , the a c"b.l. al tonnage would 
3 Isaacs , !Q£ . c1t. 
4 Howard Isaacs . " I!11rst Truck to Kunmi ng. " News-
~. 25: 34 , January 29 , 1945 . -
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depen d on how lone oxucial sections of the Road s tood up 
under monsoon we ather. on the number of truoks made avail-
able , on tr11 ck and road nnintenan ce , ancl on the efficiency 
of road traffic oper ation . 
The tonn age m9n tioned se ems smal l in comparison 
with the f'ao t aatic amounts used up in the offensives in 
Iru r ope . However. atr and grouhd :force standards in Europe 
\'l ere i napplicable t o Ohina . 
Chinese armies do not consume even a r~ape ctable 
fraction of the weight an d volume of supplies usod by 
a t ypical American divis i on . Estimates are rough and 
vary according to ootnba t conditione, but a Chinese di-
visi on ( f i eure d at the r a re a t rength of 8 • 000 men) 
will consume . about 600 t ons of food an d ammun ition a 
month compared with about 5 000 tons f or an American 
division . Translated in to Chinese te rms an d Chinese 
conditions, the prospe ctive road tonnage , the a rgumen t 
runs , will have a speoifiQ military gravity far out of 
proportion to its weight , o 
5 Isaacs , 11Firat Truok to Kunmin g, " .!.Q.£. cit. 
CHAPTER X 
A. THI:P OVEH THE STILWELL ROAD 
Most of the Stilwell Road drivers we1~ negroes, who 
painted gaudy names 8J'ld piotul'es on their txuoka, just as 
though they were planes. 
In the oonstruotion of the J,edo Road, these men, 
bringing supplies and equi}lment to the men in the forward 
areas, played as important a part in this vast projeot as 
the man who operated the dozers and the graders or oarried 
on the battle against the Ja:ps, 
At times, the drivers were confronted with danger-
ous obstaoles, suoh as sniper and artillery fire, strafing 
attacks, and taking their tru eke thro ttgh slide are as Vlith 
showers of rooks raining nown on their vehicles. 
These rnan, both colored and white. wheeletl their 
truoka up and dCRin steep, slippery mountain roads and 
sweated out long hours in the oabs as bulldozers laborious-
ly pulled the convoys through fender-deep mud, The drivers 
worked long hours, day after day, stopping beside the road 
to eat oold rations and steal a few hours' sleei)• 
Through it all, they maintained a high degree of 
morale and developed a fresh road vernacular all their own.l 
l See a))lJen dix • 
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Along with the regular driver companies stationed 
at Ledo. volunteers were accepted to drive vehicles over 
the Road, Usually, once over the Hoad was enough for a 
volunteer, whereas, the regular drivers made as many as six 
trips. 
The routine for volunteer drivers in the Ohabua 
area was first to gather the men for each convoy in a stag-
ing area, usually abro. t two miles east of Ohabua. As soon 
as the vehiolea were serviced. the drivers we1·e taken to 
the convoy area to ohoose a vehicle for 1he long haul over 
the Road. As a rille, each convoy ran close to 100 vehicles. 
eo there were 100 drivers 11lua a few spares to insure com-
plete delivery. In choosing the vehicles, it was a matter 
of "first come, first served," reaul ting in a mad dash for 
olos,e d oa be. 
I\'aoh vehicle was then "gased up" and fox·med in con-
voy line for the forty-odd-mile trip to Ledo. The towns of 
Tinsukia, Makum Junction, where 1:he Bri t1 a h originally 
started the Hoad• Digboi, a smt\ll British oil t011n, and 
Margherita were passed through en route to Ledo. 
at Ledo• hopes were dashed of immediately making 
the trip over the Road, The monsoon was playing havoc with 
the Hoad :l.n the latter part of July, and also, each convoy 
had to wait its turn as staging facilities at each dtly's 
stop were inadequate to handle more than one convoy, A 
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seven- day l ayover in ~e do was made before proceeding over 
the Stilwell Roa d• 
Le do , a t iny railhe ad ba zaar fashioned in t o a huge 
militar y installs. t i on , was the peacetime tea ce nter of 
Assam. 
It ha d a normal popula tion of 2, 000, small but sur -
prisingly cosmopolitan . There were Briti sh tea grow-
era and other commercial repres entatives , natives of 
Ass am an d other Provinces of India , and a soatterine of 
Mongols , Tibetans , Burmese , and Chinese . The re al 
business activity of Ledo has shifted to the native 
bazaar , cove ring three blocks of one of the side 
streets . The na.t ivesL_ th~ks to the !Jedo Road , now 
have mor e2money than mey ve ever seen before; tra ding is brisk . 
On July 26 , a ll vehicle s were r e-se rvice d, which 
consi s ted of an oil chan ge , checks on transmissions , d i f -
feren tials , and tire pressure . 
On July 2 7, road clearan oe was given an d the order 
was issued t o proce ed over the roa d . All vehicles proceed-
ed to a point past t he Lakhapan i yar ds of the Ben gal and 
Ass am Railway, about 7 miles eas t of Ledo . There , final 
convoy orde r was f orzood . 
The fir st day ' a objective was to reach Shi ngbwi-
yang , about 103 m~.les from Ledo and over the rugged Patkai 
r ange . This drive was a severe teat for any vehicle • Many 
of the vehicles in the convoy were gas t rucks , cont aining 
2 Nelson Gr an t Tayman , "Stilwell Road- -Land Route 
to Chin a , " Th! liational Geogr uphio: 87:682- 3, June 1945 . 
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tanks filled with 750 gallons of gasoline and t owing 
trailers conta i n ing 600 gallons more. Seve ral of these 
heavy vehicles could not s t an d fue heavy strain and were 
laft a t repa ir s t ati ons along the route. The drivers were 
carried on as spares. 
Some of the fortunate drivers arrived in Shingbwi-
yang in the late afternoon and early evening . Othe :rs , hav-
ing difficulties, arrived as late as 7 A.M., of the follow-
in g day . The convoy was tra iled by a crew of mechanics and 
a 7-ton wrecker, which towed in a di sabl ed truck, 
The ascents up the summits of Pangsau Pass and 
to Tagap Hill we re tough, but the ascent up Chin glow Hill 
was terrific. Several vehicles broke down and had to be 
towed up to the re pair stat ion at the to p of the hill . The 
remaining seven miles to Shingbwiyane were mainly downhill 
and over soggy road. 
Shin gbwiyang is drenched with continuous r a i ns 
during tho mons oon season , which usually exceeds 200 inches 
of rain . The tar~n lies at the :foot of the Patkais , o.nd 
once was a l a r ge Kaoh i n village connected with the outside 
world only by dry-season trails, It was the J a.ps ' north-
ernmost supply base in Burma, until captured by the Amer-
ican-trained Ohtneae Army late in 1943. Shin gbwiyang was 
turned into a l arge Ame rioan sub-depot. 
The next l eg of the journey, on July 28 , was from 
PIGURE 16 
ROAD SCBNE IN NORTHERN 
BUBMA 
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Shingb\•iye.ng to Myitkyina, a distance of about 165 miles, 
Drivers took off when ready on one of the most enjoyable 
stre to he a of fue journey, 
Just outside of Shingbwiyang the road was widened 
and used as an emergency landing strip. Even though the 
monsoons were at their heighth, this section of the road 
was in excellent condition, It was wider, better surfaced 
with plenty of gravel, and both sides of the road provided 
a variety of soener,v. Overpopulated growths of wild ban-
ana trees fringed the road at intervals, At other places, 
the great mass of the rain forests drew right up to the 
roadway, waiting for a ohance to overlap it, In lower 
areas, hie;h elephant grass grew wild, or in cultivated 
places, the rioh green spreads of the rice paddies made 
their presence felt, 
In moist areas of Assam, Indian rice has a sickly· 
green Mlor, The lndioos do not rotate thelr crops and 
their plows barely penetrate the surface of the ground, 
The Burmese and Chinese rice showed a rich green healthy 
color, and one couldn't help but be impressed by their 
ability as farmers, 
Due to the level, well-surfaced road, most vehicles 
made it to Myitkyina Forks Convoy Area in four or five 
hours, although it was requested that maximum speed be 
held to twenty mil as an hour, Many bridges were crossed• 
FI GURE 17 
BURMESE ON ~PAD I N NORTHERN 
BURMA 
FIGU.RE 18. 
CONVO~. A'l! MYITKYINA FORKS 
FIGURE 19 
MYITKYINA FORKS SIGN 
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the mai n ones bein e; over the Taeik, Tarung , Tawan g, Tana1 
&l d Manpin Rivers. 
At myi tkyina , convoy drivers were given a one-day 
l ayover f or rest and repa ir. 
The convoy area was several miles below the Myi t -
kyina. .Ai rs trip, which in turn was about s even mile a s outh 
of the town of Myitkyina . The tree to ps were shattered 
along the road on the way in to Myi tky i.na. and there wa s 
much evidence of the s iege on the town itself. 
After the layover, the convoy was reformed and 
proceeded southwa rd on July 30. The next object ive was to 
re ach the town of Bhamo, 10'/ miles distan ce, which once 
was fu e third l arges t city of Burma . 
Wh~1t Wt\S heralded as the world ' s largest pontoon 
bridge, across the Irrawaddy River was cross ed . As the 
convoy swun rr southward through rice country , blue-colored 
mounta in s could be seen in the dis tan ce on both s ides of 
the roa d. Many of the Burmese hous es were built up on 
stil t s to avoid possi ble fl oo d o ondi tion e . 
About halfway to Bhamo, rollin g, red-soile d coun-
try was entered and continued for some t wenty miles . 
The l as t secti on of the r oad north of Dhamo was 
f a irly level and r an through beautiful te ak fores t s . Here 
and t he re a disabl ed tank was left t o t he el ements . 
Thi s r oad. built by the British. was asphalted an d 
WTRRINC!E . 
FIGURE 20 
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in fairly s ood condition . 
Again , the oonvoy drivers were. gi ven a one-day l ay-
over. Bho.mo was a shambles of de moli shed pagoda s end burn-
ed-out buildings , after it ' s 26-day eie c;e . The Jape tun ... 
neled under huge teak trees an d used them as forts . Mu.oh 
remaine d of destroyed J apanese war equipment . 
On August 1, the oonvoy moved on toward Wan ting , on 
the China border, a 135 mile trip . It was easy going until 
the Si nlumkaba Hill Tract was reached , whore the mons oon 
rains mixed with t he soft red soil an d held up tbe convoy 
f or two hours . Each vehicle had to be pulled through by a 
" cat" as it became mired down in a soft spot near the sum-
mit , 
Fast time was made on the down- erade to the Shweli 
Rive.r· Valley . 1\'ach s :tde of the river was covered by a 
tre mendous acre age of rioh green rice paddies . Rice , be-
i ng one of Burma ' s principal exports , was grown i n abun-
dan oe along the whole leneth of the river . 
The to wn of !lamkham. another of Bur ma ' s war-shat-
tered towns , was pass ed through on the eastern s ide of the 
Shweli River . Agai n , the road was fairly level until 
reaching the town of Mong-yu, a tiny Shan village on a 
hill overlooking the junction of the Ledo and. l3u.rma Hoads . 
From Mong- yu to Wanting , the r oa d wound around dry, ba rren 
hillS • 
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Wanting (960 kilometers from Xunming) is a handful 
of wstome buildings scattered among barren hills on 
the China-Burma border. Wanting was the scene of 
some of the bloodiest fighting of the Salween cam-
paign, ohangillg hands three tines before soldiers of 
the Chinese Expeditionary Force finally secured the 
town and drove the Jape on down the DurlJ¥;1. Road toward 
Lashio,3 
As the vehicles crossed the border, Criminal In-
vestigation Department officials examined for contraband. 
Limits were put on Bllch things as cigarets, atabrine tab-
lets, eto., as eaoh brought an exorbitant price in China, 
On August 21 the convoy left Wanting for a staging 
area just past the town of Lungling, about 60 miles dis-
tant, 
The towns of Chefaug and Mangshih were passed 
through over rolling hills, level stretches, and steep 
climbs, 
The Mangshih section of the road is not a good one, 
The soil is laterite, gravel, oo d shale. The country 
is hilly and many of the hills stand already at the:lr 
natu.ral angle, This means that any cutting on this 
natural angle upsets 1.he whole slope, which will sli(le 
completely at the slightest provocation,4 
All along the road in this area where the road had 
been out into banks, the Jape had dug oavea from which 
3 S/Sgt( o.M. Buchanan and Sgt. John R. McDowell, 
Stilwell Road Calcutta: Indian Preas Ltd,, 1945), P• 19, 
4 Frank Outram and G.Jr, Fane, "Burma Road, Back 
Door to China," The llattonal Geoe:raph;!.c1 76:638, November, 1940, -
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posi t:tons they fought until the end . 
Approaching J~unglin g , the nine-foot-wide road 
which had been paved with asphalt ye ars before showed some 
huge ohuok holes. It was understandable as the Chinese 
figured a paved road was good indefinitely and consequently 
put in little labor on it . 
Luneling i s a walled city on the edge of the Burma 
Road . The largest populated center on the road west 
of the Salween Ri ver, it served aa princi pal Jap sup-
ply outlet in tho Salween c ountry and was captured by 
the Chinese in November . 1944 , after a six- month ' s 
battle . Trtnslation of Lungling; Lung, dragon: ling, 
royal t omb . 
On August z. the tryi ng , yet majestic trip from 
Lungli ne to Paoshan was undertaken . 
After })ass in g through the natural hot springs are a 
of Huangtsaopa, which was used by the Jape for bathing. the 
convoy headed for Sungshan ( Pine Mountain) and higher 
ground . Sungshan is a 7. 000-foot promontory . 
The road are a in the vicinity of Sungshan had an 
estimated 4 . 000 duds to be oleared away wh en the Chi-
nese gained f ull control of the mountain , ar1d road it 
overlooked Sept . 6 .6 
Lameng . the first small Burma Road village west of 
the Salween was passed through and then the winding des-
cent to the Sal ween HiV'er bee;an . From the heights near 
6 Stilwell Road , Loo . oit . 
6 ~ .!2..6!!! the Burma Road . Publ ic Rol attons Off icer, 
Y- l!'orce Operati one Staff , Uni tecl St a tes A~dy : p . 10. 
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Lamen g, a beautiful IH:Ul orama of the Sal ween River Valley 
could be seen , comparing, a t times . \'Vj.th the colors of the 
Grand Canyon of the Colorado. 
On the de s cent, some of the gas trucks with trail-
era could not make the hairpin turns on first try and ha d 
to ba ck up a little f or a further effort. Below, about a 
sheer 4,000 f eet, was the winding Sal ween Hiver, 
It took severa l hours to get down to the Hwei Tung 
(Hwei-clever, Tung-through) Bridge oross .ing the river. The 
bridge was the lowes t plaoe on the entire route with an el-
eva tion of 2, 960 feet above sea level. 
In orossin t) the bridge, tm r oadway seeme d to rise 
up about three feet with a wavel i ke motion just ahead of 
the vehicle until i t re uched the middle of t he bridge. 
Completing the trip a crose t he l ast hal f of the bridge . the 
rollin g, wa.ve-like mot ion f ollowed t he vehiole until it vJas 
completely a oro sa . The s ame thing occured l ater on the 
Mekong River Bridge. 
The ascen t on the eastern side was wi nding and lon g . 
At one point , f acin g the river, many burned-out veh icles 
were stranded over the a ida of the road; evidently. they 
had been strafed by J apanese pl anes . On the eastern s ide 
of the Sal ween , the Chinese had made their s t and and held 
the J aps a t bay for two years. 
From the lowest spot on the Road, the convo y, with-
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in the next few hou rs , cl i mbe d to one of the highest 
spots-- the Kaoli Kung Mountains • I n plo.oe s , this mounta in 
spur ri ses to 12 , 000 feet , and for me a southern spur of the 
Himal ayas . Several cloud formations were passed throueh a t 
the summit . 
Approxi mately twenty-five miles southwest of Pao-
shan , the noo.d had been made t ank- proof by the Chin ese in 
1~y of 1942. Late in 1944• the Road was i mproved along 
t his se ct:ton. into u. t wo-1M e truck road. Many s igns of de-
fensive earth works were present as t h.J convoy drove 
through, 
In l ate afternoon. the ridge above Paoshan , ne ar 
Chukoyin, was reached and a good view of ' the green , arrable 
valley belbw was seen. 
Just befo re enteri ng the c onvoy station i n Paoshan, 
each vehicle was "gased up" at a pipeline service station , 
as ha d been done previously, and tmn the drivers pulled i n 
t o the convoy station for a one-day layover . 
Paoahan . meaning prote ctive mountain , is a walled 
town of fair aize \Vhi oh was extamsi_:vely -ru.-.:lned b-y-J-a1~ane se -
bombin g in May of 194 2 • 
On Aue;u.s t 5, the convoy })assed the arch E-'l. t Paoahan 
f' or a drive of some 100 miles to a s pot on the high\lay , 
just outside of Yungping . 
Thi s se ction of the Road presented s oroo of the be s t 
FIGURE 27 
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exampl es of OM.nes e te rrac ing und contour irr i gation , 
Before crossing the Mekong River, a tw o and one-
half ton truck, ca rryi ng loa ded gas drums be came i gn i te d 
an d burned in the mi ddle of t he road , The vehicles t ha t 
were f ollovline; were held up f or t\19 0 hours . 
The lloa d f ollowed t he river north f or about ten 
mi les and then t he crossing was made on the Kon g Ko Bridge 
( Heavenly Fruit ). 
The name Mekong i s used f or this stl'e am i n Indo 
China . but tc t h e Chine se it i a known as the Lantaang 
Kiane ( Beau t iful Vla.ves ). There a re t wo bridge s aero as 
t hi s s tream. Thi s river flows from Tibet, par al l els 
the Sal ween npart of tho way through Weste1·n Yunn an . 
China , forma part of the Indo Chin a an d Thailand ( Si am) 
boundat y and en tars the South China Se a a t Sai gon , 7 
I t was r a i n ine heavily as t he convoy came to a atop, 
s o t he june l e hammocks had t o be s trung up i n t he r ain . 
Many Chinese swarmed ou t of the mountai ns , irregar d-
le ss of ·~h'.:l r ain , and \n t h sacks of i nfl a te d Chinese 
money (ON), s trove f or bargain a with the Americans . I n 
turn t he Ame rioan n dicke r e d with t he Ch i nese for f r esh 
eegs . 
Ear ly t he nex t mornir~g , May 6 , the convoy l eft t he 
r oa d bivouac for t he long an d grueling tri p to Yunnanyi, a 
distan ce of about 125 mi les . 
The towns of Hwanglt enpo an d N i upi ngpu we re passed 
7 .!£..!! •• p . 6 . 
FIGURE 29 
YANGPI RIVER BRIDGE 
CHAPTER X 
A THil' OVER THE STILWELL ROAD 
Most of the Stilwell Road drivers were negroes, who 
painted gaudy names and pictures on their trucks, just as 
though they were Illanes. 
In the construction of the Ledo Road, these men, 
bringing supplies and equi}Jment to the men in the forward 
areas, played as important a part in this vast project as 
the men who operated the dozers and the graders or carried 
on the battle against the Jape, 
At ti~res• the drivers were confronted with danger-
ous obstacles, suoh as sniper and artillery fire, strafing 
attacJ.m, and takine their trucks through slide areas with 
showers of rooks raining down on their vehicles, 
These men, both o olore d and white 1 wheeled their 
tru oks up and do1vn a tee p, slippery mountain roads and 
sweated out long hours in the oabs as bulldozers laborious-
ly pulled the convoys through fender-deep mud. The drivers 
worked long hours, day after day, stopping beside the road 
to eat cold rations and steal a few hours' sleer, 
ThrOU!",h 1 t all, they mainta 1ne d a high degree of 
morale and developed a fresh road vernacular all their own,l 
l See appendix. 
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tlu·ough and then the Yangpi River Bridge was cz·ossed. The 
Road followed the river southeastward for quite some dis-
t ance . and average d around fourteen curves per mile ill this 
area. 
Near one rise close to t he Yangpi River. a slide 
held up about two .. thirds of the convoy for two hours . A 
bulldozer finally arrived on the s cene and cleared away the 
soft earth. r ocks. and one huge boulder. The drivers who 
got through before the s lide occure d got in to Yunnanyi 
early. 
The old fort and natural arch that defended tl:»3 
town of Tali. to the north. was s till visable. just before 
entering the town of Siakwan , 
Spr awled at the foot of 14 ,000-foot snow-crowned 
peaks· is the town of Si akwan . This is the commercia l 
cen ter of Western Yunnan Province an d t he in terseoti on 
of the Burma Road with caravan trails use d by tea 
traders from Shunni ng to the south and Tibetan traders 
from the north. Be yond the town are the icy blue 
wa.1:era of Erh Ha i Lake. 30 miles long and trafficked 
ex .. tenstvely by sailboats transportin g cr ude salt from 
mine s north of the l ake . Three towns fringe the l ake--
Si akwan 1 Tali and Sichow .a 
The Road was f ai rly level for many mil es. but jus t 
be yond Siukwan. the surfa ce became "washboard. 11 an d hard on 
the kidneys. 
Numerous burial grounds , with their at <l'l e and oon-
8 S/Sgt. c.M. :Buchanan nn d Sgt. John R. McDowell, 
Stilwell~ ( Calcutta : In di an Press Ltd •• 1945 )1 p . 22 . 
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crete mounds , were visa.ble from the highway . 
From the top of Mi tu Hill , about fifteen miles from 
Yunnanyi , a very s ceni c view could be had of the surround-
ing countryside and the towr1 of Mi tu 1n the dis t ance . 
The last of the convoy pulled in t o the conv oy sta -
tion at Yunnanyi l a te a t night • and well de served t he one 
day l ayover tha t was f orthc oming . 
"Yunna.nyi: ( Yunnan--Southern Clouds ; Yi-- Station) a 
snall open vill age of old buildings • n9 
The next day a Chinese washerwoman and her f amily 
appr oa ched the ar ea , tryi ng to drum up some business . Chi-
nese guards thre atened t o shoot to kill any Chinese ap-
pr oaching the convoy area , so an y vendors had to be ready to 
leave a t a moments notice , 
On Augtte t 0 , the c onvoy pulled out of Yunnanyi f or 
the next to the l as t l ap t o Tau~mg, an eighty-three mile 
trip , 
The small vill age of Pupeng was passed t hrough and 
then the highest point on the Road was rea che d in c rossin g 
the Tienatze Mi ao Po ( Tienatze Mi a o- - Temple of the Son of 
He aven ; I>o- - Mountainl , a t an eleva t i on of 9 , 200 feet .lO 
9 ! Log~ the Burma Road , Public Rel a tions Off icer, 
Y- Foroe Ope r a ti onsstaf!, Un'Ite'd St a tes .Army: p . 3 . 
10 llii .. p . 2 . 
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The smll village of Hsuchie was passed through and 
then the convoy rea ched Ohennan. Chenne.n i s a walled tcmn , 
smaller than Tsuyung. 
In the ear ly afternoon, Tsuyung was reached and the 
convoy drove into the convoy area. It had rained hard here 
the night before and several vehicle s slid off the road 
trying to oo ter the parking are a . 
Tauyung (Tau- - a small St ate dating to Con fu cius' 
time i n Central China; yung--hero) an old Chinese 
walled oity in a level valley. This is the se a t of 
the Tsuyung District Government,ll 
The co_nvoy left Tauyung early the next morning , 
August 9 , for the final objective, Kunming, 120 miles away 
and the delivery ... of the vehicles to the Chinese Nation al 
Government. 
Excellent, picturesque grade views were seen sever-
al miles out of Tsuyung. The severe gr a des were well cob-
ble d, e s11e cially around tho hairpin turn a. 
I Ping Lung (one flat wave) , a small town with 
modern factories an d buildings was passed t hrough . It's 
principal i ndus try was i n clarifyi ng and solidifying salt 
from the surroundine hills . 
Lufeng: ( Plenty of luck, derived from Lu--Luck) • an 
open villae;e and the seat of the Lufeng District Government 
11 A Lt~ of the Burma Road, l~blio Hel utiona Officer, 
Y- Force Opera ons ~ff, Uni~States Army: p , 2 , 
1 
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i s the l ast villa ge of any si ze on the ro ad to Kunmin.g ,l2 
The principal product of manufacture is s cissors. 
Approa chi ng Ktmming f rom the north, a l arge l a ke 
was s.een in the dis tan ce . 
Tien Chih : ( !l'ien is an othe r word meaning Yunn an ; 
Chih--Laka ). Thi s l ake ne a r the Burma Road on the 
south s ide just ou tside of Kunmi ng, has through the 
centuries gra dually become smaller. It is sti ll 
plied by thousands of native boats , an d steamer ser-
vice i s opera ted from Kunmin g to Kunyang . On the 
western hills, jus t west of Tien Ohih, are two 
Buddhist tem:z?l es: Huating.1 Temple and Taihua, bo th ac-ce s sible by Jee p, or auto. 3 
In l a te afte rnoon , t he convoy r ounded the northern 
and eastern se ctions of t he l ake, an d entered tho out-
skirts of Kun ming . After about un hour of s low driving , 
the convoy a r ea was rea ched and the veh:i.cles were parked, 
to await d i s tribution by the Chinese. 
Kunmi ng: ( Kun--s igns of e ood luck, g ood omen; 
min s --clear , bright) forme rly ca l l ed Tunnanfu: capi-
tal of Yunnan Prov. China. located a t 22 61 ' north of 
the equa tor an d 102 45 ' eaat of Greenwich. Ytm nan 
Trans l a tes to mean ' Southern Clouds . l4 
The first night, an Ame r ican a r me d guard was 
pl a ced over the con voy are a as Chi nese Communists i n Yun-
nan I'rovin ce had t he habit of making raids on the area 
an d ripping up the vehicles . 
12 ~ •• p . 1 . 
13 .A JJo r; of the Burma Road , loc . ill• 
14 Loa . ill · 
l 
FIGURE 36 
CONVOY SIGN--KUNMI NG 
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On the night of Augus t 11, 1945 , a report can~ over 
t he r a dio , a report tha t l.a. ter pr oved t o be premature , that 
the J apane ae Governme nt had made an a.rmi stioe with the 
Allies . Whe n the newa spread , everything see med t o go off 
i n the Kunmi ng a re a. from Homan candl es to seven t y-five 
millime ter guns . 
Americans had previously been warne d that the en d 
of t he war might brj,ng trouble in Yunnan Pro vince between 
t he Nationalist troops and the Communists. When the f ire-
works start ed, many American a thought that the oivil war 
had begun . IJ1.mg Yun . gove rnor of Yunnan Province , was 
placed under house a.rreat by Chiao g Kai- s hek a t the end of 
t he war an d was finully exiled to Hong Kong ,15 rJu Han took 
ove r as goveraor . 
American un i ts were usually given a two to four day 
l ay-over in Kunmin g before f lying bnck ove :c the Hump . So 
on Augu.a t 13 • 'this convoy unit was alerted and left at in-
t ervals during the day f or India . 
The fli ght ba ck took approxima t e ly three hours , a t 
a maximum a ltitude of ar ound 18 . 000 feet . Oxygen was 
bre a thed f r om i ndividua l masks for ab out two and one-half 
hours of the trip . C-46 tran sport8 ca rried moat of the 
me n bac::k to In di a . 
15 News article i n the Oakl an d Tribune, December 
29 ' 1948 . 
CHAPTER XI 
THE EN D OF TiiR STILWELL ROAD 
This conversa tion was reported by Richardson,! a a 
he flew into Burma in 1947, to inspect the Road: 
You can't see much of it, old chap,' a British 
officer told me. 'The l ast monsoon did it in. Al-
most all the big bridges are out and the l an dslides 
have finished it in the mountains. We don' t have any 
engi nee r a to speak of in this part of Burma, you kn ow • 
so I guess your road :I.a through forever •' 
When had the l as t trucks rolled the road, I wanted 
to know. Oh, s otm Indi an army trucks had made the· 
400-mil e run from Myitkyina to Ledo before the mon-
soons i n 1946. They were the last--the bridges had 
washed out after them and the surface had potholed. 
The jun gle was reclaiming its ow11, A few American 
seven- ton trucks were being used by some Chinese as 
comme rcial buses for a short stretch south of Myitky· 
in a . Otherwise The Road waa dead, all dead. 
The Irrawaddy bridge had been ripped apart by the 
monsoons. What was left of it was clinging to the shores 
on both aides of the river. 
Back in the Jambu Bum Hills, the jungle was 
stre tchine out its green fi ngers to take back the Road t ha t 
had once been part of it. 
The r a ins had washed much of the earth away, where 
the Hoad had been e rade d. In the fill s , erosion had set in • 
1 David Hiohardeon , "The Jungle • a Victory," Ne\v 
~epublic, 116:14, Februa ry 10, 1947. 
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splitting them like an earthquake . In other areas , 
l an nelides had a lmos t compl ete ly er ased the t hi n, man-made 
sca r on the mount a insides . 
Here and there along the Road was the rusting 
skeleton of a seven-ton truck or a bulldozer . Or the 
disordered remain s of a GI camp. with the basketball 
hoops an d backboa rds still up , or the be nches of the 
outdoor movie the atre r ow on row ,2 
An d so. as the need for t he Road vanished with the 
defeat of Japan i n August 1945, its upkee p as a peace- time 
arterial of supply proved too costly to the Burmese Govern-
ment , who had inherited it from Amerioa . Thus , the Stil-
well Road, as a oomplete arter y fro m Ledo , I ndia , to Kun-
ming, Chi na., also disappeared with the onrush of the mon-
soon rai ns of 1946 , 
2 ~ •• p . 
CHAPTRH XII 
SUMMARY ;\N D CON cr.~USIONS 
China , with her seaports rut off . and with other 
avenues of suppl y eliminated, had a def i nite ne ed f or the 
Stilwe 11 Hoad , i n order to survive as a free nation • 
.Arne rioa ' s foreign policy has al ways been the Open 
Door . During the years of China ' s struggle to su1~ivet we 
took it upon ourse l ves to help her a t a lmos t any cost . 
Thus , the Stilwell Road was a conth1uation of this policy. 
American supplies of ar n)S and equi pment, as well as 
te chnical and military advice . built up China ' s mora le and 
will to survive d.uring the war years . 
The old Burma Road was a tremendous undertaking, 
regarded by the Chinese as se cond only to the Great Y/all . 
It was clawed out of the mountainsides al mos t entirely by 
hand, as very little rood equipment was available • In it-
self , it was a stirring example of Chinese spirit and 
morale . 
The importance of the Hoad to China was never 
underestima ted by the Jay.anese as t hey struck to close it 
in 1942 . The ensuing defeat f or China an d t he West was a. 
t r agedy in world history . A terrific price was pa id to re-
gain what once could have been he ld wi th the proper l eader-
ship . 
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Almost everything that General Stilwell attempted 
to do for China was either undermine ,i by the Bri tiah or 
Chiang Kai-shek and his henchmen. However. Chiang did re-
frain from much interference in StHwell 1 s final drive in-
to Burma. 
!ro the undying will, de tez·n1in at ion and pn·aeve 1'-
enoe of General Stilwell goes moat of the credit for the 
completion and use of the Road. Without his driving 
spirit, it is doubtful if the Road, named in his honor, 
would have ever been completed. 
Of the three phases in the oonstruction of the 
Ledo Road--British, Early u.s., and Completion--only the 
completion period could be regarded as entirely successful. 
Full credit must be given to General Lewis A. Pick for his 
leadership and unswerving determination to see the job 
through. Also. 'the terrific job done by the l!.'ngineers and 
others who worked on the Hoad cannot go unnoticed. 
The unexpected spirit, courage and fighting quali-
ties of the Chinese soldier, that is unexpected by those 
other than Stilwell, made it possible for the Chinese to 
put on the first euooeasfuJ. modern offensive in history. 
Teamed with Merrill's Marauder's und aonl!l British units, 
they freed the Road. route, killed thousands of Japanese, 
and, at the same time, foroed the enemy to maintain strong 
foroee in the Orient. 
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The Hump a irline was not an effioien t arterial of 
supply, nor did it prove success f ul in moving heavy equip-
men t into China , Much he avy equiproont, a r ms, ve hicles , 
etc • • did re ach distribution points i n China on the com-
pletion ~f the Stilwe ll Roa d in J anuary 1945 to tbe time 
of 1 ts di s-wse i n 1946 . 
In the author ' s opinion , the Stilwell Hoad was a 
suoceeaful war-time undertaki ng, not only from the stand-
J:!Oint of Ame r ioan en ginee r ing skill . but also in 1 ts final 
achievement of getting the ne cessary su pplies into tl hard-
pressed China . It was mainly respons ible for mai ntai ni ng 
Chi na i n the war , and , at the same time r esulte d in a with-
holdins a ction of ene wJ troops fr om other vital theaters of 
war . 
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ll'ootnote 3• !'age 6 
21hia int'ol'lllntion wa'> ta.lten :trorns 
\Val ter a. Ma.llo:r;v. J.a!. 2J2!!l »oor JJl Ohiit* A ne-
awru.&aa:J.. Foreign Af:taires 2thltf'T;Ootober 47.--
!!.2.l1 19. BrU!!W: 
' The present moroont setnne a p•J.rticul!U'ly opportune 
one tor informing lter 111'1 tannin l.mjesty's Government of 
the deSire of the 11nitod Stt .. tn to see it make a :formal 
dtolaration end to lend ita SU.PlJOrt in obta.inine airnilar 
deola:rationa from the vo.riotte l'owe:re olniming 11spheru of 
inf'lu.enoe" in Ohina. to the e:f.'feot that eaoh in i te :ra• 
speotive spheres of interest or influenoe•• 
Firat, Will in no wise interfere with any treaty 
port or t\l'lf veute<l 1nteret!t within an;v eo•oalled "aphere of' 
interest" or leaaed territory 1 t mo;v have in China. 
second. fhat the Chinese tree.ty tariff of the tir1wt 
beinr, shall a.ppl;v to all merohandiee li'.nde d or ~~hipped to 
al.l suuh porta na a:r:e within eai.d "spltere of interest" ( un• 
less they be "f:ree :ports11 ), no tntltter to what m\tiona.Ht;v 
:l.t ma;r belong. and that duties so 11viablo slw.U be ool· 
ltoted by the Ohinue Oovernmen t. 
~hbd. 111lat it will levy no hir,her harbor dttel! on 
vessels of another nationnl:lty f:requeutint uny port in aueh 
"sphere" than slulll l>e leviad on ve£Hlels of ita own nation .. 
ality. m1d no h:l.p:her railroad chal'ges over linu built, 
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controlled• or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise 
belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities 
transported through suoh "sphere" than shall be levied on 
similar merchandise belone;ine to its own nationals trans-
ported over equal distances. 
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Footnote 8• Page 8 
This information was taken from: 
William c. Johnstone , The United States and Japan ' s 
New Order . (New Yorkt Oxford University Press , 1941 . } 
pp. 165-6. 
Disruption of transportation and communication fa-
oili ties throv.gh military operations and control . Japan-
ese occupation of coastal ports with the resulting ship-
pin g restrictions , delays , and congestion checked the 
movement of commodities through these ports. The closing 
of the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers to foreign shipping and 
the disruption of the north-south r ailway lines from 
Peking to Nanking and Hankow and from 1lankow to Can ton-· 
severed all the moat importan t arteries of trans portation 
and communication . thus blocking trade . The necessity of 
rerouting trade to ' free ' China . first through Canton and 
later over tho Indo- China-Yunnan railwey and the newly 
built Burma road, aclverse ly affected trade . These routes 
have been at all times severely congested and were not de-
s.i gned to handl e the large volume of trade resulting from 
the hostilities . The interior areas held by the Chinese 
Government have been almost lacking in roads and adequate 
transportation facilities . 
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Footnote 8, Page 8 
This information was taken from: 
William C, Johnstorle, The United States und Japan's 
New Order. (New Yorkl Oxford University Press, 1941,) 
pp. 174-5, 
Table 
United States Trade with Chinese Forts Not Under 
Japanese Oooupation or Not Occupied Until the Fnd of 1938. 
( Souroe: Chinese Maritime Customs Reports.) (Figures in Chinese Standard Dollars) 
United Statu 
Imports from 1936 1937 1938 
l!'ooohow 46.787 77,441 25.442 
Amoy 462 815 ------Swat ow 1.998,722 11,973,290 13,581,694 
Canton 2,904,290 4,340,017 3,268.760 
Kowloon 129,555 469.034 149,998 
Kongmoon 130,116 162,948 48,886 
Mengtz 1.060,645 396.028 369.376 
(Figures in Customs Gold Unital 
United States 
Exports to 
Chungking 
Ohangsha 
Ningpo 
We nohow 
San tuo 
Fooohow 
Amoy 
Swat ow 
259,251 
907,562 
28,315 
15,000 
27 
194,568 
361.,.093 
695,878 
260,319 
800,660 
48.529 
46,061 
999 
380,199 
407,841 
1,393, 767 
55,331 
2:32,220 
9.515 
74.880 
59 649 
849:088 
607,196 
1,203,604 
1939 
51804 
277 
5, 997,544 
52,257 
'70(; 
1.649 
600,390 
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Footnote a. ( continue d) . Page 8 
1936 1937 1938 1939 
Kowl oon 6, 051 , 850 8 , 187, 837 17 , 600,679 454 , 678 
Con ton 1 , 753, 870 2, 631 , 090 3 , 974 , 583 883, 421 
La ppa 104, 370 407,167 358 , 748 2, 051 , 522 
Kongmoon 164, 133 189,153 315, 967 120, 122 
Luiohow 100.012 144.418 838 . 593 1 , 183, 903 
Kiungchow 174, 809 324,969 477 , 182 156.918 
Pakhoi 29 . 272 110,158 83, 637 233, 546 
tungohow 18 795 , 8 , 539 7, 067 . 106 
Mengtz 613 . 069 790, 560 747 . 827 1 , 893, 349 
Trade through these ports has been affected by attacks 
of Japanese forces , by the blockade of the China coast , or 
by ocoupat i<Jl . 
~able 
Leading .tuneric ao Exports to China. by Value 
( Som- cos u.s. ·De p1r tfflen t of Commerce • Monthly Reports) (In thousands of dollars) 
Commodity 
Aircraft m d 
parts 
Motor trucks 
and busses 
Tin plate an d 
tageers tin 
An 11ine dyes 
Tobacco le a.f 
Non-me tal lie 
min~rals­
pe troleum 
products 
Ra.w cotton 
\(he at flour 
1936 1937 
1,106 3,962 
762 1 , 327 
1 , 917 2, 713 
1,539 1,393 
5, 967 6, 103 
4 , 494 5,963 
1 , 051 584 
negligible •• •• •• 
1938 
6 , 392 
2,591 
416 
492 
6, 221 
1 , 535 
2 060 
• 677 
~939 
1, 012 
3. 688 
1 , 276 
797 
6, 631 
2, 660 
14 , 203 
3, 136 
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Footnote 6, Page 50 
~his information was taken fromt 
Joseph w. Stilwell, ~he Stilwell l'e.~ers. (New York: 
Jl.rranged and Edited by Theodore I!, White, il!iarn SloMe 
Aeaooiates, lno. Publishers., lV48l, pp, 29~30. 
Stilwell had had lone; prewar service in Asia; he 
was regarded by the Art1y as its most accomplished student 
of Oriental affairs, He knew the government of China, had 
toured its battle fronts in the early years of the war 
against Japan, spoke and read Ohineoe. In earl1 January, 
he had been consul ted freguen tly by the General Staff on 
its plans for halting the Japanese advance. 
The one remaining effective bridge of contact be-
tween China and the ,ulied world was Bu.rrna. For AllX! rioe.n 
strategy it was vital that China be kept an active fighting 
power on Japan's farther flank, and it was more vital, then, 
to keep B~rma inviolate than to maintain any other point of 
danger in the line of defense that stretched from Rangoon 
in Burma to l'ort Darwin, Australia, three thousand miles 
south, 
At the end of Januar;;r, Secretary of War Stimson had 
invited Stilwell to dinner to disouss the China situation 
with him. ~heir friendship was to r.:row steadily during the 
war years. And to Stimson after their conversation it 
eeellX!d that Stilwell oould serve the nation more effectiv• 
ely, immediately, in Burma against the Japanese than in 
1 
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leM.ine: the indefinite fllld much-debated North 4f:rioan 
OBilllJ!l.ign • 
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A few dnylil after his tBlk with Stimson. St:t.lwell 
was aaked to aeeume responaUiU t;v for the ma.inlan d front 
~Aga.1nst the Jap~\lle<Ht. He dE!wnlded thu.t he be given fttll. 
OOI'.Illlli'J,ild powors over tlie Ohinue troops if he we:ro to uae 
thern ei'feot:lvel;;r in combat. Oh:l.ang K' u.1-~hek :promised 
these powora, 'rt11s Wi.l.S the first of SUlwoll's 100.n;v :rt'" 
quests for suoh authority, the firet of Ohiang'a lliiUJY pro· 
n.ilhHl • 
'l?aken from hill pltmJ.'ling desk as ooooander o£ Oper-
atiotl Gymnast, Stilwell colH;entrated at once on the 481aU.o 
front. l!e threw toe;etner a ckeleton at~.>:ff ae quickly ae he 
oould ootl plt\fJMd for mi1Fh'eb1-u.s.ry. In Du.rma, ~1 t1l1~ell 
hoped to co~ oz·din!.'lte Chinese tmd Dri tiah :fo l'QE!Il, between 
;qhom bitter emnity Wil@ (1evelop1ng, and. with them hOld a 
f:rout whhh cotaltt be made thll ju.ml'inr;·off line for & later 
offensive. 
' 
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Footnote 17, Pae;e 55 
This j.nformat:l.on was taken from: 
Fred Eldredge, Wrath in Burma. (Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday and Oompgny:-rnc., 1946,) pp, 48·9, 
Heasons why the Gissimo asked f.or an American chief 
must, of course, be based on supposition, In light of 
Chinese nature, politics, and subsequent events. it is rea• 
sanably safe to assume that Stilwell became Chiang's chief 
of staff for the following reasons: 
1, It was a flattering gesture to America, 
2. It was oharaoteristio of Chinese courtesy, 
3, Stilwell could be used to {)Gt bigger Lend-Lease 
allocations from the United States, 
4, He might be able to get American combat troops 
into the line in China. 
5. The post was harmle as in that 1 t was purely ad• 
visory anyway, 
6, Stilwell was sup]lOSed to be chief of an allied 
staff which he did not choose to organize be-
cause of poor Chinese security and because of a 
realistic :feeling that it wouldn't work, 
Heasona for Stilwell's unprecedented appointment to 
command for the Chinese Expeditionary Force are more obscure. 
The following reasons seem most logioal and are tossed in 
for what they are worth, 
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1, It was flattering again to America and Stilwell, 
2, Faced with the prospect of being held respons-
ible in oase of a defeat in a oampa:l.gn 11lready 
seriously handicapped, the American general 
could be counted on to fight that much harder for 
American Lend•Lease to stave off defeat and 
thereby protect his own military reputation. 
3, Chiang, beoause of hostility to the .British, 
would not aooe pt a British general in direct 
command over his troops, 
4, ~he Chinese lacked generals with experience in 
Weste :m lllJ thode of warfare • 
5, In case the Chinese should suffer a thorough de· 
feat, an American general would be a very handy 
character to have arouz1d when the responsibility 
was being placed, 
6,Undoubtedly the Chinese never meant to take 
Stilwell's authority seriously anyway, 
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Footnote 21. Page 57 
York: 
Tllis information was taken from; 
Fred Eldredge, Wrath !Jl Burma. (Garden City, New 
Doubleday and Company 1 InQ. • 1946,) p. 52, 
!n London • Churchill had a conv ersa ti on with Am-
bassador William }?hillips before the latter oame to India 
as :personal representathe of the 4'rea1dent of the United 
States, Churchill told Phillips at that meeting that 
l!'ranoe fell so ignominiously in World War II because she 
had been bled white in World War I, Winston Churohill said 
that th:l.e would not ha:PIHJn to a B:ri taii:l under his steward· 
ship, He !!lade no bones about his intention to fight a 
"cheap Will'," The Chinese were fighting their own kind of 
cheap war in China, not to preserve lives esse.ntially, but 
to preserve arms and combat units to fight the Comruuniata 
and others after the war, 
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Footnote 1, Paee 65 
This inforrmtion was t a ken from: 
Fred Eldredge , Wrath~ Burma , ( Garden City. New 
York: Doubleduy and Company , Inc ., 1946 ,) p . 130. 
Sir Stafford Cripps had been sent 1n India currying 
an in tcrim pr oposi t ion t o Gandhi , but 'the meeting was 
doome d to failu re . Gandhi calle d f or civil disobedience 
throughout the l and a nd demanded that the British quit 
India . He and hi s l eaders prom11tly we ro jailed, sett i ng 
off a bri ef , diaorgani zed ora of riots and sabotage, \'lhich 
upse t r ail communications for a time, bu t petered out 
through lack of avnilable lea dership, oreani za tio:n , and 
weapons . Jail ing of the Ooneress l e uders 1:1aa cons i dered a t 
first to be Lora JJinli thgow ' a great blunller , but it turned 
out t o be a master stroke f or the Viceroy, who accurately 
gauged India •s inability to stage an effective revolution 
wi th her articula te lea ders in pri son . The India Problem 
actually be came little more than a minor irritant to mili-
ttuy opera tions after two or three months , although i t ~ss 
l ater cite d as an alibi f or military i nactivity . 
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Footnote 2, l'aee 99 
This inforn::n tion was taken fromt 
The Bulletin Board of Norther11 Air Service Command, 
Ohabua, India, May, 1944. 
UpiJer A.saam 
Year A 13 Note: A- Total precipitation 
1926 86,61 147 
(inches) IJ.uring year. 
1927 105.72 172 B· number of days on wllioh precipitation 
1928 132,79 193 occured, 
1929 120,36 180 
1930 126,33 157 
1931 156.65 191 
1932 169,16 177 
1933 ll5,87 160 
1934 111.65 173 
1935 104,54 162 
1936 112,97 166 
1937 81,54 156 
1938 118,34 171 
1939 106.33 146 
1940 90,92 144 
1941 94.80 149 
1942 94,09 129 
1943 94 .ao 158 
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Total Average Precipitation pe r Month ( 1926 through 1943 ) . 
Month A B 
January 1 .55 6 
February 2 . 34 9 
March 3 , 84 11 
April 8 ,85 15 
May 13,33 19 
June 20.82 23 
July 19 .11 22 
August 17,29 21 
September 16 .66 18 
October 6.06 10 
November 1 . 29 4 
Decembe r 1,13 3 
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Footnote 1, Page 160 
This information was taken from: 
lir_~ Qonygy Ovir the ~-dQ Road, Publio Relations Offioer~oroepera ions Stirl,-un!ted States Army: 
p. 11, 
Cowboy--A driver who likes to drive fast, take 
chances on the mountain roads, Cowboyine is the "art of 
re oklo as driving." 
~ Hqpp:v--A driver who isn't content unless he 1s 
speeding. 
Foot in the Gqa Tank--Speeding. 
Gettin' '!!!!·-Shifting gears correotly--a highly 
prized art among the drivers, 
Tank One--To drive a truck into a bank when it goes 
--
out of oootrol in the mountains. 
R!U.ller ~--fo abandon you.r truok when it is out 
of oontrol, leaving it crash over the roadside end down in-
to the gorges below, 
Bootin' 1!--To drive along at a steady, mile-eating 
eatinr; pace. 
Cu.ttin' ll--To drive fast around curves in "the 
mountains. 
!QJlll-·'l'o get over a grade without having to 
shift gears. Drivers try to speed up going down a hill eo 
they can get over the next hill without shifting, 
Cockpit Drive--A driver who out-cowboys the cow-
bo ys of the road, 
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Wave .!.illY. Baok Wheels-- To pass another t ruck and 
leave ·it far behind ~ 
